Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.

September/October 2017 PF Brief

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1 Topic Analysis by Matt Salah

Matt Salah debated for four years at the Nueva High School in San Mateo, California. As a member of the first graduating class of his high school, Matt played a large role in founding and establishing the debate team at Nueva. Some of his most notable accomplishments include championing the Tournament of Champions (2017), the ASU Invitational (2017), and the Bronx Science Tournament (2015). He will begin school at Swarthmore college this fall, where he plans to study political science.

1.1 Background

The 2017 September-October Public Forum resolution is shockingly relevant. Since the beginning of the summer, North Korea has launched four missile tests (including two intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs), developed the capacity to strike most of the continental United States, and threatened to attack the US military base in Guam (only to later withdraw the threat), South Korea has halted deployment and later redeployed the controversial anti-missile system known as THAAD, and Trump has sworn to make North Korea sorry by bringing down “fire and fury.” Major news networks have aired round-the-clock coverage of the Korean threat, journalists have compared the situation to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and John Oliver wove together an informative expose of Kim Jong Un’s motivations (follow the footnote to find the video, it’s a fun way to start thinking about the topic).¹

How did we get here? BBC News offers an insightful chronology of the North Korean threat (I’m only including snippets—follow the footnote below to read the full timeline):

1946 - North Korea’s Communist Party, called the Korean Workers’ Party, inaugurated. Soviet-backed leadership installed, including Red Army-trained

¹Last Week Tonight. “North Korea: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO),” YouTube. 8-13-2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrS0uNBuG9c

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Kim Il-sung.

1950 - South declares independence, sparking North Korean invasion and the Korean War.

1953 - Armistice ends Korean War.

1972 - North and South Korea issue joint statement on peaceful reunification.

1985 - North Korea joins the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, barring the country from producing nuclear weapons.

1993 - International Atomic Energy Agency accuses North Korea of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and demands inspectors be given access to nuclear waste storage sites. North Korea threatens to quit Treaty.

1994 October - North Korea and the US sign an Agreed Framework under which Pyongyang commits to freezing its nuclear programme in return for heavy fuel oil and two light-water nuclear reactors.

1996 April - North Korea announces it will no longer abide by the armistice that ended the Korean War, and sends thousands of troops into the demilitarised zone.

1998 August - North Korea fires a multistage long-range rocket which flies over Japan and lands in the Pacific Ocean, well beyond North Korea’s known capability.

2000 June - Landmark inter-Korean summit takes place in Pyongyang between Kim Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, paving the way for the reopening of border liaison offices and family reunions. The South also grants amnesty to over 3,500 North Korean prisoners.

2003 January - North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, marking the beginning of a series of six-party talks involving China, the Koreas, the US, Japan and Russia to try to resolve the nuclear issue.

2006 October - North Korea conducts its first nuclear weapons test at an underground facility. The UN imposes economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea.

2007 July - North Korea shuts down its main Yongbyon reactor after receiving 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil as part of an aid package.
2009 May - North Korea carries out its second underground nuclear test. UN Security Council condemns move in June.

2011 December - Death of Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un presides at funeral and takes over key posts by April.

2013 February - UN approves fresh sanctions after North Korea stages its third nuclear test, said to be more powerful than the 2009 test.

2016 November - UN Security Council further tightens sanctions by aiming to cut one of North Korea’s main exports, coal, by 60 per cent.

2017 July - Pyongyang test fires a long-range missile into the Sea of Japan, with some experts stating the missile could potentially reach Alaska.

2017 August - Tension rises in war of words with US over North Korean threat to fire ballistic missiles near US Pacific territory of Guam.²

While this timeline is far from all-encompassing, it demonstrates the trajectory of the North Korean threat: while attempts to reduce the threat and mend relations have succeeded in isolated instances in the past, those successes have short-lived and the threat has continued to grow.

One response to North Korea that isn’t mentioned in the BBC’s chronology is the military decision to deploy anti-missile systems to defend South Korea—the subject of the September/October resolution. The basic objective of missile defense is both to deter missiles (nuclear or otherwise) from being launched in the first place and to shoot down missiles in the case that they are fired. Each anti-missile system uses a slightly different mechanism to destroy missiles and is designed to counter different range missiles (short, medium, intermediate, or intercontinental). Most missile defense systems also include extensive radars networks to detect incoming projectiles. In the framework section below I discuss the specifics of the pertinent anti-missile systems, but the approach generally consistent: prevent enemy missiles from hitting their targets. The resolution is asking if that response to the North Korean threat is good for South Korea.

1.2 Framework

1.2.1 Whose missile defense?

This resolution, like many recent public forum resolutions, is vague enough to give rise to a variety of framework debates. One of the first questions that comes to mind is who’s deploying the missile defense? Nothing in the resolution specifies that South Korea is the country deploying the anti-missile systems, which may lead many teams to get creative and advocate for or condemn Japanese or even Iranian missile defense. While I think this interpretation of the resolution is grammatically valid, I would caution teams against this approach for a number of reasons.

First, I think the wording of the resolution strongly implies that teams should be discussing South Korean missile defense because it’s most directly connected to South Korea’s best interests. For example, most people would agree the resolution “eating an apple is in my best interest” indicates that we are debating whether or not I should eat an apple. Moreover, it seems silly to debate whether a decision completely out of South Korea’s control (such as whether or not China deploys missile defense) is in their best interest. Second, even if under this resolution we could debate global anti-missile systems, I think debaters need very good justifications for why we should. Absent this justification, it seems most sensible to default to a discussion of South Korean anti-missile systems. It’s also unclear that specific examples prove the resolution true in the general sense. This is especially true for the negative, as the affirmative can simply argue they don’t have to defend bad examples of missile defense. Finally, there is compelling evidence that the framers intended this topic to be centered around South Korean missile defense. Many members of the topic committee even went as far as to detail their thought process when coming up with the resolution on a lengthy Facebook thread.

So in conclusion, I think most debates will and should be centered around anti-missile systems that South Korea deploys, but debaters should be prepared to answer arguments (with framework or substance) about other countries’ missile defense.

1.2.2 Which missile defense?

So if we are talking about South Korean anti-missile systems, which ones? Fortunately, the most of the arguments I’m aware of on this topic don’t rely heavily on specific technological details but rather support or criticise missile defense in general. That said,
it is very important that debaters have a basic knowledge of the types of anti-missile systems that affect South Korea’s national security.

While there are a variety of anti-missile systems that defend South Korea, most debates will center around the deployment of the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. I believe that THAAD will be the focus because it continue to be a hot-button issue (a Google search of South Korean missile defense reveals pages and pages of results about THAAD) and because we are in the midst of THAAD’s deployment, while other anti-missile systems have existed for many years or will not be feasible until far into the future. Callum Paton at Newsweek provides a detailed summary of THAAD’s purpose and capabilities:

Developed by the U.S. the THAAD is a land-based anti-ballistic missile system that is capable of shooting down missiles inside or just beyond the earth’s atmosphere. The Missile Defense Agency that oversees the development of THAAD states the weapon system can intercept and destroy ballistic missiles at any trajectory in their flight, either in the final, or terminal, phase as they move towards their target. The THAAD uses kinetic energy, instead of carrying an explosive component, to destroy incoming warheads. Yvonne Chiu, an expert on military policy, told CNN that because the THAAD interceptors do not carry a warhead and destroy missiles by colliding with them, they are “potentially safer” and less likely to cause a nuclear explosion. “If you hit a nuclear ballistic missile with a missile with no warhead, it would hopefully not cause a nuclear explosion,” she said. Similarly, the high-altitude intercept capability lessens the effects of weapons of mass destruction before they reach the ground. The anti-ballistic launcher is truck mounted and carries eight reloadable interceptors. Its radar is the largest air transportable high-frequency radar in the world, according to the Missile Defense Agency. Developed by the primary contractor Lockheed Martin, the THAAD was first proposed as a response to the threat of Scud missile attacks by the Iraqi armed forces during the First Gulf War in 1991. The U.S. first deployed the anti-missile system in 2009 in Hawaii to counter the threat of a North Korean attack.3

However, THAAD is not the only missile defense system that might be discussed in rounds. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, used by the US Navy to shoot

down intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is also likely to come up as the US has a large naval presence near South Korea. Similarly, KM-SAM (also known as Cheolmae-2, Cheongung or M-SAM) is an indigenous system (developed locally in South Korea) designed to counter medium-range missiles. Finally, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) has announced plans to create a more extensive and integrated indigenous anti-missile system, and while those plans have been complicated by the deployment of THAAD, they are potentially still reasonable ground for debate.

1.2.3 How much missile defense?

The final and perhaps most unclear framework issue: what do the affirmative and negative worlds look like? As has been a trend with recent resolutions, the framers seem to want debaters to answer the question as a normative statement: does this trend of missile defense deployments make South Korea better off? In my opinion the problem with this type of resolution is that without a clearly-delineated policy action, it quickly becomes difficult to know for certain what changes occur when you affirm (or negate). And without that knowledge, it’s nearly impossible to prove the resolution true or false.

For this resolution, I think there are two potential approaches to this topic. The first (and likely more common approach) is to equate the affirmative with a specific missile defense system (usually THAAD). Under this framework, affirming deploys THAAD (or potentially some other system) while negating halts THAAD’s deployment. In the case of THAAD, the affirmative appears to be the status-quo, while with other anti-missile systems the negative is likely to be the status-quo. The second approach is to significantly broaden the topic and ask if South Korea would be better off with or without missile defense as a whole. Under this framework, the negative criticises all anti-missile systems and is thus a radical departure from the status-quo, while the affirmative supports the continued existence (and perhaps expansion) of missile defense in South Korea.

I believe these approaches are equally valid—the first one leads to a more clear-cut debate while the second one perhaps answers the entire resolution more completely. In some cases, this framing question can make or break an argument, and other times it is relatively inconsequential. Regardless, debaters should be prepared to engage in these highly divergent interpretations of the resolution, and should come to tournaments prepared to defend their framework.
1.3 Pro Arguments / Strategy

1.3.1 Safety from North Korea

Perhaps the most common and also most intuitive argument in favor of missile defense is that it protects South Koreans from the North Korean nuclear threat. In my opinion, there are two parts to this argument: proving there is a large chance of war with North Korea, and proving that missile defense will resolve that threat.

Proving that North Korea poses a significant threat to South Korea seems simple, but it’s an extremely necessary part of this argument. In national circuit debates this part of the argument will be referred to uniqueness: since war is likely in the status-quo the affirmative’s benefit of preventing war from happening is “unique” to their side of the resolution. Having a strong uniqueness claim also allows the affirmative to worm out of any potential turns the negative puts on their argument. In this case, even if the negative proves that the affirmative makes North Korea more likely to start a war, if the affirmative wins that war is inevitable in the status-quo it doesn’t really make a difference.

In general, many academics seem to agree that North Korea poses a real danger to the South. International relations professor Bruce Bechtol argues:

There is no ambiguous set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and most dangerous threat to the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK). It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the ROK–US alliance and the most important foreign policy issue between these two allies. As survival of the nation-state is the number-one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK.4

The more specificity the pro can provide for how and why Korean war will break out the stronger their argument will become. Not only is it more persuasive to have an extremely detailed and well-explained scenario, but it will also make it harder for negative teams to answer the argument with generic evidence that says North Korea isn’t a threat.

One convincing argument that war in the Korean Peninsula is inevitable is the concept of miscalculation—when either side pushes the envelope too far without anticipating their enemies reaction. Gordon Chang writes in the Daily Beast:

Young Kim [Jong Un], for instance, could continue to miscalculate. “They will hold to the mistaken belief that the international community will not call its bluff and will eventually back down to ensure stability on the peninsula,” Maxwell says, referring to the North Koreans. “But I think the times they are a changing and it will not be business as usual as it was for the past six decades.” Whether through miscalculation, desperation, or bluff, the North Korean leadership could make a dangerously wrong move. The next batch of North Korean missiles, therefore, could be launched not east toward open sea but south, where 28,500 Americans help guard 49 million South Koreans.⁵

Similarly, many scholars believe North Korea, with its struggling economy and political system reliant on repression, is at risk of undergoing a state collapse. Sungtae Park of the Council on Foreign Relations posits:

[North Korea] is the only existing nuclear-weapons state that could see a sudden internal collapse... In a collapse scenario, the Kim regime will also be making decisions under enormous psychological pressure and with a great sense of paranoia... During a collapse scenario, these psychological factors could greatly increase room for miscalculation or misperception for the Kim regime, particularly if it loses hope for survival and lacks access to reliable information, creating an environment that might even lead to the accidental launch of nuclear-tipped missiles. If stable nuclear-weapons states had come close to using nuclear weapons multiple times before, what might a collapsing, paranoid North Korea do with its arsenal?⁶

The second equally important part of this argument is how anti-missile systems would neutralize the Korean threat. The Heritage Foundation’s Bruce Klinger has written several articles about why THAAD is an essential upgrade to South Korean defenses. In one, he writes:

In conjunction with the already-deployed Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential, multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD is better than any system South Korea has or will have for decades. The Patriot system only has a 30 km altitude and 35 km range capacity, compared to the 150 km altitude and 200 km range of THAAD. Seoul’s planned indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile system would only have a 60 km altitude and 150 km range—both less capable than THAAD—and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023.\(^7\)

Yet on top of merely shooting down missiles after they are launched, many scholars believe that missile defense can deescalate conflicts before they happen. Brad Roberts, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues:

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It:
1. Creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of the attacker.
2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage.
3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor.
4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy.
5. Reduces the political pressure for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping to free the United States and its allies from escalation decisions that might seem premature.\(^8\)

Overall, I think the safety from North Korea is the most strategic pro argument because the impacts can easily outweigh any con argument. In other words, if the pro team wins that war is likely in the near future, and missile defense has some risk of preventing that war, then the affirmative is likely to win the round given how devastating nuclear war would be (especially in the context of the Bechtol evidence, which indicates that when comparing various nuclear threats, Korean war is by far the most threatening).


1.3.2 The US-ROK Alliance

The other common pro argument is likely to regard the United States and South Korean alliance. The media seems to be obsessed by this subject—a plethora of THAAD-related news stories detail the tension South Korea’s initial refusal to deploy the system has created in the alliance. Not only is the continued deployment of THAAD important to retain South Korea’s confidence in the American security guarantees, but South Korea’s reversal on THAAD has caused the Trump administration to question South Korea’s commitment. In the context of the THAAD controversy, Scott Snyder from the Council on Foreign Relations wrote in June:

If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. 9

One of the most crucial aspects of the US-ROK alliance is that it shelters South Korea under what is known as the US nuclear umbrella—a promise that the US will defend South Korea with nuclear weapons if the country were to be attacked. Due to the nuclear umbrella, South Korea has no need to develop nuclear weapons of its own. However, many fear that without confidence in the US alliance (and therefore the nuclear umbrella), fueled by fears of North Korea and China, South Korea would undergo a nuclear breakout. Indeed, David Feith of the Wall Street Journal writes last November that:

Even as majorities of South Koreans have told pollsters since the 1990s that they support nuclearization, policy makers in both capitals have been overwhelmingly opposed. That may no longer be so. Several potential candidates in South Korea’s looming presidential election back nuclearization, including former National Assembly floor leader Won Yoo-cheol and Nam Kyung-pil, governor of the country’s most populous province. Mr. Cheong, who acknowledges that “experts and technocrats have tended to be against going nuclear,” says that officials have privately expressed greater interest since Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test in September. Once Pyongyang completes a hydrogen bomb, he says, “many experts will switch their views.” Then there’s Donald Trump. If he sticks to supporting South Korean and

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Japanese nuclearization, he might as well hold a bonfire of traditional U.S. nonproliferation dogmas on the White House lawn. Even if he reverses course, though, his record of denigrating U.S. allies has already made South Koreans and others more fearful of abandonment and therefore more likely to hedge their bets and consider going nuclear, despite the costs.\(^{10}\)

THAAD, however, could potentially reverse this trend by restoring confidence in the alliance. For example, Daniel Pinkston argues:

> Many critics fail to appreciate the role THAAD plays in reassuring Seoul in the shadow of Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities. There is strong support in South Korea for nuclear breakout, it almost certainly would occur if not for the U.S.-ROK alliance. If South Korea were to seek a nuclear deterrent, it seems implausible that Japan would not follow. This scenario is not in the interest of China, Russia, the U.S., or any nation with the exception of North Korea.\(^{11}\)

I think this argument has a lot of potential, especially because of how it interacts with many of the con arguments. If the con, for example, tried to argue that THAAD would anger China or North Korea (arguments I will touch on below), the pro could correctly point out that South Korean nuclearization would anger China and North Korea to a much greater extent. One potential shortfall of this argument is that it’s difficult to prove unequivocally that absent THAAD, South Korea will acquire nuclear weapons, as the chance of that seems relatively low in both worlds. Regardless, I believe this argument can be very effective.

1.4 Con Arguments / Strategy

1.4.1 Chinese Backlash

I believe that the main con argument will likely be Chinese backlash to the THAAD system. The Economist succinctly outlines China’s principal concerns about the system (the article goes on to explain why China’s reasons are illegitimate, but it explains why they are angry nonetheless):


China has expressed two related criticisms of THAAD, which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defence. The first is that the powerful radar that THAAD uses to track and hit targets has the capability of “seeing” far into China and thus could be used to undermine the effectiveness of China’s own nuclear arsenal. The second is that the system, which is designed to intercept and destroy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their descent (terminal) phase, at altitudes of 40-150km, would not be effective because Seoul is so close to North Korean missile launchers. The implication, again, is that China is the real target.12

Chinese backlash has a number of implications, all of which can be used in rounds to make an effective negative argument. For one, China has placed unofficial sanctions on South Korea for the deployment of THAAD, which have significantly hampered South Korean economic growth. Since China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, any decline in their economic ties certainly runs counter to South Korea’s best interest.

Similarly, many have warned that THAAD might spark a regional arms race, with China already beginning to build up arms in order to guarantee they can penetrate the system if they ever need to. Gerry Mullany and Chris Buckley reported in the New York Times last March:

The United States said on Tuesday that it had begun deploying an advanced and contentious missile defense system in South Korea, prompting China to warn of a new atomic arms race in a region increasingly on edge over North Korea’s drive to build a nuclear arsenal.13

Arms races not only drain the economies of the countries involved, they also present a sharp rise in tensions that can spark regional instability and raise the chance of miscalculation (which, as discussed above, can have devastating consequences).

One other potential implication of damaging South Korea’s relationship with China is that China is the only country with enough leverage to force North Korean cooperation. Con teams could potentially argue that by deploying THAAD, China will become unwilling to assist with the goal of getting North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons

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and therefore make a peaceful resolution of the conflict less likely. In a recent article for The Diplomat, Robert Kelly summarized China’s importance in resolving the North Korean threat:

South Korea increasingly needs China to get any measure of good behavior, much less unification, out of North Korea… South Korean President Park Geun-Hye must now dote on Beijing to bring about any kind of movement on North Korea, and in the longer term, any hope for unification now depends on Beijing’s willingness to one day cut off North Korea. So long as Beijing pays Pyongyang’s bills, provides it diplomatic cover at the UN – where it recently blocked a reference of North Korea to the International Criminal Court – and provides it with an unstated defense guarantee against the United States, North Korea will continue to stumble on. The road to Pyongyang now runs through Beijing.14

This argument can be particularly effective for the con, in part because, unlike the pro arguments mentioned above, the ramifications of China’s anger have already started to play out in the real world. Having empirical proof of your arguments certainly helps you make a much more persuasive case.

1.4.2 Angering North Korea

Similar to the previous argument, another con argument could be that deploying missile defense will anger North Korea and make them more aggressive. Even though anti-missile systems appear solely defensive, they limit North Korea’s offensive capability and therefore North Korea is likely to perceive them as provocative.

I think there are two major implications of this. First and most directly, the con can argue that North Korea will simply increase funding for their missile programs to compensate for the strategic disadvantage THAAD represents. Not only would this increase regional tensions and therefore the chance of miscalculation, it would also likely take out the pro argument that relies on THAAD protect South Korea from potential strikes, making it a very strategic negative position.

Furthermore, con teams can argue that taking a hardline stance on North Korea by deploying missile defense trades off with effective diplomatic efforts. For example, South

Korea’s new president Moon Jae-in wants to reignite diplomatic efforts with the South in line with the “sunshine policy” of the early 2000s. CNN reports:

South Korea’s president has doubled down on diplomacy at a time when tensions all around him are rising. Days after North Korea announced it had successfully tested its first operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), South Korea’s Moon Jae-in declared he’d be willing to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “at any time, at any place” – circumstances permitting. Speaking in Berlin ahead of G20 talks in Hamburg, Moon said the reunification of East and West Germany gave him hope that peace could be achieved on the Korean Peninsula. “To Korea, which is the last divided nation on this planet, the experience of Germany’s unification gives hope for unification, and at the same time shows us the path that we need to follow,” he said. Moon’s defense of diplomacy echoed former President Roh Moo-hyun’s “sunshine policy” towards Pyongyang, and his predecessor Kim Dae-jung’s “Berlin Doctrine,” outlined in the German capital 17 years ago.15

While the jury is still out on whether these diplomatic efforts can truly reduce the North Korean threat, they are certainly worth a try and could potentially be the only viable way out of the conflict in the long term. If negative teams can show that THAAD inhibits the success of diplomacy or even causes North Korea to outright refuse engagement, then THAAD would be contributing to a more unstable and dangerous Korean Peninsula. Overall, I think the argument that THAAD would anger North Korea is intuitive and an easy-sell to judges, making it an incredibly viable con position.

2 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

Austin debated for four years at Trinity Prep (FL). Austin served as team captain his senior year. During his debate career, he reached the octafinals at Tournament of Champions, broke at several bid qualifying tournaments, and qualified to NSDA nationals and CFL nationals.

2.1 Argument Guide 1: THAAD can protect South Korea from missiles.

This is perhaps the most argument on the topic. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a United States anti-missile system which has been partially deployed in South Korea. Two THAAD batteries have been deployed at the time of writing, and there are more planned to be deployed. The most direct argument possible would be the ones related to whether the system can shoot down missiles from North Korea in the event of a war, and this guide will go over the evidence on THAAD’s efficacy.

2.1.1 THAAD has a high likelihood of intercepting missiles

THAAD has a great track record of tests - 100 percent successful

[Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, staff writers, “U.S. THAAD missile defenses hit test target as North Korea tension rises”, Reuters, July 11, 2017]

In the latest test, a THAAD in Kodiak, Alaska, intercepted a ballistic missile target that was air-launched from a C-17 aircraft flying north of Hawaii, the Missile Defense Agency said in a statement. A defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the test took place early on Tuesday. This success leaves THAAD with a 100 percent track record for all 14 intercept attempts since flight testing began just over a decade ago. Lockheed Martin
Corp (LMT.N), the prime contractor for the THAAD system, said it could intercept incoming missiles both inside and outside the Earth’s atmosphere.

THAAD’s success has been greater than comparable anti-missile systems - it has better technology.

[Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, staff writers, “U.S. THAAD missile defenses hit test target as North Korea tension rises”, Reuters, July 11, 2017]

THAAD’s success rate in testing is far higher than the one for America’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is designed to shoot down an ICBM headed for the U.S. mainland. That GMD system has only a 55 percent success rate over the life of the program, stoking fierce criticism from groups including the Union of Concerned Scientists, a non-profit science advocacy group. But advocates say the technology has improved dramatically in recent years. The GMD system successfully shot down an incoming, simulated North Korean ICBM in a test in May. That led the Pentagon to upgrade its assessment of the United States’ ability to defend against a small number of ICBMs, according to an internal memo seen by Reuters. A ground-based missile defense system, THAAD is designed to shoot down short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

2.1.2 Responses to “THAAD has a high likelihood of intercepting missiles”

THAAD can be overwhelmed since it takes an hour to reload.

[Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, analysts at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins,“THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do”, 38 North, March 10, 2016]

While THAAD can provide an important additional capability to protect for South Korea, a critical question is whether Pyongyang’s large missile inventory will afford it opportunities to overwhelm the postulated one-to-two THAAD battery architecture. A single THAAD battery holds a limited number of ready-to-launch interceptors, likely ranging from 48 to 96. Spare interceptors can be stockpiled, though at great expense. This implies that one THAAD battery can defend against 20 and 50 attacking missiles if two interceptors are assigned to each incoming warhead. If additional interceptors are available, the launch canisters can be reloaded within an hour or
so. However, there is no assurance that North Korea would pause firing its missiles to allow THAAD to reload. And given that North Korea has hundreds of Hwasong and Nodong missiles, one can easily recognize how large the defenses would have to be if the mission was to attempt intercepts on all incoming missiles over an extended time. Further, the AN/TPY-2 fire-control radar is limited in terms of the number of objects it can track while also providing updated guidance information to the interceptors in flight. Once again, if North Korea launches more than roughly 20 missiles simultaneously, this would likely saturate the radar, as it would necessarily be tracking 60 objects at once. The precise limitations are classified, though it is clear that if the objective is to blunt large salvos from North Korea, at least two or more THAAD batteries would be required.

THAAD may not be able to defend against a barrage or swarm attack

[James Pearson, journalist, “Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South”, Reuters, March 7, 2017]

THAAD’s job is to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in its final phase of flight, either inside or just outside the earth’s atmosphere. But with its specifications secret and having never been used in wartime, THAAD’s ability to deal with a barrage of missiles at the same time is uncertain. “The use of multiple shots, timed ever-more-closely together, appears destined to re-hearse saturating a defensive system by presenting it with an overwhelm-ingly complex radar picture,” Joshua Pollack, editor of the U.S.-based Non-proliferation Review, said of Monday’s launch.

Could potentially be overwhelmed by only a few missiles

[James Pearson, journalist, “Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South”, Reuters, March 7, 2017]

Most experts believe North Korea would likely need to fire off more than four ballistic missiles at one time to inundate a THAAD battery - perhaps 10, according to Michael Elleman, a U.S.-based rocket expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “I would be disappointed to learn that four attacking missiles would overwhelm THAAD,” he said. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin declined to comment. “The specific number of threats (THAAD) can engage at once is classified, but we have successfully
demonstrated the ability to engage multiple targets,” Pentagon spokesman Gary Ross said.

THAAD can’t defend against submarine launched missiles


Lastly, to protect against missile attacks launched from North Korean territory, all of the PAC-3 and THAAD radars would necessarily be pointed north. If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a submarine-launch ballistic missile, as it has been attempting over the past year or two, the missile defenses discussed above would be ineffective against the missiles fired from the waters east, west and south of the lower Korean peninsula.

North Korea is trying to exploit the north-facing THAAD batteries

[David Axe, journalist, “North Korea Assembling Arsenal for a Nuclear Sneak Attack”, The Daily Beast]

But at present, the United States lacks an effective defense against a short-range, submarine-launched rocket targeting South Korea. THAAD’s powerful radar points north in order to detect rockets coming from North Korea, leaving most of southern South Korea open to attack from other directions. And the GMD interceptors in Alaska and California lack the range to protect South Korea. “The missile defenses… would be ineffective against the missiles fired from the waters east, west, and south of the lower Korean Peninsula,” Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek Jr., analysts at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins, warned in a 2016 report. Pyongyang is apparently eager to exploit that vulnerability. In April 2016, North Korea test-fired a rudimentary rocket from one of its small, diesel-fueled submarines.

Even with primitive technology, North Korean subs can change the regional balance

[David Axe, journalist, “North Korea Assembling Arsenal for a Nuclear Sneak Attack”, The Daily Beast]

The 2016 test was outwardly unimpressive. The submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM, traveled only 18 miles. The sub itself is an older design that probably can’t reliably cross the Pacific Ocean in order to threaten
the continental United States. “I certainly wouldn’t want to be on a North Korean submarine,” Eric Wertheim, an independent U.S. naval analyst and author of Combat Fleets of the World, told The Daily Beast. “They’re not the safest of underwater platforms.” But an SLBM and its launching vessel need not be too technologically advanced to upset the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. It need only sail a short distance from its base and lob a missile at a city that THAAD’s north-facing radar doesn’t cover. “The SLBM is good for shooting behind THAAD at targets in South Korea, so the system is useless,” Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert who blogs at Arms Control Wonk, told The Daily Beast.

THAAD can’t protect from an ICBM

[Jeffrey Lewis, journalist, “Are You Scared about North Korea’s Thermonuclear ICBM” Foreign Policy, February 19, 2016]

As North Korea prepared to launch the latest Taepodong-2, Japan deployed an American-made PAC-3 missile defense battery in downtown Tokyo just as it had in 2012. (I was in Tokyo a few days before the launch. My friend, Kyle Mizokami, pointed out that the battery was just a short walk from my hotel in Shinjuku.) After the launch, South Korea and the United States announced that the two countries would discuss deploying another U.S. missile defense system known as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea. It might seem that deploying missile defenses is a sensible response to a missile launch, although if you know much about either PAC-3 or THAAD you’ll be scratching your head. After all, THAAD and PAC-3 are what is known as terminal defense systems — they defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as they come back down to Earth. They have no capability to defend against a Taepodong-2. Space launches, of course, don’t come back down. THAAD and PAC-3 would have fire at the missile as it going up, during its boost phase, a capability that neither possesses.

Tests are scripted to make THAAD seem effective

[Jeff Daniels, “South Korea’s THAAD missile shield could be ‘overwhelmed’ by swarm-like attack from North”, CNBC, July 13, 2017]

Critics say, however, that the military’s testing may not reflect the danger of swarm-type attacks by multiple incoming ballistic missiles from North
Korea or other enemies. Such a scenario could overwhelm or confuse the system and render it useless. “While the THAAD system does have a good number of interceptors, I can imagine it getting overwhelmed by sheer numbers,” said Laura Grego, a missile defense expert and senior scientist in the Global Security Program for the Union of Concerned Scientists. Similarly, Grego said the U.S. military’s May 30 test of the “less mature” GMD system designed to protect the U.S. homeland from ballistic missiles has flaws and was “not challenged in the way they would be [in] a real-world scenario.” “We generally say they are scripted for success. They don’t have challenging countermeasures of the type that a really dedicated adversary would include,” Grego added.

2.1.3 Defense of “THAAD has a high likelihood of intercepting missiles”

Even if THAAD is imperfect, it can still improve South Korea’s defenses

[Michael Elleman and Michael J. Zagurek, analysts at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins,“THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do”, 38 North, March 10, 2016]

The deployment of one or two THAAD batteries in South Korea would substantially enhance its capacity to defend against a North Korean missile attack. To be sure, there is no perfect defense against ballistic missile attacks, but the probability of greatly reducing the damage resulting from missiles with conventional warheads increases when THAAD is incorporated into the defense architecture. When viewed through the lens of providing maximum protection from a North Korean missile threat, accepting the American offer to provide THAAD to the Republic of Korea is a prudent and defensible policy decision for Seoul.

Even in a barrage/swarm attack, THAAD would have a high likelihood of preventing missiles from reaching South Korea and would minimize their effect

[No Author, “Why China is wrong to be furious about THAAD”, The Economist, March 23, 2017]

It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that faced with 50-missile salvos, a layered defence consisting of South Korea’s Patriot system and two THAAD batteries (another
may be deployed when it is available) would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles. The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.

Layered and integrated systems can defend against a barrage attack

[James Pearson, journalist, “Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South”, Reuters, March 7, 2017]

North Korea theoretically had enough launchers to send at least 36 ballistic missiles of various types at the same time, said Joseph S. Bermudez, a strategic advisor at Allsource Analysis Inc and contributor to the 38 North Korea monitoring project. To counter that risk, South Korea, Japan and the United States have installed layers of different missile defenses that can work together to reduce the threat. “If all three nations and their assets are integrated – and they can be integrated, there are systems for doing that – then the system has a synergy that is quite remarkable,” Bermudez said. In addition to the new THAAD system, South Korea also operates a Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system while Japan is upgrading its PAC-3 defenses and mulling a shore-based version of the Aegis missile-defense system used on Japanese ships.

Additional THAAD batteries may be deployed

[Reuters Staff, “South Korea’s Moon orders talks with U.S. to deploy more THAAD units after North Korea ICBM test”, Reuters, July 28, 2017]

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered discussions to be held with the United States on deploying additional THAAD anti-missile defense units following North Korea’s test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, his office said on Saturday. Moon also wanted the United Nations Security Council to discuss new and stronger sanctions against the North, the presidential Blue House said following a National Security Council meeting. Two units of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system have been deployed by the U.S. military in a southern South Korean region, with four more planned but delayed over concerns about their environmental impact.

[Harry J. Kazianis, journalists, interviewing Dan Sauter of the Business Development
Sauter: THAAD is the right solution today for improving ballistic-missile defense capabilities and architectures around the globe. THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds an essential layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts. The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in an awesome display of the BMDS in action. While it is not appropriate for us to comment on other non-U.S. and non-Lockheed Martin systems, we believe that there is no other system in the world that can compare to THAAD’s unique capabilities (Endo-Exo capability against current and emerging advanced threats, hit-to-kill technology to destroy an array of missiles and payloads, extraordinary Mass-Raid capability, deployability and tactical mobility, interoperability with other BMDS elements, etc) and proven record (100 percent mission success record in nine years of rigorous developmental and complex operational BMDS testing—including 100 percent mission success and eleven for eleven intercepts, successful first operational deployment support strategic stability, delivering first THAAD foreign military sales ahead of schedule, operational readiness rate that far exceeds U.S. government standards, growing U.S. and international demand for THAAD, etc).
2.2 Argument Guide 2: THAAD Upsets China

One argument is that THAAD and its radar system upsets China and can have greater geopolitical consequences on South Korea.

2.2.1 THAAD upsets China

Both China and Russia have stated opposition to THAAD

[Reuters Staff, “China, Russia share opposition to U.S. THAAD in South Korea: Xi”, Reuters, July 3, 2017]

BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping set off on a visit to Russia on Monday stressing the grave threat a U.S. anti-missile system in South Korea poses to both Chinese and Russian interests. China has repeatedly stated its opposition to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and has called for its deployment to stopped, and the missiles already installed to be removed. China says the system’s powerful radar can probe deep into its territory, undermining its security and a regional balance while doing nothing to stop North Korea in its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

Russia and China have closer ties over THAAD

[Reuters Staff, “China, Russia share opposition to U.S. THAAD in South Korea: Xi”, Reuters, July 3, 2017]

“Beijing and Moscow are steadfastly opposed to the THAAD deployment and seriously suggest that relevant countries stop and cancel the installation,” Xinhua cited xi as saying. China and Russia would take “necessary measures”, either together or independently, to protect their interests, Xi said, without elaborating, according to Xinhua. Xi also said China and Russia should work together to boost trade and increase investment and financial cooperation, Xinhua reported. Xi will arrive in Moscow for a state visit on Monday before traveling to Germany to attend a G20 summit. Relations between China and South Korea have been strained by the THAAD deployment though both sides have struck a more conciliatory tone since President Moon Jae-in took office in South Korea May.
Canceled Talks over THAAD

[Jeff Daniels, journalist, “China says no thanks to talks with South Korea, Japan as THAAD remains contentious issue”, CNBC, June 29, 2017]

China has called off plans for top-level talks with South Korea and Japan, according to reports. The trilateral summit was expected to take place in late July. Beijing notified Tokyo that that time won’t work, although the controversy over the U.S.-supplied THAAD missile shield system appears to be the main reason, according to Japan’s Asahi Shimbun.

South Korea wants to continue deployment in spite of Chinese opposition

[Jeff Daniels, journalist, “China renues call for Seoul to halt THAAD amid ‘shocking’ news of new launchers”, CNBC, June 1, 2017]

That said, Moon insisted Wednesday that he isn’t seeking to reverse the current deployment arrangement between Washington and Seoul, which was reached last July. Regardless, defense analysts said much is at stake because of the continuing threat from North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs. “You’ve got folks who are in place, elected by the people, who are not representing them well,” said John Venable, a U.S. Air Force veteran and senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative think-tank. The defense expert added: “There is no harm in having the THAAD system in place. It’s a political talking point that a politician wants to use to distance himself from America.”

THAAD’s radar may undermine China’s nuclear deterrent by seeing China’s nuclear weapons


The Chinese government worries that the American antimissile system, called the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, could erode its nuclear deterrent — its ability to scare off potential foes from ever considering a nuclear attack. Its chief worry is not that Thaad could take down missiles: the system offers a canopy of potential protection over South Korea, but does not have the reach to bring down China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. Instead, China’s complaint is focused on Thaad’s radar system, which Chinese experts have said could be used to track the People’s
Liberation Army’s missile forces. Deploying Thaad’s current radar system “would undermine China’s nuclear deterrence by collecting important data on Chinese nuclear warheads,” Li Bin, a nuclear weapons expert at Tsinghua University in Beijing, wrote last week. He and other Chinese experts say the radar could identify which Chinese missiles are carrying decoy warheads intended to outfox foes. That would be like being able to see what cards China holds in a nuclear poker game, and that could weaken China’s deterrent, they say.

China may abandon its no first strike policy


Last week, the Global Times, a stridently nationalist Chinese newspaper, warned in an editorial that China could consider abandoning its “no first use” policy if Thaad leads to other antimissile systems deemed threatening to China.

China may lose its first strike capability


The second hypothesis is, I think, more convincing, and one where Beijing may have legitimate concern about the Gyeongsangbuk-do AN/TPY-2 radar upsetting U.S.-China strategic nuclear stability. Specifically, China may — correctly or incorrectly — fear that its nuclear second-strike capability is significantly degraded as a result of a third U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar going up specifically near the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. To avoid the need for a massive nuclear build-up and to feel comfortable with its several hundred or so nuclear warheads for targeting, China needs to feel comfortable enough its intercontinental ballistic missiles can reliably penetrate U.S. antiballistic missile countermeasures. Pre-THAAD-in-South-Korea, a Chinese ICBM launch would still have been exposed to the AN/TPY-2s in Japan, but that exposure alone wouldn’t have been enough to reliably help U.S. ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Alaska get a convincing edge against incoming Chinese warheads. (Set aside GBI’s patchy success record for the moment.) With a third AN/TPY-2 in South Korea, the resolution
of U.S. data on incoming Chinese warheads would potentially be greatly enhanced. Specifically, China may fear that penetration aids for its ICBMs — such as decoy warheads — would be degraded, lowering the certitude that its existing arsenal would be sufficient for penetrating past the U.S. ABM apparatus. Theoretically, a triangulated AN/TPY-2 setup between Japan and South Korea could give U.S. midcourse interceptors in Alaska enough warning to have a better shot at an incoming Chinese missile.

This intelligence on China can undermine mutually assured destruction


Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.

2.2.2 Responses to “THAAD Upsets China”

US officials have stated that THAAD’s mission is to protect against North Korea, not China


American officials claim that THAAD serves to protect against a North Korean, not a Chinese, attack. According to a joint statement issued by American and South Korean officials in 2016, the anti-missile system would “en-
sure the security of the South and its people, and [protect] alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.” And, most importantly, the system is “focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third party nations.” American officials sought to ease China’s anxiety by offering a briefing on the technical details of THAAD. As then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “We realize China may not believe us and also proposed to go through the technology and specifications with them…and prepared to explain what the technology does and what it doesn’t do and hopefully they will take us up on that proposal.” Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters in South Korea simply, “There is no other nation that needs to be concerned about THAAD other than North Korea if they’re engaged in something that’s offensive.”

THAAD does not give any additional intelligence on China

[Robert Kelly, associate professor in political science at Pusan National University, “The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD”, National Interest, June 13, 2017]

THAAD captures this problem well, because China’s objections are almost certainly not technical. THAAD does not impinge on China’s strategic deterrent against the United States. Its anti-missile rockets do not have the range for that. THAAD also does not give America any new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to observe China. The United States already has excellent satellite coverage of China and would rapidly detect a Chinese missile launch. THAAD’s X-band radar, about which so much fuss has been made, does not point into China. Unlike an I-band radar (the sort one sees at airports or in the movies), the X-band does not rotate 360 degrees, generating imagery of China. Rather it projects northward, as its intended target is North Korea.

THAAD radar won’t penetrate into China

[Robert Kelly, associate professor in political science at Pusan National University, “The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD”, National Interest, June 13, 2017]

Chinese (and Russian) objections that it might then penetrate into northeastern China (or the Russian far east) are also specious. The curvature of the
Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

earth means that the X-band signal begins to peel away from the earth after several hundred miles, so coverage north of North Korea is limited too. As its name implies, THAAD is a defensive system. It is designed to shoot down incoming missiles as they approach a target. Unless China, or Russia, intend to strike South Korea or Japanese cities, there is no threat to them. Repeating all this, however, is almost besides the point now. The Chinese (and the Russians) know this. Beijing had ample years before the Park deployment decision last summer to raise technical concerns. It forewent all such opportunities. This strongly suggests a political motive, which Moon’s transparently phony excuses to drag out deployment only further verify.

China is just trying to exert its influence over South Korea, not unique to THAAD

[Robert Kelly, associate professor in political science at Pusan National University, “The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD”, National Interest, June 13, 2017]

So once again, THAAD is victim to South Korea’s tough position between the United States and China. As China rises, it exerts pressure on its neighboring states, as most large, expanding states do in their locality. Beijing can mask such pressure in bogus technical language—suggesting that THAAD peers into China, or that South Korean imports suddenly require new health and safety inspection—but these are obvious fakeries. And indeed, Beijing may want them to be flimsy enough so that South Korean elites can actually see the steel in the glove. Beijing’s real objection, of course, is the deepening of the South Korea–U.S. alliance, which THAAD represents. THAAD is technically confusing enough that muddying the waters on it masks an open Chinese power-play, but to those who understand THAAD, Beijing’s objections are shallow enough for the real message to come through: that South Korea should not further its military relationship with the United States.

If THAAD doesn’t provoke China, something else will since THAAD is not the root cause of the division

[Robert Kelly, associate professor in political science at Pusan National University, “The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD”, National Interest, June 13, 2017]

This sort of decision point, or fork, is almost certain to recur with greater frequency for South Korea. China is growing relative to the United States.
As the gap between them diminishes, pressure will rise on China’s neighbors. South Korea’s ability to walk between the raindrops—to find political spaces congenial to both the United States and China—will invariably contract. THAAD and the Moon government’s decision to once again get on the deploy-or-not merry-go-round is only the beginning. Tussles like this will become a defining feature of South Korean foreign policy.

China is overstating the ability of the radar


Chinese experts are nearly unanimous in supporting Beijing’s criticisms. But quite a few foreign experts say those fears are overstated or unfounded. The United States already has access to radar systems in Qatar and Taiwan able to peer at China’s missile tests, and Japan has two radar systems just like the one used for Thaad, Mr. Lewis said. “I don’t see the deployment of Thaad in South Korea as a significant improvement in the ability of the U.S. to monitor Chinese missile tests,” he said. The Chinese government appears to have an exaggerated view of the Thaad radar’s abilities, two experts, Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan L. Fearey, wrote in a recent paper. That radar is often said to have a range of about 620 miles. Some Chinese experts say its reach could be much farther. But in practice the range could be much lower and “not possess the ability to track Chinese strategic missile warheads/decoys,” Mr. Sankaran and Mr. Fearey wrote. “The Thaad radar simply cannot cover the entire or even a substantial part of the Chinese mainland.”

China is not likely to abandon its no first strike policy


But for now at least such threats are bluster, said many experts. China is far from taking a dramatic step like abandoning its bedrock nuclear policy, they said. “I don’t see ‘no first use’ going soon — at least most responsible officers and officials stick to the policy, despite ongoing debate behind the scenes,” said Douglas H. Paal, a China expert who worked on the National Security Council under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

China will instead try to evade US missile systems rather than change whole policy of
Instead, China is likely to respond by spending more on its nuclear, missile and antimissile forces “to ensure survivability of a second-strike force, and expanded penetration aids and decoys to defeat U.S. missile defenses in the event of a second strike,” Mr. Paal said. In the shorter term, China may accelerate the introduction of a new generation of missiles, the Dongfeng-41, which can be moved around on roads and will also be able to carry multiple warheads, said Mr. Fravel and Ms. Cunningham. China is also working on a “glide technology to alter the trajectory of a warhead as it nears its target, which could be used to overcome U.S. missile defenses in the long term,” they said.

China has refused to come to agreement over THAAD - shows they aren’t actually concerned about it

However, by that same token, China has turned down good faith offers from the United States for technical talks and consultations on the THAAD deployment in South Korea. The Obama administration, looking to assure China that the deployment wasn’t all a ruse to hurt China’s interests, invited Beijing to talks as early as a year ago. “We will be very glad and hope we’ll have the opportunity to sit down and talk with China about those very technical limitations and facts about the system,” Rose Gottemoeller, the former undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, had said at the time. China rebuffed those offers. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying noted last year that THAAD was “certainly not a simple technology issue” for China.

### 2.2.3 Defense of “THAAD Upsets China”

China is not convinced by U.S. assurances


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The Chinese are far from convinced. According to state news media, President Xi Jinping has said that THAAD will not solve the North Korea problem, and accused the U.S. of “using responding to a threat as a pretext to unilaterally deploy missile defense systems in Europe and Asia, causing serious harm to the strategic security interests of countries in the region.” Li Bin, an academic with expertise in arms control, explains that Chinese officials are worried THAAD’s radar system “would undermine China’s nuclear deterrence by collecting important data on Chinese nuclear warheads that the United States could not acquire from other sources.” With a relatively small nuclear arsenal, China is worried that surveillance of this kind would undermine its ability to strike back if attacked by the U.S.

Even if THAAD’s radar is not enough, it could open the door to future anti-missile systems which might undermine China’s strategic interests


Even so, China’s real, underlying worry appears to be that Thaad could open the door to a much wider, more advanced fence of antimissile systems arrayed around it by America’s allies, several experts said. That would magnify Chinese worries about the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent, and entrench Chinese fears of encirclement by a coalition knit together by a shared antimissile system. “I think this is what really worries them, because then what you have is the basis for a common interoperable system,” said Michael J. Green, the former senior director for Asia in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. “I think it’s more about the creation of a virtual collective security system,” he said of China’s worries about Thaad.

China has specifically pointed out radar as biggest issue of THAAD deployment


For China, opposition to THAAD is simple: it’s all about the X-band AN/TPY-2 radar unit that accompanies the interceptor battery and aids in targeting. The radar unit has yet to be delivered; it is expected to arrive in South Korea in April. To be clear, China hasn’t been coy about specifically pointing to the radar issue. In fact, it has been explicit. Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi has made multiple references to the “X-band radar” that accompanies the THAAD battery, pointing out last February that it “goes far beyond the defense need of the Korean Peninsula.” This isn’t a case of Beijing nebulously stating its opposing to the deployment in terms of its national inter

2.3 Argument Guide 3: Sanctions

This argument guide deals more with the impact level than Argument Guide 2 examines. In order to curb THAAD, China has placed informal sanctions on South Korea with the goal of dissuading them from using THAAD. This will also examine the effect of THAAD on sanctions against North Korea.

2.3.1 China’s unofficial sanctions have hurt the South Korean economy

China has put economic pressure on South Korea because of THAAD

[Jethro Mullen, journalist, “China’s ‘unofficial’ sanctions rattle South Korea”, CNN, March 3, 2017]

South Korean businesses were rattled Friday by signs that the deployment of a controversial U.S. missile system in the country could spark a travel boycott by China. The government in Seoul said it believed Chinese authorities had told travel agencies in Beijing to stop selling trips to South Korea, intensifying fears of a trade war between the neighbors. The Chinese government, which is upset about South Korea’s decision to host the THAAD missile defense system, denied any knowledge of such an order. “Instead of chasing shadows that don’t exist, we hope the South Korean side will heed the voice of the people and take concrete actions to avoid causing further damage to bilateral relations,” said Geng Shuang, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At least one Chinese travel company, Tuniu, has already stopped sales of South Korean trips with immediate effect. The online travel firm said in a statement Friday that it objected to the THAAD deployment and a decision by the Lotte conglomerate to make land available for the missiles.

China is South Korea’s biggest trading partner
South Korea is China’s third-largest trading partner and China is South Korea’s largest, with the latter exporting up to $142 billion per year to the country, according to a report released by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

South Korean tourism, a sector affected by sanctions, depends heavily on China

Tourism between the two countries has also boomed, with South Korea seeing a 27% increase of tourists from China (3.8 million) in 2016, according to non-governmental research institute, the Union of International Associations – largely thanks to the popularity of hallyu – Korean pop culture – which has been a hit among young people in China and the rest of Asia since the 1990s. THAAD’s planned deployment puts such trade and cultural relations at risk – Oh says China’s hallyu market is worth just under $1 billion. Exporters of Korean dramas, pop music and shows, said Oh, were now trying to “withdraw from China and recommit themselves to old and new markets.”

Sanctions on South Korea can get worse and official

South Korea sold goods and services were worth roughly $124 billion to China last year, about 25 percent of the country’s total exports. Some local analysts have suggested businesses begin scouting new markets, as THAAD poses a formidable barrier to resolving the trade dispute. In the meantime, Ahn suggested Seoul use a mediation provision in its FTA with China. It’s essentially a channel, he said, to discuss non-tariff issues when it’s unclear if the problem is intentional. But Ahn is not hopeful about resolution. “I think the situation will become worse,” he said. He said it’s likely THAAD will be fully deployed and China will eventually formalize its economic sanctions against South Korea. But even if China backs off its pressure, Ahn said, it’s
inevitable that South Korean companies will expand into other markets because of growing competition in China, as well as increased labor costs and standards. “That’s an unavoidable direction.”

Quantified impacts on South Korean sanctions

[Shuli Ren, journalist, “China’s Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink Korea’s Economy”, Barrons, March 5, 2017]

China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in China. China’s travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea’s GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. Chinese tourists, who come as part of tour groups, contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea’s economy, or 0.5% of its total GDP. Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP. So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea’s GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse.

2.3.2 Responses to “China’s unofficial sanctions have hurt the South Korean economy”

China has been easing the unofficial sanctions since the South Korean election


And some see signs that China is already beginning to loosen its ban on the import of South Korean cultural products such as television shows and entertainment performances, as well as group travel by Chinese tourists to the country. The shift started with signals from the top late last week. On Friday, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with an envoy of South Korean President Moon, he said Beijing was willing to work together with Seoul to “properly handle disputes” and “put China-South Korea relations back onto a normal track.” Over the past few days, reports in the Chinese state media have noted signals that the ice-breaking may have already begun. Two South Korean musicals already have performance dates in Beijing and
Shanghai. “Bballae,” which means laundry in Korean, will begin in late June. Performances of another musical, “My Bucket List,” will begin in Beijing and Shanghai in August, reports said. According to a report in the National Business Daily, which was also carried in the Communist Party-mouthpiece People’s Daily, 4,000 Chinese employees of an unnamed medical equipment company are reaching out to travel agents in Seoul to book a group trip to South Korea.

China willing to renormalize relations with South Korea

[Ben Blanchard, journalist, “China says willing to put South Korea ties back on track , urges THAAD resolution”, Reuters, May 18, 2017]

BEIJING (Reuters) - China wants to put ties with South Korea back on a “normal track”, President Xi Jinping said on Friday, but Beijing also urged Seoul to respect its concerns and resolve tensions over the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system that it opposes. Relations between Beijing and Seoul, strained by disagreement over South Korea’s hosting of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, have taken on a more conciliatory tone with the election earlier this month of President Moon Jae-in. Xi told Moon’s representative Lee Hae-chan on Friday that his visit showed the importance the new South Korean leader attached to relations with Beijing, “China, too, pays great attention to the bilateral ties,” Xi said in comments in front of reporters in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. “We’re willing to work with South Korea to preserve the hard-won results, properly handle disputes, put China-South Korea relations back onto a normal track and benefit both peoples on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual respect,” he said.

2.3.3 Chinese relations are key to North Korean sanctions

North Korea depends on Chinese oil

[Tony Munroe and Jane Chung, journalists, “For North Korea, cutting off oil supplies would be devastating”, Reuters, April 13, 2017]

BEIJING/SEOUL (Reuters) - Isolated North Korea doesn’t consume much oil, but curbing or cutting off its supplies in retaliation for further nuclear or long-range missile tests would be painful and potentially destabilizing
to the regime of Kim Jong Un. U.S. officials have told Reuters that an oil embargo is among tougher sanctions Washington could pursue to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Separately, the Global Times, an influential Chinese tabloid whose stance does not necessarily reflect official policy, said in an editorial on Wednesday that “Chinese society” would approve of “severe restrictive measures that have never been seen before, such as restricting oil imports to the North,” if Pyongyang engages in further provocative activity. China, which supplies most of North Korea’s crude, no longer reports its oil shipments to the country, but according to South Korean data supplies it with roughly 500,000 tonnes of crude oil annually. It also exports over 200,000 tonnes of oil products, according to U.N. data. Analysts said the impact of a full oil embargo on Pyongyang would be so damaging that China, which opposes any measures that could fuel instability in North Korea, would be unlikely to take that step or agree to such a measure in the United Nations Security Council, where it has a veto as a permanent member. “If China cuts off oil supply, North Korea would not survive on its own for three months and everything in North Korea would be paralysed,” said Cho Bong-hyun, who heads research on North Korea’s economy at IBK Bank in Seoul. “This could increase the possibility of North Korea’s collapse and have an adverse impact on China as well. China would rather consider reducing crude oil supply,” he said.

China has used oil embargoes to add pressure in the past

[Tony Munroe and Jane Chung, journalists, “For North Korea, cutting off oil supplies would be devastating”, Reuters, April 13, 2017]

Much of North Korea’s energy is supplied by abundant domestic coal, but oil is used by the military as well as in transport and agriculture. “Cutting off all oil for an extended period of time, perhaps indefinitely, is probably the toughest economic punishment that China could impose on North Korea. It is highly unlikely that China would take such a step,” said Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It is possible that it might reduce the flow, stop oil deliveries for a week or two, but not cut it off entirely.” In 2003, China’s oil pipeline to North Korea shut down for three days after a missile launch, adding to pressure on Pyongyang to draw back from nuclear brinkmanship. Chinese officials said then it was a mechanical breakdown, but some experts said it was deliberate.
2.3.4 Responses to “Chinese relations are key to North Korean sanctions”

China will not enforce sanctions on North Korea

[Robert E Kelly, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University, “Why THAAD in South Korea is a Red Line for China”, National Interest, January 18, 2017]

Politically, South Korea has tried for years to work with China on the underlying issue—North Korea’s missilization—to no avail. South Korean president Park Geun-hye launched a three-year charm offensive to flatter the Chinese into a tougher line on North Korea. South Korea has consistently reached out to China to work on North Korea sanctions at the United Nations. Seoul has said THAAD is only a stop-gap measure until its own Korean Air and Missile Defense is completed. It is very obvious that South Korea wants some kind of deal with China on North Korea. The THAAD decision came only after years of prevarication, during which Seoul would likely have made major concessions for serious Chinese action on the North. Yet the Chinese will not budge on THAAD, nor will they seriously enforce the sanctions. They warned South Korea for years not to accept THAAD and, in the last year, have threatened various punishments. Stephen Haggard conveniently brings together the many, often quite petty, ways in which the Chinese have struck back. Beijing is essentially demanding that South Korea remain defenseless—“roofless”—in the face of a spiraling nuclear missile threat on its doorstep. That is an astonishing ultimatum: to effectively surrender South Korean national security over an existential threat to demands of a foreign power. That China would make such a demand regarding an issue where the developments all broadly support the South Korean position—the North Korean missile threat is blatantly obvious, as is the South Korea’s thin defense—shows all the more chutzpah on Beijing’s part. The Chinese “argument” against THAAD is so preposterous that it is hard to read its demands against Seoul as anything but bullying power politics.

China has not informed provinces of sanctions

[Megha Rajagopalan, journalists, “The coal loophole: doubts on China’s will to enforce North Korea sanctions”, Reuters, March 17, 2016]

BEIJING (Reuters) - Over two weeks after the United Nations slapped harsh
new sanctions on North Korea, several Chinese shipping and trade sources say they have not been told of any curbs on the import of coal from the isolated nation - a lifeline for its struggling economy. China accounts for about 90 percent of North Korea’s trade and its help is crucial in enforcing the sanctions announced by the United Nations on March 2 to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Coal is particularly important to the economic health of North Korea because it is one of its only sources of hard currency and its largest single export item. Coal is also bartered for essentials, including oil, food and machinery. Although some curbs have been put in place in the border city of Dandong, half a dozen trade and shipping sources at ports in northeastern China said they had received no instructions from the government on any new rules on coal imports from North Korea. The ports account for the bulk of the coal trade between the two countries. “At this point, nobody has come to us and said you shouldn’t do it,” said an official at a company in the port city of Dalian that imports North Korean coal and other goods. “I’m not even clear on what the specific sanctions are.” “It’s chaos - at this time nobody knows what the impact will be on us and it’s tough to tell,” he added.

Unclear if sanctions are being enforced at all, though China is necessary for sanction efficacy

[Matt Rivers, journalist, “North Korea sanctions: Is China enforcing them?”, March 31, 2016]

Experts agree that if the sanctions are to be at all effective, China must uphold them stringently. China is North Korea’s only major ally, and accounts for more than 70% of the country’s total trade volume. It’s in border cities like Dandong that these sanctions will be enforced. On the Chinese side of the border, you can see the small customs area situated just before the only bridge that goes in and out, called the “Friendship Bridge.” All truck traffic passes through there, but it’s difficult to see if inspections are taking place. CNN contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provincial officials in Liaoning, where Dandong is located, to ask how inspections were being conducted. Both declined to provide details. CNN followed the trucks to a loading yard, and watched as Chinese goods were placed on board, ready to be shipped back across the river. No one at the yard would speak with us, and a security guard blocked us from filming. The Chinese say inspections
are effective, but CNN couldn’t independently verify that.

2.3.5 Defense of “Chinese relations are key to North Korean sanctions”

China is enforcing sanctions now


BEIJING — Trucks packed with seafood were backed up, bumper to bumper, at the Chinese border with North Korea. Protesters carried red banners demanding compensation. And Chinese businessmen who have been making big money from North Korean crabs, shrimp and squid were furious. United Nations sanctions banning the import of North Korean seafood started to bite on Wednesday, two days after China’s Commerce Ministry announced it would enforce the new rules passed by the United Nations Security Council as punishment for the North’s nuclear and missile tests.

Sanctions will be even more broad than just seafood, though seafood is admittedly one of the easiest to enforce


In all, North Korea earned $196 million from seafood exports last year, with almost all of that revenue coming from China, the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency said. Coal, North Korea’s most lucrative export, earned $1.2 billion, the agency said. China stopped importing North Korean coal earlier this year, leaving seafood as one of the few remaining easy sources of revenue for the North. The sanctions passed by the United Nations Security Council this month prohibited the export of North Korean coal, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood. The ban on seafood, a highly visible export that goes almost directly to consumers, is probably one of the easiest to enforce.

China has said that it will enforce sanctions

[Dan Boylan, journalist, “China to enforce U.N. sanctions against North Korea, will block coal, iron ore, fish imports”, Washington Times, August 14, 2017]

China said Monday it will begin enforcing tough new U.N. economic sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs, announcing
its will start blocking imports of coal, iron ore and other goods early next month. China is by far Pyongyang’s biggest trading partner, but analysts are divided on how much the new sanctions will harm North Korea’s already isolated economy. Beijing has in the past also been hesitant to push too hard against the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for fear it could collapse and produce even greater regional instability. Beijing’s trade ban also comes after a week of extremely hostile rhetoric between the United States and North Korea after President Trump declared the U.S. military was “locked and loaded” while Pyongyang threatened to fire missiles into waters near the U.S. Western Pacific territory of Guam. The latest U.N. sanctions — which were approved early this month by the Security Council with Chinese support — are intended to block North Korean exports of coal and other key goods worth $1 billion, a significant share of total exports valued at $3 billion last year. In February, in compliance with an earlier U.N. resolution, China announced a ban on North Korean coal imports for the rest of 2017. However, total trade appears to have risen and prompted the Trump administration to recently accuse Beijing of failing to use its economic leverage to stop Mr. Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

2.4 Argument Guide 4: THAAD as a bargaining chip

This is related to the impacts that THAAD could have on China, but more in that THAAD’s deployment can be used as leverage or a bargaining chip in negotiations with China or North Korea.

2.4.1 THAAD can be an effective bargaining chip

US can use THAAD to pressure North Korea

[Guy Taylor, journalist, “THAAD missile shield to South Korea gives Donald Trump advantage over China on North Korea”, Washington Times, March 8, 2017]

A sophisticated missile defense system being delivered to South Korea may give President Trump a bargaining chip that no other U.S. president has had to pressure China to rein in North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Beijing has long expressed anger over the Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) shield, and on Wednesday, just two days after the Trump administration announced the start of the system’s deployment, Chinese officials suddenly signaled that they may be ready to increase pressure on Pyongyang. In an unusual and public proposal that analysts say exposed Beijing’s growing alarm over the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters that Pyongyang could suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a halt in joint U.S.-South Korean military drills that the North has long condemned as a rehearsal for an invasion.

It can act as leverage against North Korea and/or China, since they dislike it

[Shannon McKeown, contributor, “THAAD- A Necessary Measure?”, American Security Project, June 5, 2017]

In an ideal scenario, THAAD would not be necessary. While the possibility of a North Korean missile launch is still present, the THAAD system provides a reassurance for South Korea and a deterrence against North Korea. Once the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons, the system should be removed. In addition, the US can use the THAAD system as a bargaining chip. The removal of the system could be used as leverage to encourage the North Korean government to engage in negotiations or further pressure China to utilize its leverage on North Korea.

THAAD’s temporary deployment halt has been seen as an example of it being used to placate China

[Paul McLeary, senior reporter, “In Nod to China, South Korea Halts Deployment of THAAD Missile Defense”, Foreign Policy, June 7, 2017]

“THAAD is a bargaining chip for President Moon,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “His political base likes taking a Korea First stance on a military system rushed into deployment by the main opposition party of the previous government.” Moon and his new government reacted angrily when they discovered they had not been informed about the upcoming arrival of four more interceptors, and ordered an environmental assessment before they arrive. “My order for a probe on THAAD is purely a domestic measure and I want to be clear that it is not about trying to change the existing decision or sending a message to the United States,” Moon told visiting...
2 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

U.S. Senator Dick Durbin in Seoul last week. There is little indication that the new government is looking to significantly restructure relations with the United States, which is a major trading partner, maintains 23,000 troops in the country, and sells billions of dollars worth of advanced military technology to Seoul. Still, the halt on the THAAD deployment can be seen as a new wrinkle in an old relationship, and a significant win for Beijing, which has strongly objected to the radar and missile interceptor system being deployed on the peninsula. China is South Korea’s biggest trading partner, accounting for about a quarter of its exports, and has sought to make the THAAD deployment sting. Citing health and safety issues, China shut down 87 of 99 of South Korean conglomerate Lotte’s department stores in China in the days after THAAD arrived in South Korea, and stopped work on South Korean-funded theme park. In order to ease tensions, just days after his election Moon sent an envoy to Beijing to meet with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Upon his return, China stopped blocking Lotte’s web site, and walked back some other economic pressures. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated Beijing’s opposition to the missile-defense system, which China fears could be used to neuter its own strategic missile forces. “China’s stance of opposing the THAAD deployment by the U.S. in [South Korea] is clear, consistent and firm,” the spokesperson said. Moon also recently sent his top national security advisor, Chung Eui-yong, to Washington to meet with U.S. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster to discuss the threat from North Korean missiles.

2.4.2 Response to “THAAD can be an effective bargaining chip”

US officials have said that will not be used as a bargaining chip

[Yi Whan-woo, journalist, “THAAD is not ‘bargaining chip’”, Korea Times, February 28, 2016]

A senior U.S. diplomat said Friday that the proposed deployment of an American missile system in South Korea is not “a bargaining chip” with China over tougher U.N. sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test and long-range missile launch. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel dismissed allegations that the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system is a diplomatic bargaining
chip in Washington’s negotiations with Beijing over the North Korean issue and other security agendas in the region. “There’s no connection between what is going on in the diplomatic track in the U.N. Security Council and the question of the deployment of THAAD,” Russel told reporters in Seoul. “THAAD is not a diplomatic bargaining chip.”

North Korea and China not trustworthy enough to bargain for THAAD

[Guy Taylor, journalist, “THAAD missile shield to South Korea gives Donald Trump advantage over China on North Korea”, Washington Times, March 8, 2017]

Private analysts said a withdrawal of THAAD in exchange for an end to the North’s nuclear programs might be an attractive trade-off — but only if Pyongyang and Beijing hold up their end of the bargain. Anthony J. Ruggiero, a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said he would not rule out the notion that Mr. Trump sees the situation differently from the Obama administration. But Mr. Ruggiero said he would strongly advise against using THAAD as a bargaining chip because he believes China is far from willing to offer anything of equivalent value in exchange for any potential halt to the system’s deployment. “It’s not clear to me that China would be ready to do what is necessary,” he said. If he were advising Mr. Tillerson, he said, he would advise the secretary of state to tell the Chinese next week that “THAAD is off the table.”

2.4.3 Defense of “THAAD can be an effective bargaining chip”

The US can bring China to diplomatic talks using THAAD

[ Kyung Lee, journalist, “THAAD could be useful ‘bargaining chip’ with China: Haggard”, NK News, August 23, 2016]

Washington and Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD, following sustained nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing in the North, is justified – but could be used as leverage with Beijing. That was according to Professor Stephan Haggard, speaking at the 54th East Asia Foundation Seminar in Seoul on Monday, with colleague Dr. Moon Chung-in, adjunct professor at Yonsei University. Haggard said because the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment was upsetting Pyongyang and Beijing, the
U.S. and ROK might be able to use it as ‘bargaining chip’ to stimulate active trilateral talks with Beijing. “The U.S. needs to reiterate that THAAD is contingent to the nuclear missile capabilities of North Korea,” he said. As such, the “U.S. and ROK should discuss THAAD with the Chinese in the context of the Chinese doing something about North Korea.” And if Beijing remains unwilling to discuss North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Haggard asked rhetorically: “why should we discuss THAAD?”.

Sidelining THAAD could bring China into diplomatic engagement


These moves would not resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea or turn around contentious relations with China. But sidelining THAAD would reassure China—it might even provide a bargaining chip to freeze Chinese weapons deployments in the South China Sea. It would certainly remove a volatile issue from South Korean politics at a time of a national leadership crisis. If a new decision on THAAD were accompanied by revival of talks with North Korea, which a Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul is likely to initiate and which the Trump administration should support, it might put a brake on the drift toward confrontation. Unless the Trump administration starts paying attention to THAAD’s liabilities, it will face a cold-war style crisis at the same time that the United States and Europe are in the midst of another cold war standoff with Russia over Ukraine.

THAAD pause was seen as potential sign of it used as bargaining chip


During a briefing on Wednesday, an unnamed Blue House official told multiple local media that the government wasn’t sure how long the assessment might take, pointing out that the THAAD environmental assessment in Guam, a U.S. territory, had taken 23 months. However, one South Korean defense expert refuted the claim and said the process could only take up to few months, depending on how fast Seoul decides to finish it. “If Seoul wishes to finish the assessment, I believe they can do it in a few months,”
Choi Hyun-ho, director of Milidom, a South Korean military-focused website, told NK News. “For example, the U.S. Forces Korea base in Pyongtaek, which is multiple times bigger than the THAAD deployment site, only took around one year for an environmental assessment during Roh Moo-hyun’s era.” The move to temporarily suspend the deployment was instead being used a “bargaining chip” against Beijing and Washington, Choi said. “Keep in mind that no one has officially said how long the process might take.” Two THAAD missile launchers arrived at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek on March 6. More than 30 key parts of the THAAD system arrived at the Seongju site in South Korea at 4 am on April 26. The deployment of the controversial missile defense system, which the Chinese government has expressed strong opposition to, was agreed last year by the U.S. and South Korea and is set to cost $1 billion – a payment the United States has said it will cover.

THAAD can be reconfigured to be less threatening to China and that reconfiguration can be leverage

[Charles V. Peña, former Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute, “Trump’s Tough Talk Won’t Work on North Korea”, National Interest, April 27, 2017]

The other bargaining chip we have is the recent deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD for short) missile defense in South Korea—a decision actually made during the Obama administration. THAAD is designed to intercept incoming missiles and was deployed to South Korea in response to the North Korean missile threat. Beijing, however, is apparently concerned that the THAAD radar could be used to track Chinese missiles—but not necessarily shoot them down. So perhaps it’s possible to be creative and configure THAAD in a way that is not seen as threatening by the Chinese. Moreover, if the Chinese are successful in pulling in the reigns on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, then the need for THAAD should lessen. As such, removing THAAD from South Korea could be held out as a reward to the Chinese for a successful outcome.

The U.S. has previously considered anti missile defense systems as bargaining chips

[Nancy Gallagher, director at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, “Congress and Missile Defense”, University of Maryland, No Date]
Congress reacted negatively when the Nixon administration tried to circumvent public opposition by announcing that the first ABM sites would be located to protect nuclear missiles based far from population centers. Nixon and his top advisers thought that having some ability to limit the damage that the Soviets could do by attacking first would make deterrence more stable than relying solely on threats of mutual assured destruction, but many in Congress disagreed. Traditionally, only administration witnesses testified on defense policy, but Congressional committees began to invite testimony from independent scientists opposed to missile defense. Congress also used its power of the purse to reduce the number of planned sites, but allowed some work on missile defense as a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations. Fear of losing all funds for missile defense explains why Nixon let the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty allow only two (later one) ground-based sites, although he wanted a higher limit. After the ABM Treaty entered into force and the first U.S. site became operational, Congress decided that Safeguard was too expensive, vulnerable, and ineffective, so it eliminated funds for operation.
3 Pro Evidence

3.1 North Korea/South Korea Conflict

3.1.1 Diplomacy

Trump’s abandonment of strategic patience creates a credible threat of force, forcing everyone in the region to take the US seriously.

Lipson, Charles. [Peter B. Ritzma Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he is founding director of PIPES, the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security]. “‘Can you hear me now?’ Trump team voices credible threat of force,” The Hill. April 19, 2017.

Kim Jong-un probably won’t stop for small sweeteners. Even if he said he would, his regime’s dismal record of keeping promises would require intrusive inspections. They will resist that mightily, and, unless they cave, that will kill the deal. The days of John Kerry and Barack Obama accepting Iranian self-reporting are dead. If carrots won’t work and delay is too dangerous, the alternative is to reach for a big stick. That’s what the Trump administration has chosen, hoping they will not have to use force if the threat is credible enough. But if your adversary sees you flinch, you’ll either have to swing the stick or back down. That’s where we are now. The threat is directed at Pyongyang via Beijing, which dreads a war on the peninsula. The hard part is to resolve the issue with threats and not the actual use of force, which could lead to vast casualties. In using threats, Trump has a huge advantage over Obama. Trump’s threats to use force are credible. For the first time in years, the Chinese and North Koreans — and America’s friends in the region — have to take that seriously.
A credible threat of force also compels China to take a harder line on North Korea.

Stanton, Joshua; Yee, Sung-Yoon; and Klinger, Bruce. [ICAS Fellow and founder of One-FreeKorea; Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor in Korean Studies and Assistant Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center]. “Getting Tough on North Korea: How to Hit Pyongyang Where It Hurts,” Foreign Affairs. May/June 2017.

China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime on its northeastern border. Accordingly, Washington must make clear to both Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping that it would prefer the regime’s chaotic collapse to a stable, nuclear-armed North Korea. The missing ingredient in U.S. diplomacy with Pyongyang has been not trust but leverage—and the willingness to use it. Washington must threaten the one thing that Pyongyang values more than its nuclear weapons: its survival.
China is the last hope for diplomacy with North Korea.


Today, only one diplomatic option remains, and it does not involve talking to Pyongyang. Instead, President Trump should urge President Xi Jinping that reunifying the Korean Peninsula is in China’s national interest. This is a hard argument to make, requiring reversal of decades of Chinese policy. It should have been broached years ago, but it is still doable. There is now growing awareness in China that maintaining the two Koreas, especially given the current nuclear crisis, does not benefit China long-term. Historically, the Korean Peninsula’s 1945 partition was always intended to be temporary. Kim Il-Sung’s 1950 invasion of South Korea and three years of ultimately inconclusive war resulted in hardening the bifurcation into its current manifestation. Beijing has backed the status quo, believing that North Korea provided a buffer between Chinese territory and U.S. military forces. Maintaining its satellite, however, has been expensive and risky. China has long supplied more than 90 percent of the North’s energy needs, and vast quantities of food and other assistance to sustain Pyongyang’s gulag. China has also expended enormous political and diplomatic energy, costing it precious international credibility, to protect the North’s erratic regime. Initially, China saw the North’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs as a problem for America, Japan and South Korea rather than itself. That notion has disappeared, however, under the harsh prospect that today’s nuclear crisis will be merely the first of many with North Korea. Moreover, Japan is now increasingly likely to seek its own nuclear capability, a nightmare for China in some respects more troubling than America. Confronted by this new, deeply threatening reality, Beijing’s views on Korean reunification are ripe for change. China has never applied its uniquely strong economic leverage on Pyongyang because it feared so doing could cause catastrophic collapse of the North’s regime. That would in turn produce two unacceptable consequences: massive Korean refugee flows across the border into China, and American and South Korean troops crossing the DMZ and quickly reaching
the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. The answer to China’s fear of uncontrolled collapse is a jointly managed effort to dismantle North Korea’s government, effectively allowing the swift takeover of the North by the South. China can start by quietly bribing the Kim regime’s top military and civilian officials, offering political asylum and a safe exile for them and their families in China, while simultaneously cutting off energy and other supplies to the North. Seoul can also offer inducements to key North Korean leaders, reminding them what life could be like in a post-Kim world. Simultaneously, massive information efforts should be launched throughout the North to spread word quickly on what is happening. The population may lack cell phones and the Internet, but they are far more aware of the outside world than conventional stereotypes. The end of North Korea, and hence the end of its nuclear threat, would be inevitable. The process will undoubtedly be dangerous and somewhat chaotic, but far less so than a completely uncontrolled collapse. And whatever the risks, they pale before the risks of nuclear conflict emanating from the erratic Kim regime. Washington can offer Beijing two assurances to assuage its concerns. First, we would work closely with China to prevent massive refugee flows either into China or South Korea. Our common interests here are clear. Second, as the North begins to collapse, allied forces would necessarily cross the DMZ to locate and secure Pyongyang’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and to maintain civil order. These forces would ultimately reach China’s border, but we can commit to Beijing that Washington will not station troops there for a sustained period. Instead, we would pledge to base virtually all U.S. military assets near Pusan at the Peninsula’s southern tip, to be available for rapid deployment around Asia. They would not constitute a watch on the Yalu. The alternative to this last available diplomatic play is military force. The imperative of protecting innocent American civilians from the long-term threat of North Korea’s nuclear capability dictates that we should be willing to strike those capabilities pre-emptively. But before that, who will argue against this one last realistic diplomatic effort?
The Sunshine Policy has not worked in the past.


South Korea’s peaceful “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea failed, a government report has found, saying there have been no positive changes to Pyongyang’s behavior despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement. Aid shipped to the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998-2008 also failed to make a difference to the lives of destitute North Koreans, said the Unification Ministry white paper, seen by Reuters on Thursday. The policy review by current President Lee Myung-bak’s government pointed to North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms and the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in March that killed 46 sailors as key examples of Pyongyang’s deceptive nature.” The attack on the Cheonan proves that despite the qualitative growth in inter-Korea ties, North Korea has not changed,” the report said. “There are no positive changes to North Korea’s position that correspond to the support and cooperation offered by us.”
North Korea cannot be trusted to honor any agreements made.


North Korea benefited tremendously from South Korean investments such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Mount Kumgang Resort Complex and inter-Korean transportation projects. This gave Pyongyang time to partially recover from the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Further, the two South Korean presidents even succeeded in having summits with Kim Jong-il to improve mutual understanding and solidify the gains from joint Korean endeavours. Unfortunately, the Sunshine Policy did little to persuade North Korea to launch basic economic reforms, and it even failed to prevent it from carrying out a nuclear test. In short, engagement did not achieve the intended goals of reforming the economy, halting Pyongyang’s nuclear developments or restructuring North Korea’s political system. But if President Moon is determined to champion his predecessors’ approach, he will likely invest his political capital into another unsuccessful round of tit-for-tat negotiation. Moon’s ‘Sunshine Policy 2.0’ will not be as revolutionary and unconditional as that of Kim and Roh given Pyongyang’s recent preponderance of provocations. Nonetheless, Moon’s policy is clearly influenced by his predecessors’ legacy, hence his many proposals to restart dialogue with Pyongyang as well as his pledge to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex as incentives for denuclearisation. But even if North Korea agrees to temporarily freeze its nuclear program in exchange for Moon’s promised economic assistance, Seoul and Washington should not be hopeful that Pyongyang would honour such a deal in the long run. North Korea’s violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Six-Party Talks Joint Statements and the 2012 Leap Day deal have tarnished its image as a reliable partner. If North Korea was not willing to denuclearise when its nuclear arsenal was primitive, there is even less reason to believe that it will abide by another deal now.
Financial assistance does not provide enough leverage over the Kim regime. It doesn’t solve the root cause of the conflict.


More importantly, reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex, resuming humanitarian aid and supporting limited economic exchanges may damage the international community’s efforts in punishing Pyongyang for its missile tests. Common North Koreans have not historically benefited from South Korean humanitarian and economic support, since Pyongyang largely channelled the workers’ payments to other state projects or distributed aid according to the songbun system under which the North Korean government assigns a status to all citizens at birth based on the perceived political loyalty of his or her family going back generations. Further, Seoul’s promise of financial assistance in exchange for North Korea’s economic liberalisation and denuclearisation is simply not enough to incentivise North Korea to risk political instability and undertake major changes in its national policies. Moon’s Sunshine Policy 2.0, if welcomed by Pyongyang, would at best temporarily halt inter-Korean tension and delay the nuclear issue until a further date. The root cause of the nuclear program is not Pyongyang’s low level of economic development but rather the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula. Rewarding North Korea’s bad behaviour with lucrative North–South projects is not smart foreign policy. Given Pyongyang’s repeated violations of international sanctions and agreements, South Korea needs to refrain from giving the North any economic benefits — which Pyongyang might potentially use to fund weapons of mass destruction — until it looks like it is willing to credibly come to the table.
Use diplomatic pressure not against North Korea, but rather the international community.


Seoul should instead invest its resources in denying North Korea’s access to foreign currency, raising the issue of its human rights violations at international summits, pressuring China and its businesses to enforce United Nations punishments and enhancing its military coalition with the United States and Japan. Effective sanctions and pressure in order to build a foundation for the possibility of credible negotiations will take time and effort and South Korea needs to maintain a cool head when it comes to denuclearising North Korea.
Diplomacy fails - the interest gap is too broad - this makes deterrence key

International Crisis Group. [Crisis Group aspires to be the preeminent organisation providing independent analysis and advice on how to prevent, resolve or better manage deadly conflict. We combine expert field research, analysis and engagement with policymakers across the world in order to effect change in the crisis situations on which we work.]. “North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks,” June 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/north-korea-beyond-six-party-talks

South Korea (ROK) faces an existential threat from the North’s growing nuclear arsenal. It is divided, however, over policy toward Pyongyang. After activity was detected around the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in spring 2014, it invested considerable effort in an attempt to restart the Six-Party Talks. By late February 2015, five parties had reached a consensus on the minimum criteria to present to Pyongyang. To test intentions and sincerity on denuclearisation, Seoul has pushed for “exploratory talks” in a track two setting as a first step toward resuming the formal six-party process. If Pyongyang does not meet the criteria for resumption, which have not been disclosed publicly, the U.S., South Korea and others appear poised to take increasingly punitive measures. There is little likelihood the U.S. would enter upon resumed talks unless there is a much greater prospect than appears to exist that they would be pursued in good faith by the North and not simply for manipulation and propaganda. Experience under the Agreed Framework in the 1990s, in addition to widespread perception that the DPRK is unreliable, make the Obama administration, and almost certainly any future president, sensitive to likely domestic blowback from another failed diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. China does not face the same domestic risks if the talks were to restart and turn out badly. It could always take credit for hosting them, and in the case of failure, blame the DPRK and/or the U.S. Its consistent position has been to restart dialogue even with low likelihood for success. Japan also has a high threat perception regarding the North’s nuclear and missile programs and generally will support South Korea and the U.S. over the talks. Bilateral discussion of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s raised hopes for improved relations, but that process also has stalled. Without a satisfactory resolution on abductions, Tokyo will be even more inclined to take a harder
line on the nuclear issue. Russia wants the talks to resume as soon as possible. Though sensitive about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile activities, it believes Washington exaggerates the threat, and its focus is on economic cooperation, which the North welcomes as helping reduce economic dependence on Beijing. Whether or not an intended exploratory meeting is held, the gap between positions is too broad to expect the Six-Party Talks to resume as a good-faith effort to denuclearise the peninsula. For that, either the DPRK must abandon its nuclear identity and ambitions, or the international community must accept transformation of the talks into a different type of institution that does not address denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Neither seems possible, so deterrence and containment will remain fundamental for dealing with a nuclear North.
North Korea will refuse to engage in diplomacy


Dealing with North Korea rightly tops the summit agenda, as Pyongyang poses a security threat to both countries, but policy divergence here is not new. In the past, there were serious misalignments. Yet not only did the alliance endure, it strengthened over time. Moon favors an engagement-oriented approach, but he will have little opportunity to substantively engage the North. That is because North Korea will continue to be North Korea. The Kim regime will continue to pursue its nuclear weapons program and test missiles. This will limit President Moon’s ability to pursue a rapprochement, ultimately limiting policy divergence between the United States and South Korea.
North Korea would never give up their nukes - Kim would instantly be ousted by the US


Negotiations aren’t possible because Washington refuses to sit down with a country which it sees as its inferior. Instead, the US has strong-armed China to do its bidding by using their diplomats as interlocutors who are expected to convey Washington’s ultimatums as threateningly as possible. The hope, of course, is that Pyongyang will cave in to Uncle Sam’s bullying and do what they are told. But the North has never succumbed to US intimidation and there’s no sign that it will. Instead, they have developed a small arsenal of nuclear weapons to defend themselves in the event that the US tries to assert its dominance by launching another war. There’s no country in the world that needs nuclear weapons more than North Korea. Brainwashed Americans, who get their news from FOX or CNN, may differ on this point, but if a hostile nation deployed carrier strike-groups off the coast of California while conducting massive war games on the Mexican border (with the express intention of scaring the shit of people) then they might see things differently. They might see the value of having a few nuclear weapons to deter that hostile nation from doing something really stupid. And let’s be honest, the only reason Kim Jong Un hasn’t joined Saddam and Gadhafi in the great hereafter, is because (a)– The North does not sit on an ocean of oil, and (b)– The North has the capacity to reduce Seoul, Okinawa and Tokyo into smoldering debris-fields. Absent Kim’s WMDs, Pyongyang would have faced a preemptive attack long ago and Kim would have faced a fate similar to Gad- hafi’s. Nuclear weapons are the only known antidote to US adventurism.

3.1.2 South Korea’s Interests

South Korea’s ultimate goal is reunification and a denuclearized North Korea.

South Korea: Frozen in an unresolved conflict with North Korea, Seoul’s ultimate goal is the denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula. The South also wishes to liberalize North Korea’s decrepit economy [PDF] through greater financial engagement aimed at mitigating the potential cost of future reunification.
3.1.3 THAAD Protects South Korea

THAAD has a powerful radar

Macias, Amanda and Szoldra, Paul. [Correspondent and Editor for Business Insider’s military and defense team, respectively] “This is the advanced anti-missile defense system being deployed to Korea — and it has Beijing spooked,” Business Insider. 7 March 2017.

THAAD’s first line of defense is its radar system. “We have one of the most powerful radars in the world,” US Army Capt. Kyle Terza, a THAAD battery commander, told Business Insider. Raytheon’s AN/TPY-2 radar is used to detect, track, and discriminate ballistic missiles in the terminal (or descent) phase of flight. The mobile radar is about the size of a bus and is so powerful that it can scan areas the size of entire countries, according to Raytheon.
THAAD could eliminate nearly all incoming missiles from North Korea.

Macias, Amanda and Szoldra, Paul. [Correspondent for Business Insider’s military and defense team]. “We spent a day with the world’s most advanced missile system that has China and North Korea spooked,” Business Insider. 11 March 2016.

Depending on where it’s deployed, nearly all incoming missiles from the North could be eliminated, as displayed by the following graphic from The Heritage Foundation.
Tests prove that THAAD is extremely effective at what it does.


THAAD is the right solution today for improving ballistic-missile defense capabilities and architectures around the globe. THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds an essential layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts. The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in an awesome display of the BMDS in action. While it is not appropriate for us to comment on other non-U.S. and non-Lockheed Martin systems, we believe that there is no other system in the world that can compare to THAAD’s unique capabilities (Endo-Exo capability against current and emerging advanced threats, hit-to-kill technology to destroy an array of missiles and payloads, extraordinary Mass-Raid capability, deployability and tactical mobility, interoperabiltiy with other BMDS elements, etc) and proven record (100 percent mission success record in nine years of rigorous developmental and complex operational BMDS testing—including 100 percent mission success and eleven for eleven intercepts, successful first operational deployment support strategic stability, delivering first <of many upcoming> THAAD foreign military sales ahead of schedule, operational readiness rate that far exceeds U.S. government standards, growing U.S. and international demand for THAAD, etc).
THAAD is designed to work together with existing anti-missile systems to destroy a variety of threats.


THAAD is a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD has a unique capability to destroy threats in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear or biological) payloads. THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower (up to 72 Interceptors per battery), capable organic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability. THAAD is interoperable with other BMDS elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe.
3 Pro Evidence

A layered defense with THAAD can destroy almost all incoming land-based missiles.


It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that faced with 50-missile salvoes, a layered defence consisting of South Korea’s Patriot system and two THAAD batteries (another may be deployed when it is available) would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles. The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.
THAAD protects 10 million people.


THAAD launchers are operational and were deployed in Seongju, at a civilian site rather than a pre-existing military base, because it is the “best” means to defend the country, according to Vandal. The THAAD battery defends 10 million people, the U.S. military commander added. THAAD also intercepts ballistic missiles launched from North Korea that could possibly target U.S. military bases in Japan or Guam.
3.1.4 South Korea’s Interests

South Korea’s ultimate goal is reunification and a denuclearized North Korea.


South Korea: Frozen in an unresolved conflict with North Korea, Seoul’s ultimate goal is the denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula. The South also wishes to liberalize North Korea’s decrepit economy [PDF] through greater financial engagement aimed at mitigating the potential cost of future reunification.
3.1.5 THAAD Deters North Korean Attacks on South Korea

Refusing to implement THAAD makes South Korea appear weak in the long term.


THAAD’s termination sends a powerful yet undesirable message about South Korea’s security policy and prioritization of alliances. In creating a vacuum in Seoul’s defensive preparations against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, it perpetuates the perception of ROK vulnerability to the DPRK. In addition, the THAAD symbolizes a joint U.S.-South Korea resolve against a shared adversary – removing this emblematic defense system could thus send the message that Seoul no longer views Washington as its most important alliance partner. From a long-term security perspective, this makes South Korea more susceptible and vulnerable to North Korea’s incursions and provocations, as it essentially gives Pyongyang greater reign to force Seoul, no longer buttressed by its American ally, to make concessions and accommodate the DPRK.
THAAD helps deter North Korea provocations.


More broadly, there are logical security arguments for China to favor THAAD deployment to South Korea. THAAD should enhance deterrence of North Korean provocations, including limited attacks, thereby helping to stop threats to regional instability from North Korea that China does not seek. Overall, China’s objections appear to be motivated more by politics than meaningful military security concerns.
Regardless of how effective ballistic missile defenses are, they stabilize crises by deterring North Korea from using its nuclear weapons.

MacDonald, Bruce W. and Ferguson, Charles D. [Special Advisor to the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Project at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP); President of the Federation of American Scientists]. “Understanding the Dragon Shield: likelihood and implications of Chinese strategic ballistic missile defense,” Center on Contemporary Conflict. September 2015.

In contrast, however, risk aversion appears to play mostly a stabilizing role in crisis management with a smaller nuclear power where strategic BMD is concerned. Facing a threat from a small nuclear power, and aware of its strategic BMD limitations, the United States cannot count on its missile defenses working reasonably well. On the other hand, facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD not working reasonably well. Each side is deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisis. This situation is portrayed conceptually in Charts 1 and 2 below, where risk aversion acts as a stabilizing presence in the simplified two-country game. Chart 1 illustrates no risk aversion, while Chart 2 does. The shaded “island” depicted in the figure is the product of the risk aversion of each country in this game-theoretic construct and is labeled as a “risk-aversive effect.” Both sides in the crisis have the same perceptions in this theoretical case. However, given the stakes involved, adversaries in the crisis will likely have uncertainty and be aversive to risk. The greater the stakes, the greater the risk aversion. Is this stabilizing risk-aversive effect robust? No. Is it resilient over time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis China? Not likely, though China should not ignore this important additional dimension of the BMD issue. But this risk-aversive stability effect does not appear to be trivial; it is better than nothing; and it should not be ignored, particularly where North Korea is concerned. It is possible to discern a few deterrent characteristics of thin strategic BMD; there are elements of both fragility and robustness, namely that it is: Not affected by small changes in either offense or defense; Affected by large offense increases, where modest defenses are simply overwhelmed; Potentially affected by important BMD technology changes; More robust against North Korean offensive technological changes than those by Iran, as Iran can bring far more resources to bear.
to defeat strategic BMD than can North Korea; and Subject to being eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what have I got to lose?”). This purely qualitative analysis suggests that from an “arms race stability” perspective, there are noteworthy, however not decisive, destabilizing aspects to strategic BMD, even modest deployments or even just an active engineering development program. However, from a crisis management perspective, there are important stabilizing dimensions to a thin strategic BMD posture, where risk aversion on both sides in a confrontation appears to augment the important deterrent effects of nuclear weapons themselves. This risk aversive effect leads each side to hedge against the possibility that the other country’s systems are more effective than expected, while its own systems are less effective than expected, suggesting that actions to upset the status quo could leave the country significantly worse off versus taking no action at all. Observations on the strategic implications of thin U.S. strategic BMD are: BMD performance and capabilities are very important, but they are not the only metric by which BMD should be assessed; From a crisis stability perspective, limited BMD deployments appear to be stabilizing as long as they remain limited; From an arms race stability perspective, there are elements of both stability and instability present; Geopolitically, it provides a useful tool for messaging and affecting adversary perceptions, at least at limited deployment levels; Having no strategic BMD would deny the United States certain strategic and geopolitical benefits that have already advanced U.S. security interests;
3.1.6 North Korean Nuclear Weapons Pose a Serious Threat

North Korea’s nuclear program is accelerating.


Behind the Trump administration’s sudden urgency in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis lies a stark calculus: a growing body of expert studies and classified intelligence reports conclude the country is capable of producing a nuclear bomb every six or seven weeks. That acceleration in pace — impossible to verify until experts get beyond the limited access to North Korean facilities that ended years ago — explains why President Trump and his aides fear they are running out of time. For years, American presidents decided that each incremental improvement in the North’s program — another nuclear test, a new variant of a missile — was worrisome, but not worth a confrontation that could spill into open conflict. Now those step-by-step advances have resulted in North Korean warheads that in a few years could reach Seattle. “They’ve learned a lot,” said Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford professor who directed the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, the birthplace of the atomic bomb, from 1986 to 1997, and whom the North Koreans have let into their facilities seven times.
North Korea can already hit South Korea with nuclear-tipped missiles.


It is a round, metallic sphere, covered by small circles, that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, is shown caressing in official photographs as if it were his crown jewel. And it may be: The sphere is supposedly a nuclear weapon, shrunken to fit inside the nose cone of one of the country’s growing arsenal of missiles. American intelligence officials still debate whether it is a real bomb or a mockup that is part of the country’s vast propaganda effort. But it is intended to show where the country is headed. Unless something changes, North Korea’s arsenal may well hit 50 weapons by the end of Mr. Trump’s term, about half the size of Pakistan’s. American officials say the North already knows how to shrink those weapons so they can fit atop one of its short-to medium-range missiles — putting South Korea and Japan, and the thousands of American troops deployed in those two nations, within range. The best estimates are that North Korea has roughly 1,000 ballistic missiles in eight or so varieties.
North Korea will be able to make a reliable nuclear-topped ICBM by 2020.


“They’ve greatly increased the tempo of their testing — in a way, showing off their capabilities, showing us images of ground tests they could have kept hidden,” John Schilling, an aerospace engineer and expert on North Korea’s missile program, said in an interview on Friday. “This isn’t something that can be ignored anymore. It’s going to be a high priority for the next president.” Military experts say that by 2020, Pyongyang will most likely have the skills to make a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile topped by a nuclear warhead. They also expect that by then North Korea may have accumulated enough nuclear material to build up to 100 warheads.
North Korea could kill 100,000 South Koreans in just 48 hours.


The Daily Telegraph can reveal details of a recent intelligence assessment of the immediate threat posed by North Korea has determined there would be more than 100,000 casualties within 48 hours if Kim Jong-un attacked Seoul with rockets and artillery. North Korea has thousands of artillery tubes poised ready to fire ammunition against Seoul and this could be its first strike.
3.1.7 North Korean Collapse

North Korean collapse is inevitable in the long term.


Irreversible domestic economic changes, small social and cultural changes, and burgeoning corruption among government and law enforcement could cause political erosion within the country. We should not underestimate just how determined the North Korean government is to survive. But eventually, the widening gap between North Korean reality and North Korea’s socialist paradise will reach a tipping point and lead to political collapse. This is when South Korea may launch its plan (assuming/hoping it has one) to unify the two nations with the help of other countries.
A North Korean collapse would be extremely dangerous for East Asia.


In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family’s hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.
A North Korean collapse could result in last stand attacks that ignore the logic of deterrence.

Kazianis, Harry J. [Executive Editor of The National Interest, Director of Defense Studies at the Center for the National Interest and a Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute]. The Real North Korea Problem Isn’t Missiles or Nukes (But a Collapse), The National Interest. 7 March 2017.

2. A Civil War Is Possible. “A civil war in North Korea and especially the use of WMD could spill over into the ROK and cause serious damage. Factional forces could cause considerable damage with artillery and special forces attacks on the ROK, especially if nuclear and/or biological weapons are used. In addition, one or more North Korean factions could purposefully attack the ROK, potentially as a form of revenge if they perceive themselves unlikely to survive. Thus, ballistic missile attacks against ROK cities—especially ones using nuclear weapons or even chemical or biological weapons—could cause damage across the ROK. Besides the physical damage done, the ROK economy and society could be significantly affected. All these consequences could make it difficult for the ROK to pay for and manage unification. From a ROK perspective, the worst outcome could be destabilization of all of Korea, including the ROK, as crime and insurgency spread, if the ROK is unable to contain and defeat them.”
3.1.8 Safety from North Korea

North Korea has been threatening for decades.


In 1994 South Koreans stocked up on essentials in panic after a threat by a North Korean negotiator to turn Seoul into “a sea of fire” - one which has been repeated several times since. After US President George W Bush labelled it part of the “axis of evil” in 2002, Pyongyang said it would “mercilessly wipe out the aggressors”. In June 2012 the army warned that artillery was aimed at seven South Korean media groups and threatened a “merciless sacred war”. There is also a pattern of escalating threats whenever South Korea gets a new leader, with misogynist rhetoric directed at South Korea’s first female President Park Geun-hye after she was elected in 2013.
North Korea has been building up its military and nuclear weapons capabilities for years. THAAD is a reaction to, not the cause of, the problems.


North Korea has tested a series of different missiles, including short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Estimates of the country’s nuclear stockpile vary: some experts believe Pyongyang has between fifteen and twenty nuclear weapons, while U.S. intelligence believes the number to be between thirty and sixty bombs. The regime conducted two tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead in July 2017. The Pentagon confirmed North Korea’s ICBM tests, and analysts estimate that the new missile has a potential range of 10,400 kilometers (6,500 miles) and, if fired on a flatter trajectory, could be capable of reaching mainland U.S. territory. U.S. analysts and experts from other countries are still debating the nuclear payload that the ICBM could carry, and it is still unclear whether the ICBMs have the capability to survive reentry. A confidential U.S. intelligence assessment from July 2017 reportedly concluded that North Korea has developed the technology to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit its ballistic missiles.
Korean war is by far the most likely threat to South Korea

Bechtol, Bruce [ICAS Fellow; Professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Intelligence Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1997 until 2003, serving as the Senior Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Intelligence Directorate on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon; 20 years active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, serving at various locations in the western Pacific and East Asia; he has written widely on Korean security issues, contributing articles to such journals as the International Journal of Korean Studies, Pacific Focus, the Korea Observer, East Asian Review, the Air and Space Power Journal, the International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Korean Quarterly, and Occasional Papers: The Journal of the Korea American Historical Society]. “South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat,” AEI. 11-5-2013, http://www.aei.org/publication/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) military, one must take into account the unique geopolitical position that the ROK government finds itself in. There is no ambiguous set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and most dangerous threat to the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK). It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the ROK–US alliance and the most important foreign policy issue between these two allies. As survival of the nation-state is the number-one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK. Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat to determine what the priorities of the South Korean military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–US alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations: one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and one that involved an artillery barrage against a South Korean island that killed both military and civilian personnel.[2] North Korea also conducted yet another nuclear test this past February.[3] In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test launch conducted in mid-December last year that it is now capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the United States.[4] Pyongyang also has the capability of target-
ing all of South Korea and most of Japan with its ballistic missiles.[5] “All other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK.” North Korea has also continued to advance the capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, long-range artillery forces, and special operations forces.[6] And, finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he has any intentions except to carry on the violent and corrupt policies of his father Kim Jong-il. This means, of course, that South Korea and the ROK–US alliance must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North Korean threat for the foreseeable future.
North Korean development is accelerating - they can make a bomb every 6-7 weeks


Here is the most frightening thing you’ll read all day: Growing numbers of US intelligence officials believe North Korea can produce a new nuclear bomb every six or seven weeks. That’s one of the most jarring takeaways in an exhaustive New York Times story about North Korea’s rapidly expanding nuclear program — and the decades of US efforts that have tried, and failed, to slow it. The Trump administration plans to detail its own approach Wednesday when it brings the entire US Senate to the White House for a highly unusual briefing on the North Korean threat. The threat is real. Here are a few more details, courtesy of the Times’s David Sanger and William Broad. North Korea is on pace to have 50 nuclear weapons by 2020. It already knows how to miniaturize those weapons so they can fit into missiles capable of hitting Japan, South Korea, and the tens of thousands of US troops stationed in those two countries. And a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the US — while not yet in Pyongyang’s arsenal — is now seen as a genuine possibility. The reclusive country’s steady efforts to develop that type of missile, the Times reports, “have resulted in North Korean warheads that in a few years could reach Seattle.”
Missile tests make Korea war likely now

Bort, Ryan. [Staff writer covering culture for Newsweek]. “The United States is making sure its missile defense systems are ready to go,” Newsweek. 8-1-2017, http://www.newsweek.com/united-states-testing-missile-644854

The United States early Tuesday tested an unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a launch between 12:01 a.m. and 6:01 a.m. from the Vandenberg Air Force Base, north of Lompoc, California. According to the Air Force, the test was meant to assess the effectiveness of the Minuteman III missile defense system. It’s the fourth time an ICBM has been launched from Vandenberg this year. On Sunday, a successful test of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system was conducted in Alaska by launching an ICBM over the Pacific Ocean. The latest test comes amid escalating tensions with North Korea, which on Friday launched a rocket that flew for 45 minutes before crashing off the coast of Japan. Earlier in July, the People’s Republic tested an ICBM that flew for 37 minutes before crashing. The missile launched on Friday is said to be the most powerful of the 18 missiles North Korea has tested in 2017. Despite Friday’s missile test, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said Monday that the White House is “done talking about North Korea” and pressured China to support stronger U.N. sanctions on the nation. President Donald Trump expressed his frustration toward China on Saturday. China was not moved by Trump’s tweets. As was reported by The New York Times, a Chinese state-run news agency wrote in an editorial that Trump’s “emotional venting cannot become a guiding policy for solving the nuclear issue on the peninsula.” Haley’s statement attempted to put the onus on China, South Korea and Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke with Trump and urged him to take action. “International society, including Russia and China, need to take this seriously and increase pressure,” Abe told reporters after his conversation with Trump, which reportedly did not include discussion of military action. The world and North Korea ultimately are at an impasse, and some believe military action could be the only option should North Korea continue to launch missile tests. One of those people, apparently, is Trump. On Tuesday morning, Senator Lindsey Graham said on the Today Show that Trump told him the United States would go to war with North Korea if it keeps testing missiles. “He has told me that. I believe him,” Graham said. “If I were China, I would
believe him too and do something about it.” “If there’s going to be a war to stop [Kim Jong Un], it will be over there,” Graham continued. “If thousands die, they’re going to die over there. They’re not going to die here. And he has told me that to my face.” “There is a military option to destroy North Korea’s program and North Korea itself,” he added.
Korean tensions are higher than ever – prior forecasts underestimate the rate of modernization


President Donald Trump condemned North Korea’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Friday. “Threatening the world, these weapons and tests further isolate North Korea, weaken its economy, and deprive its people.” Trump said in a written statement. “The United States will take all necessary steps to ensure the security of the American homeland and protect our allies in the region.” The United States detected an intercontinental ballistic missile launch out of North Korea at approximately 10:45 am ET on Friday, the Pentagon confirmed to CNN – Pyongyang’s second such test this month. The North Korea threat. What can Trump do? The missile was launched from Mupyong-ni and traveled about 1000 km before splashing down in the waters off the Japanese coast, according to the Pentagon, which is working with interagency partners on a more detailed assessment. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) determined the missile launch from North Korea did not pose a threat to North America. “Our commitment to the defense of our allies, including the Republic of Korea and Japan, in the face of these threats, remains ironclad. We remain prepared to defend ourselves and our allies from any attack or provocation,” a statement from the Pentagon said. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told Japanese broadcaster NHK: “I have received the first report that North Korea again launched a missile and it possibly landed inside the exclusive economic zone.” Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said the missile launched by North Korea possibly flew for approximately 45 minutes. Suga told reporters there is no damage to any vessel or aircraft. South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff said they estimate that the intercontinental ballistic missile is more advanced than one launched last month based on the range it traveled. “The altitude is about 3,700 km and the flying distance is about 1,000 km. It is estimated that it was a more advanced type of an ICBM compared to the previous one based on the range,” a statement to CNN said. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dun-
ford, Jr., and the commander of US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, called the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Lee Sun Jin in the wake of North Korea’s test to express the US’ “ironclad commitment” to its alliance with South Korea and discuss military response options. Hours after that call, the US and South Korean military conducted a live fire exercise as a show of force in response to the missile test, according to Pentagon spokesman, Capt. Jeff Davis. The exercise included firing missiles into the ocean. Both militaries conducted a similar show of force, after North Korea’s first ICBM test in early July. New US intelligence on North Korea missile program The ongoing assessment from the US intelligence community in recent months has been that North Korea has accelerated its intercontinental range ballistic missile program. The US believes that North Korea will be able to launch a reliable nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by early 2018, a US official familiar with the latest intelligence assessment confirmed to CNN Wednesday. That would be an acceleration of two years from previous estimates that put Pyongyang three to five years from fully developing long-range missile capabilities. Why North Korea still hates the United States: The legacy of the Korean War The official clarified to CNN that while North Korea can currently get a missile “off the ground,” there are still a lot of undetermined variables about guidance, re-entry and the ability to hit a specific target. CNN reported earlier this month that US intelligence indicated that North Korea was making preparations for another ICBM or intermediate range missile test. Two administration officials familiar with the latest intelligence at the time confirmed they’d seen indicators of test preparations. “In all honesty, we should not be surprised anymore: North Korea is slowly morphing into a nuclear and missile power right before our very eyes,” said Harry J. Kazianis, director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest and an expert on North Korea. 2017 has been a year of rapid progress for North Korea’s missile program. Pyongyang has carried out 12 missile tests since February and conducted its first-ever test of an ICBM on July 4 – which it claims could reach “anywhere in the world.” “North Korea will continue to test over and over again its missile technology and nuclear weapons in the months and years to come in order to develop the most lethal systems it can,” Kazianis said. “You can bet every time they do tensions will continue to rise. This is what makes the situation on the Korean Peninsula as dangerous as it is.” Less than six
years into his reign, Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined. What are President Donald Trump’s options? North Korea’s latest test has spurred calls for a response from the Trump administration. “North Korea’s latest missile test shows the Trump administration’s actions are not changing North Korea’s behavior and it’s time for the President to articulate a comprehensive strategy to the American people – so far he’s failed to do that,” Democratic Rep. Ted Lieu told CNN on Friday. Trump administration officials have warned that “all options are on the table” but a clear path forward has yet to materialize. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute who specializes in foreign policy, told CNN that North Korea’s missile launch shows Pyongyang is “absolutely committed to their missile programs” and not interested in tempering their activities. Bandow, who visited North Korea just last month, said the regime is convinced that developing its missile program as a nuclear deterrent is absolutely necessary – a mindset that continues to put pressure on President Donald Trump, who finds himself in a situation with no good choices, according to Bandow. Those choices are further complicated by the unpredictable nature of Kim Jong Un, according to Lieu, who also told CNN he “does not know” if Kim would be willing to use a long-range nuclear weapon should he acquire that capability. Trump has often cited China, North Korea’s longtime ally, as a key player in reining in North Korea’s quest to have long-range nuclear missiles. But diplomatic efforts calling for China to put pressure on Pyongyang or enforce meaningful sanctions on North Korean revenue streams used to fund its missile program have proven ineffective to date. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has put countries on notice that if they or their companies help North Korea – also known as the DPRK – they’ll face penalties. That mostly means China, which accounts for 90 percent of North Korea’s trade. That doesn’t seem to be working yet. Lawmakers in the US House and Senate have overwhelmingly passed a bill that would expand economic sanctions on North Korea, but the White House has not definitively said Trump will sign the sweeping measure that also tightens restrictions on Iran and Russia. Republican Rep. Mike Turner of Ohio, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, implored Trump to sign the bill following North Korea’s missile test on Friday. “These missile tests must be met with consequences. Earlier this week, I voted to increase sanctions against North Korea. The Senate has since taken the same action. I
urge the President to quickly sign these sanctions into law to thwart further escalation of North Korea’s missile systems,” a statement from Turner said. Even if Trump does sign the bill there is no guarantee that additional sanctions will slow North Korea’s march toward a long-range nuclear missile. Pyongyang’s nuclear aspirations have progressed forward rapidly despite previous sanctions, and Kim’s regime has resisted any US attempts at negotiation that mandates de-nuclearization upfront. Earlier this year, Beijing called on Pyongyang to suspend its nuclear and missile tests while calling on the US to stop military exercises on and near the Korean Peninsula, which North Korea sees as a threat to its sovereignty. But neither the US nor North Korea has shown any willingness to compromise as the situation has escalated in recent months. Last month, CNN reported that the US military updated its options for North Korea with the goal of giving Trump plans for a rapid response, according to two US military officials at the time. Officials said the options, which include a military response, would be presented to the President if Pyongyang conducted an underground nuclear or ballistic missile test that indicates the regime has made significant progress toward developing a weapon that could attack the US. But a US preemptive attack continues to be highly problematic option because the Pentagon has long believed North Korea would in turn attack South Korea.
Miscalculation is inevitable and coming now—it’s try or die for effective interception like THAAD


On Monday, North Korea fired five short-range missiles eastward. The projectiles fell into the Sea of Japan, what Koreans call the East Sea. The provocation followed Friday’s launch of two Nodong medium-range missiles, which can put a dent anywhere in South Korea and parts of Japan. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has launched 15 projectiles on four separate occasions since early last month in apparent shows of anger. Friday’s and Monday’s belligerent acts follow a series of threats to kill all the residents of Manhattan and launch “preemptive and offensive” nuclear strikes. The regime has also taken the unprecedented step of releasing photographs of leader Kim Jong Un standing next to what it implied is a thermonuclear device. As one friend whose son served on the peninsula in the 1990s told me in the last few hours, we’re “eyeball-to-eyeball” with the North Koreans at the moment. Tensions are high on the Korean peninsula this month, as approximately 300,000 South Korean and 17,000 American personnel participate in annual military exercises. Every year the Kim regime reacts to the drills, but this year its provocations have been “unprecedented,” as David Maxwell of Georgetown University told The Daily Beast today. Unfortunately for the international community, Mr. Kim this year has something to prove. As Maxwell points out, his provocations of last August—two South Korean soldiers were maimed in the Demilitarized Zone by land mines—were considered a “failure” because he did not anticipate Seoul’s decisive responses. And his belligerence since then has only worsened his predicament. Kim authorized the regime’s fourth nuclear test, on Jan. 6, and a launch of a long-range rocket, on Feb. 7. These acts did not divide the international community as they might have in an earlier time. Instead, Mr. Kim managed to create his nightmare scenario, the uniting of the United...
States, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China in a loose coalition against him. Thanks to this coalition, the UN Security Council unanimously imposed a fifth set of sanctions this month, in Resolution 2270, and Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. unilaterally enacted their own coercive measures. As Georgetown’s Maxwell notes, “I think the regime is doubling down after 2270 as it did not expect to get sanctioned harder than it had ever been.” Maxwell sees Kim having “to demonstrate strength to both internal and external audiences for fear of greater international pressure that will further cut access to resources.” To do that, he thinks Kim will have to speed up his nuclear, missile, and satellite programs “in anticipation of the loss of resources.” No surprise then that there are reports that the North is getting ready for a fifth detonation of a nuclear device. A test so soon after the last one would raise young Kim’s standing with the top brass, but it would not be enough for him to get back in the good graces of the flag officers. Since taking over the regime in December 2011 upon the unexpected death of his father, he has been feuding with the generals and admirals while trying to diminish their power inside ruling circles. As Richard Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center told The Daily Beast in e-mails, recent provocations have been accompanied by purges and executions. The disappearance and reported execution of Ri Yong Gil, the chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, early last month suggests Kim is losing control of the most important institution in North Korea. Ri, if he was in fact killed as South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap News Agency reports, would be at least the third four-star put to death in 13 months. In the short term, Kim probably will not do anything other than make threats and fire weapons into the sea. With the ongoing joint military exercises, the U.S. and South Korea are at a high state of readiness. Yet in May, when the exercises are over, he may engage in another “kinetic” incident. Leading North Korean analyst Bruce Bechtol, who told The Daily Beast that he thinks recent provocations are in response to the new “robust sanctions,” has studied the history of Pyongyang’s belligerence. In an article in Korea Times, he writes that the patterns of the last four decades show the North could very well initiate “a small violent provocation” against South Korea. Alison Evans of IHS Country Risk told USA Today that “increasing economic hardship in North Korea may well make more provocative action a logical option for the leadership.” Yet it is not only desperation that Washington has to worry about. Young
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Kim, for instance, could continue to miscalculate. “They will hold to the mistaken belief that the international community will not call its bluff and will eventually back down to ensure stability on the peninsula,” Maxwell says, referring to the North Koreans. “But I think the times they are a changing and it will not be business as usual as it was for the past six decades.” Whether through miscalculation, desperation, or bluff, the North Korean leadership could make a dangerously wrong move. The next batch of North Korean missiles, therefore, could be launched not east toward open sea but south, where 28,500 Americans help guard 49 million South Koreans.
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Deterrence is working now, but North Korea could collapse.


On February 7, North Korea conducted another long-range missile test, disguised as a satellite launch. The test comes after a nuclear test on January 6 and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in December of last year, indicating that the Kim Jong-un regime is intent on developing a secure and deliverable nuclear deterrent. If the regime achieves its objective, North Korea could become the most dangerous nuclear-weapons state in the world, not because the Kim regime is irrational, but because North Korea is the only existing nuclear-weapons state that could conceivably collapse at any moment. Then, U.S. policy makers will have to ask a very, very uncomfortable question: Should the United States come to terms with North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state and seek détente? The conventional logic with regard to nuclear deterrence rests on the principle that states are rational, care about self-preservation above all, and will not willingly commit suicide by attacking another state capable of exacting devastating retaliation. The general idea behind this school is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons would more or less prevent their use and would reduce, if not eliminate, a state’s incentive to start or escalate a destructive conflict. History has so far backed this argument. To be sure, there were the Berlin crises culminating in the Cuban missile crisis, the Able Archer exercise, the India-Pakistan crises and others, which nearly resulted in nuclear wars. Humanity may have been fortunate, rather than wise, with these crises. But strictly speaking, the fact is that nuclear deterrence, at least in today’s world with a small number of nuclear-weapons states, has stood its ground so far. According to this principle, North Korea should not be much of a threat. After all, Pyongyang’s motive for seeking a secure and deliverable nuclear arsenal is security, as the North Koreans themselves have stated many times. Of course, the Kim regime might launch provocations and even increase them with better nuclear capabilities. According to the logic of nuclear deterrence, however, Pyongyang will make rational calculations and will never escalate to a point where the regime would critically endanger its own security. Moreover, given North Korea’s military and economic weakness, the coun-
try is in no shape to expand beyond its borders. Unlike China, for example, North Korea will never become a potential regional hegemon or a serious competitor to the United States. But North Korea is not an ordinary nuclear-weapons state. The country is the only existing nuclear-weapons state that could see a sudden internal collapse. Critics might argue that predictions about the regime’s demise have been wrong before, but this logic does not stand: the fact that an event has not happened yet does not mean that the event will never happen. Indeed, the Iranian revolution began on January 7, 1978—one week after Jimmy Carter touted the country as “an island of stability.” How about the Soviet Union, which Robert Gates, during the 1980s, said would never collapse during his or his children’s lifetime? Then there is the Arab Spring, which caught the entire world by surprise. The common theme from these cases is that regime instability could manifest itself before analysts realize that it might be possible. Only with hindsight, can one point out why these uprisings happened at the time of their occurrence.
If North Korea collapses, they could lash out with nukes.


In a collapse scenario, the Kim regime will also be making decisions under enormous psychological pressure and with a great sense of paranoia. The regime understandably sees the United States as bent on seeking regime change in North Korea. The regime also fears that the collapse of the country and implosion of the Kim family’s cult of personality might not only mean loss of power, but loss of life, as with the cases of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. According to Andrei N. Lankov in his book, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia, a North Korean bureaucrat once said: “The human rights and the like might be a great idea, but if we start explaining it to our people, we will be killed in no time.”

Given the uniquely brutal nature of North Korea’s totalitarianism, such sentiments are only rational. During a collapse scenario, these psychological factors could greatly increase room for miscalculation or misperception for the Kim regime, particularly if it loses hope for survival and lacks access to reliable information, creating an environment that might even lead to the accidental launch of nuclear-tipped missiles. If stable nuclear-weapons states had come close to using nuclear weapons multiple times before, what might a collapsing, paranoid North Korea do with its arsenal?
North Korean war is devastating and regime collapse likely


When you combine this insecurity with the opaque nature of the North Korean regime, you have a situation that could easily spiral into outright conflict in the event that one of North Korea’s frequent military provocations (like the missile test) goes awry. Given North Korea’s massive conventional military and unknown number of nuclear weapons, conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. That’s not to say that war between the US and North Korea is likely, even after the new missile test. It isn’t. Rather, it’s that the risk of a catastrophic conflict is much higher than anyone should feel comfortable with, arguably more likely than anywhere else in the world. Here at home, many are preoccupied with the fight against ISIS and, before that, the Iranian nuclear program. North Korea gets far less public attention, but it is a literally existential threat to two of America’s closest allies, Japan and South Korea. And it doesn’t seem like there’s any solution in sight. North Korea’s government is weak and unpredictable. To understand why North Korea is so unstable, we need to start with something counterintuitive: North Korea is really weak. Pyongyang is one of the world’s poorest countries. Its GDP per capita is estimated at about $1,000, about 1/28th of South Korea’s. It faces chronic shortages of food and medical supplies, depending on Chinese aid to meet its citizens’ basic needs. There’s a real risk that the Kim regime collapses under the weight of its own mismanagement. Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world’s only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling...
a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they’re constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation. The problem is that this strategy is inherently unstable. There’s always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants. This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn’t have the kind of direct line of communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating.
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Weak missile defense independently causes South Korean preemptive strikes – that escalates

Kelly, Robert. [Associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University]. “South Korea’s THAAD Decision,” The Diplomat. 4-13-2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-koreas-thaad-decision/

Last month, I argued that North Korea’s combined nuclear and missile program was reaching a tipping point. Previously these systems could be defended—at the outer reaches of rationality, to be sure—as protection against possible American-led regime change. In practice, they were primarily tools for the extortion and blackmail of Pyongyang’s neighbors, most obviously South Korea. North Korea’s gangsterism, while objectionable, has generally been manageable. But if (when?) the Northern program expands into more, faster, and more powerful warheads and missiles (as seems likely), then it would morph into a serious, possibly existential threat to South Korea (and Japan). A North Korea with a few missiles and warheads is unnerving, an obvious concern for proliferation and blackmail, but not a state- and society-breaking threat to the neighborhood. But a North Korea with dozens, or even hundreds, of such weapons (in the coming decades) is a threat to the constitutional and even physical survival of South Korea and Japan. My greatest concern then for regional stability is that at some point Seoul elites will be so terrified of a spiraling arsenal of Northern nuclear weapons (following the logic of the security dilemma), that they will consider pre-emptive air-strikes (as Israel has done in Iraq and Syria). The possibility of a Northern response and slide into war is obvious. There is an alternative however—the deployment of robust missile defense. While hundreds of incoming missiles would overwhelm any current missile defense system, the technology is advanced enough now for at least modest coverage. This would buy time, providing South Korea with at least a basic “roof” against Northern threats.
Continued North Korean nuclear development cause preemptive strikes –those escalate

Kelly, Robert. [Associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University in South Korea]. “Will South Korea Have to Bomb the North, Eventually?,” 3-6-2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-south-korea-have-to-bomb-the-north-eventually/

As North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal, will Seoul have to consider targeting missile sites at some point? As North Korea continues to develop both nuclear weapons and the missile technology to carry them, pressure on South Korea to take preemptive military action will gradually rise. At some point, North Korea may have so many missiles and warheads that South Korea considers that capability to be an existential threat to its security. This is the greatest long-term risk to security and stability in Korea, arguably more destabilizing than a North Korean collapse. If North Korea does not arrest its nuclear and missile programs at a reasonably small, defensively-minded deterrent, then Southern elites will increasingly see those weapons as threats to Southern survival, not just tools of defense or gangsterish blackmail. During the Cold War, the extraordinary speed and power of nuclear missiles created a bizarre and frightening “balance of terror.” Both the Americans and Soviets had these weapons, but they were enormously vulnerable to a first strike. Under the logic “use them or lose them,” there were enormous incentives to launch first: If A did not get its missiles out of the silos quickly enough, they might be destroyed by B’s first strike. One superpower could then hold the other’s cities hostage to nuclear annihilation and demand concessions. This countervalue, “city busting” temptation was eventually alleviated by “assured second strike” technologies, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). SLBMs ensured the survivability of nuclear forces; hard-to-find submarines could ride out an enemy first strike and still retaliate. So the military value of launching first declined dramatically. By the 1970s, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had achieved enough survivability through various “hardening” efforts that nuclear bipolarity was relatively stable despite the huge number of weapons in the arms race. The Korean nuclear race does not have this stability and is unlikely to ever achieve it. Nuclear Korea today is more like the Cold War of the 1950s, when nuclear weapons were new and destabilizing, than in the 1970s when
they had been strategically integrated, and bipolarity was mature. Specifically, North Korea will never be able to harden its locations well enough to achieve assured second strike. North Korea is too small to pursue the geographic dispersion strategies the Soviets tried, and too poor to build a reliable SLBM force or effective air defense. Moreover, U.S. satellite coverage makes very hard for the North to conceal anything of great importance. North Korea’s nuclear weapons will always be highly vulnerable. So North Korea will always face the “use it or lose it” logic that incentives a first strike.

On the Southern side, its small size and extreme demographic concentration in a few large cities makes the Republic of Korea an easy target for a nuclear strike. More than half of South Korea’s population lives in greater Seoul alone (more than 20 million people), and Seoul’s suburbs begin just thirty miles from the demilitarized zone. This again raises the temptation value of a Northern strike. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were so large, that only a massive first strike would have led to national collapse. In South Korea by contrast, nuking only about five large cities would likely be enough to push South Korea toward national-constitutional breakdown. Given its extreme urbanization and centralization, South Korea is extremely vulnerable to a WMD and/or decapitation strike. While large-scale North Korean offensive action is highly unlikely – Pyongyang’s elites most likely just want to survive to enjoy their gangster high life – nuclear weapons do offer a conceivable route to Northern military victory for the first time in decades: a first-strike mix of counterforce detonations to throw the Southern military into disarray; limited counter-value city strikes to spur social and constitutional break-down in the South; followed by an invasion and occupation before the U.S. military could arrive in force; and a standing threat to nuke Japan or the United States as well should they intervene. Again, this is unlikely, and I still strongly believe an Allied victory is likely even if the North were to use nuclear weapons. But the more nukes the North builds, the more this threat, and the “use it or lose it” first strike incentives, grow. It is for this reason that the U.S. has pushed South Korea so hard on missile defense. Not only would missile defense save lives, but it would dramatically improve Southern national-constitutional survivability. (Decentralization would also help enormously, and I have argued for that repeatedly in conferences in Korea, but it is unlikely.) A missile shield would lessen the military-offensive value of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, so re-
producing both first-strike temptations in Pyongyang and preemptive air-strike pressure in Seoul. Unfortunately South Korea is not hardened meaningfully to ride-out Northern nuclear strikes. Missile defense in South Korea has become politicized as a U.S. plot to dominate South Korean foreign policy (yes, really) and provoke China. (Although opinion may, at last, be changing on this.) Air drills are routinely ignored. And no one I know in South Korea knows where their shelters are or what to do in case of nuclear strike. Ideally North Korea would de-nuclearize. And we should always keep talking to North Korea. Pyongyang is so dangerous that freezing it out is a bad idea. Talking does not mean we must be taken advantage of by the North’s regular bargaining gimmicks. But we must admit that North Korea seems unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons. The program goes back decades, to the 1960s. Rumor has it that Pyongyang has devoted more than 5 percent of GDP in the last two decades to developing these weapons. The program continued through the 1990s, even as more than a million North Koreans starved to death in a famine resulting from post-Cold War economic breakdown. The North has repeatedly lied and flimflammed to outsiders like the ROK government and the IAEA to keep its programs alive clandestinely. Recently Kim Jong Un has referred to nuclear weapons as the “nation’s life.” We could even go a step further and admit that a few Northern nuclear missiles are tolerable. If we put ourselves in Pyongyang’s shoes, a limited nuclear deterrent makes sense. Conventional, North Korea is falling further and further behind. No matter how big the North Korean army gets quantitatively, it is an increasingly weak shield against high-tech opponents. U.S. regime change in the Middle East has clearly incentivized despots everywhere in the world to consider the ultimate security which nuclear weapons provide. The North Koreans have openly said that nuclear weapons ensure their post-9/11 regime security. As distasteful as it may be to us, there is a logic to that. A small, defensive-minded deterrent – say five to ten warhead-tipped missiles that could threaten limited retaliation against Southern cities – would be an objectively rational hedge against offensive action by the U.S. or South Korea. Indeed, this is almost certainly what Pyongyang says to Beijing to defend its program to its unhappy patron. But this is the absolute limit of responsible Northern nuclear deployment and it is probably where the DPRK is right now. Further nuclear and missile development would exceed even the most expansive definition of North Korean security
and takes us into the realm of nuclear blackmail, highly dangerous proliferation, and an offensive first-strike capability. Pyongyang does not need, for example, the ICBM it is supposedly working on. In this context, my greatest fear for Korean security in the next two decades is North Korean nuclearization continuing apace, generating dozens, perhaps hundreds of missiles and warheads, coupled to rising South Korean paranoia and pressure to preemptively strike. There is no possible national security rationale for Pyongyang to keep deploying beyond what it has now, and if it does, expect South Korean planners to increasingly consider preemptive airstrikes. North Korea with five or ten missiles (some of which would fail or be destroyed in combat) is a terrible humanitarian threat, but not an existential one to South Korea (and Japan). South Korea could ride out, perhaps, five urban strikes, and Japan even more.
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With a ICBM and no BMD, North Korea perceives US commitment as low – causes provocation


The first issue is the ICBM threat from this region. North Korea is believed to be making consistent efforts to develop an ICBM that can reach the US mainland, such as the Taepo-Dong 2 or Musudan. If North Korea acquires an ICBM with a nuclear warhead, the missile could threaten the US. North Korea might then perceive that it has more a reliable deterrent against the US military commitment, while it has a minimum strike capability against a handful of US cities. This perception could intensify its provocative behavior in the region. To prevent such a perception, the US mainland needs to have a BMD system. From this perspective, theater-based missile defense would not be enough for regional stability. If North Korea completed ICBM development, and felt confident that it could deter the US military commitment, the danger of regional provocation by ballistic missile would be more serious. To counter such confidence, both the US homeland BMD and theater BMD play an essential role in regional security. Without these damage-limitation capabilities against ballistic missile threat, a North Korea ICBM could worsen the regional security situation. In this sense, deployment of the US mainland missile defense system needs to be continued, in addition to deployment of theater BMD.
North Korean threat is likely and escalates to world war via miscalculation

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While domestic and international punditry endlessly debates the latest atomic provocation by the so-called “hermit kingdom,” know one thing: the danger presented by North Korea is very real—but for reasons that are exactly obvious to the untrained observer. Consider this: a 2013 report by Rand Corporation expert Bruce Bennett noted that just one North Korean nuke detonated in Seoul with a 10 kiloton yield could very well cause 200,000 or so deaths along with a similar number of serious injuries. The financial cost could be as high as $1.5 trillion and likely much more if South Korea then had to foot the bill to rebuild the North after a war. And while the chances of the so-called Democratic People’s Republic ever launching a nuclear blitz against the South, Japan, or America are next to nil, the possibility of nuclear war still remains. So how do we go from nil to nuclear holocaust? Simple: war by accident. Consider this: Kim Jong-boom loves to push the tension meter, especially when he feels the world is not paying enough attention to his regime. And let’s face it: planet Earth has been a little preoccupied with Russia annexing Crimea, the never-ending civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIS, and what seems like China’s unfolding master plan to dominate the South China Sea and maybe all of Asia. Nuclear tests are surely the best way to get Pyongyang back in the headlines. But what happens if Kim one day pushes too far? And what if it happens unintentionally? If current patterns hold, North Korea could very well test a medium- to long-range missile in the next few weeks. While the DPRK’s missiles certainly inspire a tremendous amount of fear, they don’t seem to have exactly mastered the fine art known as accuracy. The danger is quite obvious: what happens if a North Korean missile goes off course and slams into South Korea or Japan? While Tokyo and Seoul both sport advanced American-made missile defense systems, there’s always the possibility of
an accidental crash landing—and lives could be lost. What happens next is where things could get dangerous very quickly. South Korea’s President Park, her own family the victim of Pyongyang’s hit squads, would not take kindly to losing more of her citizens to North Korean aggression. Neither would Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Imagine if a North Korean rocket accidentally crashed into Japan. Tokyo would very likely retaliate in some fashion militarily, considering Abe has done what he can to reinforce the narrative that Japan must become a “normal country”—and that means Tokyo being able to respond against military threats. The recent reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution makes this quite clear. So let’s assume the injured party responds—by, say, South Korea launching its own attack against the North’s missile complex that fired the weapon. North Korea, feeling the pressure to up the ante and leave no challenge unmet, then fires 20 or so artillery rounds into Seoul. The city goes into absolute panic. Millions of people clog the streets and mass transit systems to escape the carnage. Hundreds if not thousands die due to panic—not the artillery shells. South Korea would then respond again…and a cycle of escalation leading to war would begin. This is where things get really tricky. The United States is bound by treaty to protect both South Korea and Japan from external threat, and provides both nations that all important “nuclear umbrella.” China, while it might not always be happy about it, is North Korea’s only ally. It would very likely step in to protect Pyongyang if the regime’s survival were at stake, as it wouldn’t want a united and eventually powerful Korea led by the South—one that could still have American troops within its borders. With Beijing and Washington both sporting nuclear weapons, and with a whole host of pressure points between them, it would take very little for just one accidental missile launched by North Korea to spark a crisis no one has any interest in seeing to the bitter end. While North and South Korea are still technically at war, no one wants the ultimate “frozen conflict” to burn red hot thanks to atomic fire. Kim Jong-un is clearly an international pariah, but one who could accidentally start a conflict for the history books. We should remember this as the debate over Pyongyang’s nuclear test marches on.
Tensions are at an unprecedented high – conflict is inevitable

Today News [news agency, citing Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at Australian National University, Aidan Foster-Carter, a Korea expert at the British, Chang Yong-Seok, a veteran expert at the Research Institute for peace and unification in Seoul National University, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun, Giles Hewit, AFP’s Asian commentator]. “The Korean peninsula on the brink of major conflict,” TN. 2-17-2017, http://www.todaynews24h.com/the-korean-peninsula-on-the-brink-of-major-conflict/

Relations between the two regions of the Korean peninsula into a State of being split by far the deepest, causing conflict could explode at any time. The relationship is not good between the two Koreas appear to continue to suffer serious erosion after the official communication lines between the two sides was cut off and the stress problems appear, signaling the potential risk in the coming time. In theory, North and South Korea are still in a State of war throughout the 6 years of the past decade, and the two countries have also experienced a series of crises in the past, but the situation never became dangerous as at present. The nuclear test and missile launch by Pyongyang recently extinguished any hope about the prospects for negotiation and dialogue between the two regions. Despite the harsh response from the international community, North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un confirms will pursue to the end the development of nuclear weapons, while Seoul declared adamantly responded any provocative move from Pyongyang. The current deadlock situation are increasingly tend to turn into a “cold war” on the North Korean nuclear issue, between China, Russia and North Korea, with the United States, Japan and South Korea. Tension on the Korean peninsula has reached a peak last week when Seoul stopped all cooperation activities at the Kaesong joint industrial park. Despite being a rather sensitive area located on the border of Korea Kaesong maintained, existence after more serious incident in the two countries ’ relations since this industrial operations since 2004. “It really is a miracle when this industrial zone can exist so long,” Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at Australian National University, reviews. But now magic has ended and it’s hard to hope for recovery. On 10 February, in response to the move Pyongyang orbit satellite launch, Seoul declared retired 124 South Korean businesses in Kaesong, the North Korean workers 53000 will lose jobs. Pyongyang also responded in-
stantly by expelling the entire South Korean business managers and freeze their accounts, at the same time put this industrial park under the supervision of the army. North Korea also claims the whole cutting electricity and water supplies for industrial parks. “I believe that Kaesong can hardly work again. Things have gone too far and North Korea as South Korea were never intended to solve disagreements, “said Petrov. The risk of outbreak of conflict The Kaesong industrial zone was established thanks to the diplomatic policy of “sunshine” that South Korea applied with North Korea in the period 1998-2008, with the main aim is to appease Pyongyang with economic assistance and cooperation. South Korea considers this industrial park is a symbol of the partnership the two regions, is the first step in promoting market reforms in North Korea, advance to replicate this model. Many analysts feel the dismay when “door free trade” only one small but very important in the region of the border militarized most closely to this world has been closed. “Kaesong zone, when South Korea and North Korea will not have any platform to maintain regular contact. This is a very serious step backwards”, Aidan Foster-Carter, a Korea expert at the British. Chang Yong-Seok, a veteran expert at the Research Institute for peace and unification in Seoul National University, also said that one of the most important contributions of the Kaesong industrial park is contributing to maintain the soft in relations between the two regions. “Both North Korea have benefitted in Kaesong area should they somehow are tempered to maintain the operation of it. But all has ended, “said Chang asserted. The opportunity for dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang as declining than when on 12/2, North Korea announced two severed the last hot line between the two countries. After the move, the South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman Moon Sang-gyun claimed the risk of conflict will inevitably rise in the border areas are militarized thick between the two countries. “The hot line has not been used for diplomatic dialogue, but they are still used to promote and assign the schedule of the talks of the two sides. The last time, despite the stress, they can still be maintained for the purpose of avoiding conflict occurs, but now this chance has not left, “Giles Hewit, AFP’s Asian commentator identified Besides that, many analysts believe that North Korea will inevitably negative reaction to the sanctions of the Un Security Council after the nuclear test and missile launch. In March, South Korea and the United States is expected to conduct a series of military exercises that North Korea’s an-
nual General considered the actions threatening to territorial sovereignty and instigate tensions escalate. Pyongyang will certainly increase the dynamics responded, especially when Seoul and Washington began to discuss the deployment of high-altitude defense system (THAAD) last stage on the territory of South Korea. “South Korea and the United States of America declared the rehearsal will scale larger than usual and North Korea will certainly have the strong reaction. So, I believe that the world will witness the escalation of unprecedented tension on the Korean peninsula in the coming years,” said Chang.
THAAD deployment’s necessary to prevent out-of-the-blue biological or nuclear missile strike by North Korea


Growing North Korean Nuclear and Missile Threats Pyongyang asserts that it already has the ability to attack the continental United States, American bases in the Pacific, and U.S. allies South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons. In March 2015, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong warned that Pyongyang now “has the power of conducting a pre-emptive strike.”[2] Pyongyang announced that its February 2013 nuclear test was of a “miniaturized and lighter” nuclear weapon that could fit on a missile, giving the regime the ability to “make a precision strike at bases of aggression and blow them up with a single blow, no matter where they are on earth.”[3] North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile force that could strike South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military bases in Asia. Pyongyang has deployed at least 400 Scud short-range tactical ballistic missiles, 300 No-Dong medium-range missiles, and 100 to 200 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Scud missiles threaten South Korea, the No-Dong can range a portion of South Korea and all of Japan, and the Musudan can hit U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam. U.S. experts estimate that Pyongyang currently has 10–16 nuclear weapons.[4] Dr. Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, has concluded that North Korea could have 20 nuclear weapons by 2016.[5] Chinese nuclear experts have warned that North Korea may already have 20 nuclear warheads and could enrich enough uranium to double its arsenal by 2016.[6] The Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) has predicted a worst-case scenario of Pyongyang having 100 nuclear weapons by 2020.[7] Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that the regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization—the ability to place nuclear weapons on its No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles—and can threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons.[8] Following an August 2013 meeting between South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a Ministry of Defense official commented that both countries agreed that North Korea could “miniaturize
nuclear warheads small enough to mount on ballistic missiles in the near future.”[9] In April 2013, U.S. officials told reporters that North Korea “can put a nuclear weapon on a missile, that they have missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, but not ones that can go more than 1,000 miles.”[10] In October 2014, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, senior U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula, told reporters that North Korea has the ability to produce a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile.[11] A South Korean National Assembly member revealed that some of the flight tests of No Dong missiles were flown on a higher trajectory in order to reduce their range to 650 kilometers. As such, a No Dong missile could be used to attack South Korea with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.[12] North Korea Threatens Nuclear Attacks North Korea has repeatedly threatened to use its nuclear arsenal in preemptive attacks against the United States, South Korea, and Japan. According to a senior North Korean military defector, in 2012, Kim Jong-un approved a new war plan in which Pyongyang would use nuclear weapons early in a conflict—prior to U.S. reinforcements arriving—in order to occupy all of South Korea within seven days.[13] In 2013, the regime declared that inter-Korean relations were in a state of war after it revoked the armistice ending the Korean War, all inter-Korean non-aggression agreements, and all previous North Korean commitments to abandon its nuclear weapons. The North Korean People’s Army warned that “the [South Korean] presidential Blue House and all headquarters of the puppet regime will be targeted. If the South recklessly provokes us again, the sea of fire at Yeonpyeong will turn into a sea of fire at the Blue House.”[14] In March 2013, the North Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee decided: [A]ny military provocation in the West Sea of Korea or along the Military Demarcation Line will not be limited to a local war, but develop into an all-out war, a nuclear war. [The first strike will reduce] U.S. military bases in South Korea and [South Korean] ruling institutions including [the Blue House] and puppet army’s bases to ashes at once.[15] North Korea also threatened to turn Seoul and Washington into “seas of fire” through a “precise nuclear strike.”[16] Inadequate South Korean Missile Defense The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[17] Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. Despite the growing
North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework. Only Low-Level Interceptors. South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[18] South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). Resisting an Allied System. Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program. In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The agreement would have provided Seoul with access to information collected by Japan’s high-tech intelligence satellites, Aegis ships, and early-warning and anti-submarine aircraft, thus improving South Korean defense against North Korean missiles. But lingering South Korean animosities stemming from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century forced Seoul to cancel the agreement. In December 2014, a modified version of the agreement was signed which allows voluntary passing of intelligence about North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear activities between Japan and South Korea through the U.S. Department of Defense. Need for Layered Missile Defense A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or
biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles’ trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD’s large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery would complement Patriot’s point defense and enable defense of more military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed. A Lockheed Martin simulation showed that a single THAAD battery could defend most of South Korea against a North Korean missile attack, while two batteries would protect all of Korea except the southeast and provide greater protection against multiple missile attacks. Three batteries would cover all of South Korea.[20] The four most recent senior U.S. commanders in Korea[21] have recommended that South Korea should deploy the THAAD system and join the allied missile defense network. Similarly, the two most recent South Korean Defense Ministers Han Min Koo and Kim Kwan-jin have assessed that THAAD would improve the country’s defense.
THAAD deployment is crucial to avoid North Korea war


The April 2015 interim nuclear agreement with Iran generated speculation that a similar agreement may be possible with North Korea. However, Pyongyang has made emphatically clear that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and declared the Six Party Talks negotiations “null and void.” Kim Jong-un and all major senior government entities have vowed to maintain North Korea’s nuclear weapons, even amending the constitution to forever enshrine North Korea as a nuclear nation. North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile force that can strike South Korea, Japan, and U.S. military bases in Asia. Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that the regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles, and can currently threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies need to deploy sufficient defenses against the growing North Korean missile and nuclear threats. To deter and defend against ballistic missile attacks, the United States, South Korea, and Japan need a comprehensive, integrated, multilayered ballistic missile defense (BMD) system capable of multiple attempts at intercepting incoming missiles at various phases. Having multiple systems providing complementary capabilities improves the likelihood of successful defense against missile attack. Yet, despite this growing threat, South Korea insists on exposing its citizens to a greater threat than necessary. Seoul resists procuring more effective interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage so fewer citizens are protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile, all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) would be more effective than existing South Korean systems to defend military forces, population centers, and critical targets at a higher altitude over a larger area with more reaction time than existing systems in South Korea. Even the U.S. deployment of THAAD BMD to better protect American troops on the Korean Peninsula has been controversial due to Chinese pressure on Seoul. The Park Geun-hye
Administration pursues a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in order to postpone public discussion on THAAD deployment. South Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyungwook described Seoul’s position as three ‘no’s’ – “no [U.S. deployment] request, no consultation, and no decision.” But a February 2015 Joongang Ilbo poll showed that 56 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD. Missile defense is most effective when systems are integrated into a seamless and cohesive network. Integrating South Korean, U.S., and Japanese sensors would enable more accurate interceptions by tracking attacking missiles from multiple angles and multiple points throughout the flight trajectory. Yet South Korea resists integrating its system into a more comprehensive allied network due to lingering historic animosities with Japan. In 2014, South Korea advocated delaying the planned transfer of wartime operational control of its military forces because it felt insufficiently prepared to defend itself against North Korean attacks. Postponing the OPCON transfer ensured maintaining a combined allied deterrent and defense effort. It would be illogical for Seoul to prefer going it alone on missile defense rather than availing itself of better interceptors and a more comprehensive allied BMD network. The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 2 Rebuffing Beijing’s Disingenuous Objections Beijing claims that THAAD deployment would be against China’s security interests. China overlooks, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles went against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Is Beijing concerned that an improvement of a defensive system would impede North Korea’s ability to attack South Korea, Japan, and the United States? Or is China worried that its own ability to threaten and target the U.S. and allies will be curtailed? While deploying THAAD would improve defenses against a North Korean attack on South Korea, it would not constrain Chinese ICBM missiles. Chinese ICBM trajectories would exceed THAAD interceptor range, altitude, and speed capabilities. THAAD interceptors are designed to attack missiles heading toward the interceptors in the terminal inbound phase, not missiles flying away in the boost and mid-range phases of an outbound ICBM. The THAAD’s accompanying X-Band radar would be unable to see or track the ICBMs. The THAAD X-Band radar—which can only see in a 90 degree arc—would be directed at North Korea, not China. Chinese ICBM trajectories would be outside of the X-band radar range. Washington has emphasized
that even its homeland BMD capabilities based in the continental United States provide for defense only from a limited ICBM attack from North Korea and Iran and are not intended or scaled to affect China’s or Russia’s nuclear forces. According to remarks made by Frank A. Rose, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, a comprehensive U.S. defense against the larger and more sophisticated Chinese and Russian arsenals would be “extremely challenging and costly.” THAAD would also be poorly positioned against Chinese medium-range missiles. Examining the locations of Chinese SRBM and MRBMs indicates that THAAD deployed in South Korea could help defend South Korea against a Chinese DF-15 SRBM attack from Tonghua in northeast China since those missiles would be in the same trajectory as those launched from North Korea. However, THAAD would be unable to intercept Chinese DF-21 MRBMs launched from Dengshahe, Laiwu, and Hanchang toward South Korea or Japan. The THAAD X-Band radar would have minimal capabilities to monitor Chinese missiles bound for South Korea or Japan. Since Chinese technical objections are without merit and THAAD does not threaten China in any way, Beijing’s true objective becomes apparent—to prevent improving and integrating allied defensive capabilities. The THAAD deployment issue is a microcosm of the greater North Korea problem. Once again, China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the precipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations. On the THAAD issue, China has taken Pyongyang’s side over that of Seoul, disregarding South Korea’s legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger. Beijing again characteristically pressures Seoul rather than Pyongyang. In essence, China wants a role in South Korea’s national security decision-making by being able to exercise a veto over Seoul’s defense procurement decisions. China may be Seoul’s largest trading partner, but it is clearly not South Korea’s friend. South Korea should instead articulate to its citizens—as well as the Chinese leadership—the need for a more effective missile defense system to better protect its citizens. Seoul should rebuff Chinese interference in exercising its sovereign right to defend itself against the North Korean threat brought on, in part, by Beijing’s unwillingness to confront its belligerent ally. Conclusion Deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would enhance South Korea’s defense against potentially catastrophic nuclear, biological, or chemical
attacks and well as impede Pyongyang’s ability to engage in coercive diplomacy. The decision to deploy THAAD is a sovereign right that Seoul should base on national security objectives and the defensive needs of the nation. To date, the Park Geun-hye administration has demurred from redressing a national security shortfall out of concern of agitating Beijing. Seoul should not subjugate the defense of its citizens to economic blackmail by Beijing. Seoul and Washington should make clear to Beijing that Chinese pressure tactics would be better applied to its ally North Korea whose development of nuclear weapons and missiles have caused South Korea and the U.S. to take defensive actions.
THAAD makes North Korean threats a non-factor—there’s a military consensus


Recently, North Korea claimed to have tested a fusion weapon—very unlikely due to the low recorded seismic activity—and launched its sixth long-range rocket that placed a satellite into orbit. Congressman Mac Thornberry, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, is correct that South Korea needs the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and America must boost homeland missile defense and modernize its nuclear deterrent for protection. Policy leaders should take the chairman’s recommendations seriously to ensure U.S. allies and citizens are safe from potential harm. THAAD uses a radar to detect and target incoming missile threats. The system then fires an interceptor from a truck-mounted launcher and kinetic energy destroys short- and medium-range missiles in the terminal stage of flight. THAAD is considered one of the most advanced missile-defense systems—it has successfully completed 100 percent of tests since 2005. This is why America deployed a THAAD unit to Guam to deter aggression from Pyongyang and defend the Pacific region. General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, has specifically recommended the system to protect Seoul from Chinese and North Korean threats—the system can counter some threats from Beijing and just about all threats from Pyongyang. Right now, the U.S. has limited protection from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. The GMD launches ground-based interceptors (GBIs) to destroy incoming missiles in space from sites located in Alaska and California. Vice Admiral James D. Syring, Director, U.S. Missile Defense Agency, stated at a recent event in Washington that GBIs will increase to 37 interceptors in 2016 and 44 interceptors in 2017. While GMD has received criticism due to high costs and uneven success of flight tests, the system needs upgrades and more testing to increase reliability and effectiveness.
BMD works and can defend against North Korea


The lack of realistic nuclear threats requiring a guaranteed second strike and the limited utility of strategic deterrence against Iran and North Korea raise the question of which platform best addresses modern nuclear-armed ballistic-missile threats. In the event that deterrence fails, BMD becomes the best way to reduce an attack’s likelihood and minimize its consequences. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is responsible for developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), which is used by the Navy, Army, and Air Force, and includes Aegis-equipped ships conducting patrols, sea-based sensors, land-based versions of Aegis, ground-based interceptors and sensors, deployable land-based radars and missiles, and space-based sensors. BMDS is designed to protect against Iranian and North Korean missile launches (nuclear and conventional) and has made significant strides in recent years, particularly the Aegis-integrated radar, tracking, and weapon system equipped on board Ticonderoga -class cruisers and Arleigh Burke–class destroyers (DDG). The successful completion of the April 2011 flight test, FTM 15, demonstrated that an Aegis destroyer can launch a ballistic-missile interceptor (SM3 Blk IA) and successfully destroy an enemy ballistic missile based on tracking data from an Army radar relayed through an Air Force satellite. The Navy and MDA followed up this test with another successful launch, FTM 20, in February, when an SM3 Blk IA destroyed a ballistic missile based solely on track data provided by an Air Force satellite. Additionally, the Navy and MDA have demonstrated the next series of ballistic-missile interceptors (SM3 Blk IB) can successfully discriminate a target from potential decoys and debris and destroy the proper target. The Navy and MDA are building on these achievements by developing and fielding more powerful BMD capabilities as well as working with European and Middle Eastern allies to defeat Iranian missiles through the European Phased Adaptive Approach. In response to North Korea, the United States has developed a special partnership with Japan, which is co-developing the SM3 Blk IIA ballistic-missile interceptor, has four Aegis-equipped ships, and
3 Pro Evidence

provides basing rights to land-based BMD systems. The BMDS has proven itself in both testing and real-world conditions and should continue to be developed and deployed to defend against Iran and North Korea.
BMD de-escalates all kinds of conflicts - laundry list of reasons


The Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Regional Deterrence Architectures This new deterrence challenge cannot be met by missile defense alone. The Obama administration has set out a comprehensive strategy for strengthening regional deterrence architectures, building on solid bipartisan foundations from the two decades since the end of the Cold War. 18 Key elements of that approach are the following: • Strong political partnerships between the United States and its allies and partners that focus cooperative action on new (as opposed to past) problems of international security; • Preservation of a balance of conventional forces that is favorable to the interests of the United States and its allies/partners; • Conventional strike capabilities, including a long-range prompt component; • Ballistic missile defense in two dimensions: (1) protection against regional threats to U.S. forces and U.S. allies/partners and (2) protection of the American homeland against limited strikes from countries like North Korea and Iran; • Resilience in the cyber and space domains; • A nuclear component tailored to the unique historical, geographical, and other features of each region where the nuclear “umbrella” is extended.19 These various elements contribute in different but complementary ways to the deterrence of regional aggression under the nuclear shadow. This comprehensive approach is the game changer, not any single element. It provides a strong and diverse tool kit for addressing the particular challenges of deterrence in a regional conflict against a state like North Korea. Missile defense is an essential part of the solution, but not the solution in and of itself. The Strategic Values of BMD As argued above, for deterrence in a regional context to be effective, it must be effective in decisively influencing the adversary’s assessments of resolve and restraint at each of the decision points in the transition from “gray zone” to “red zone” to “black-and-white zone”. Missile defense operates differently but constructively on each of those main decision points. Before illustrating this assessment, it is important to understand the current state of U.S. missile defense capability. With the systems in hand and in current development, it is possible for the United States and its allies to have a defense in depth from attacks by states like North Korea. Defenses against regional ballistic mis-
siles have been developed, successfully tested, and deployed. Defenses against intercontinental-range missiles were deployed during the George W. Bush administration before developing and testing were complete and have a number of reliability and other performance problems. But as a general proposition, the existing homeland defense posture is effective against small numbers of early generation intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Early generation missiles are relatively unsophisticated technically, meaning that they take longer to ready to launch, are slower in flight, lack missile defense countermeasures and, if not the result of a rigorous development and testing program, may lack reliability. An early generation force, as opposed to an early generation missile, is also likely to be relatively small in number. Later generation missiles fly sooner, faster, further, and more reliably, may have missile defense countermeasures along with multiple warheads, and are likely to exist in numbers sufficient to enable the kind of salvo launches that can overwhelm either sensors or interceptors or both. The shortcomings of available BMD systems in dealing with countermeasures and large raid sizes are well known. Accordingly, the Obama administration set out as national policy commitment to (1) maintain an advantageous defensive posture of the homeland against limited strikes by countries like North Korea and Iran and (2) field phased, adaptive regional defenses in partnership with U.S. allies in each region where it offers security guarantees. In follow up to the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the administration and its regional partners have made substantial progress toward the latter objective. The administration has also taken subsequent decisions to adjust the homeland posture in the light of new information about the threat, by implementing certain hedge capabilities identified in the 2010 BMDR (and emplacing additional Ground-based Interceptors in available silos once technical fixes are confirmed). With this defense-in-depth portfolio of improving missile defenses, what then are the particular strategic values of BMD in this comprehensive approach to strengthening regional deterrence? And what other values should be accounted for in a comprehensive stock-take of BMD strategic values? In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitions from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It: 1. Creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of the attacker. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby undermining a strategy of firing one or
two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage. 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political pressure for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping to free the United States and its allies from escalation decisions that might seem premature. When a crisis has become a hot war and where testing is underway in the red zone, missile defense again has various strategic values. It: 1. Helps to preserve freedom of action for the United States and its partners by selectively safeguarding key military and political assets. 2. Increases time and opportunity to attack adversary’s missile force with kinetic and non-kinetic means, potentially eliminating his capacity for follow-on attacks or decisive political or military effects. 3. Reduces or eliminates the vulnerability of allies, thus reinforcing their intent to remain in the fight. If and as a regional adversary begins to contemplate possible nuclear attacks on the American homeland, perhaps only in revenge, missile defense: 1. Significantly reduces if not eliminates the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to one or a few shots, thus taking the adversary’s “cheap shot” off the table and driving him to larger salvos that will seem less like blackmail than all-out nuclear war and thus should be deterrable by other means. 2. Reduces the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to repeat attacks, thus reinforcing its intention to remain in the fight. A catalogue of the strategic values of BMD must also include an assessment of its contributions in peacetime to the foundations of effective deterrence in crisis and war. In this context, it: 1. Provides opportunities for close defense cooperation among the United States and its allies and security partners. 2. Signals the resolve of the United States and its allies/partners to stand up to coercion and aggression (regional missile defense can be demonstrated in live testing with our partners to demonstrate that resolve). 3. Erodes the perceived potential effectiveness for both military and political purposes of nascent ballistic missile capabilities. 4. Imposes additional costs and uncertainty on those considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons to challenge U.S. regional guarantees. 5. Encourages engagement with Russia and China to slow or halt missile proliferation in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects. 6. Provides non-nuclear allies a means to contribute to the strengthening of ex-
tended deterrence, thereby reducing incentives to acquire nuclear deterrents of their own. This catalogue identifies 16 specific strategic values of missile defense. Some of them are direct to the deterrence challenge, some indirect, and some are relevant only to related challenges. Of note, U.S. allies participating in the BMD project have identified and elaborated many of these strategic values. In the language of strategy, BMD reinforces the comprehensive approach by lowering the cost and risk of our continued resolve and by raising the cost and risk for the challenger, essentially taking his “cheap shots” off the table and requiring him to resort to larger salvo shots that undermine a blackmail strategy of doing a little damage while threatening to do more. Missile defense also has important assurance values, especially for those allies who might be targeted by an adversary’s efforts to split the United States from its allies.
BMD is stabilizing and leads to crisis stability in the region– deters North Korean nuclear use, regardless of true effectiveness of BMD capabilities.

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In contrast, however, risk aversion appears to play mostly a stabilizing role in crisis management with a smaller nuclear power where strategic BMD is concerned. Facing a threat from a small nuclear power, and aware of its strategic BMD limitations, the United States cannot count on its missile defenses working reasonably well. On the other hand, facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD not working reasonably well. Each side is deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisis. This situation is portrayed conceptually in Charts 1 and 2 below, where risk aversion acts as a stabilizing presence in the simplified two-country game. Chart 1 illustrates no risk aversion, while Chart 2 does. The shaded “island” depicted in the figure is the product of the risk aversion of each country in this game-theoretic construct and is labeled as a “risk-aversive effect.” Both sides in the crisis have the same perceptions in this theoretical case. However, given the stakes involved, adversaries in the crisis will likely have uncertainty and be aversive to risk. The greater the stakes, the greater the risk aversion. Is this stabilizing risk-aversive effect robust? No. Is it resilient over time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis China? Not likely, though China should not ignore this important additional dimension of the BMD issue. But this risk-aversive stability effect does not appear to be trivial; it is better than nothing; and it should not be ignored, particularly where North Korea is concerned. It is possible to discern a few deterrent characteristics of thin strategic BMD; there are elements of both fragility and robustness, namely that it is: Not affected by small changes in
either offense or defense; Affected by large offense increases, where modest defenses are simply Overwhelmed; Potentially affected by important BMD technology changes; More robust against North Korean offensive technological changes than those by Iran, as Iran can bring far more resources to bear to defeat strategic BMD than can North Korea; and Subject to being eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what have I got to lose?”). This purely qualitative analysis suggests that from an “arms race stability” perspective, there are noteworthy, however not decisive, destabilizing aspects to strategic BMD, even modest deployments or even just an active engineering development program. However, from a crisis management perspective, there are important stabilizing dimensions to a thin strategic BMD posture, where risk aversion on both sides in a confrontation appears to augment the important deterrent effects of nuclear weapons themselves. This risk aversive effect leads each side to hedge against the possibility that the other country’s systems are more effective than expected, while its own systems are less effective than expected, suggesting that actions to upset the status quo could leave the country significantly worse off versus taking no action at all. Observations on the strategic implications of thin U.S. strategic BMD are: BMD performance and capabilities are very important, but they are not the only metric by which BMD should be assessed; From a crisis stability perspective, limited BMD deployments appear to be stabilizing as long as they remain limited; From an arms race stability perspective, there are elements of both stability and instability present; Geopolitically, it provides a useful tool for messaging and affecting adversary perceptions, at least at limited deployment levels; Having no strategic BMD would deny the United States certain strategic and geopolitical benefits that have already advanced U.S. security interests; In the absence of agreed limitations on strategic BMD deployments, countries are likely to want to hedge against the possibility of larger such adversary BMD deployments to preserve the credibility of their offense nuclear deterrent. Going beyond a thin U.S. strategic missile defense posture should only be considered when: A suitable answer can be provided as to how China and Russia can be persuaded to turn their backs on decades of policy and behavior and accept a serious degradation of their strategic deterrent capabilities; or New defensive technologies are developed that fundamentally change the offense-dominant nature of the nuclear domain. 3
THAAD is key to deterrence, defense against nukes, and reduces the need for preemptive attacks – recent missile tests prove


North Korea’s test launch of an ICBM that could target the United States within the next few years has fixated attention on how Washington and its allies should respond to the growing military threat. However, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities are already an existential threat to South Korea and Japan. Given these circumstances, the United States and its allies must deploy sufficient defenses to deter and defend against the growing North Korean missile and nuclear threats. Shortly after assuming power in late 2011, Kim Jong-un directed the creation of a new war plan to complete an invasion of South Korea within a week using nuclear weapons and missiles. A senior North Korean military defector indicated that the North’s strategy would be to quickly occupy the entire South Korean territory before U.S. reinforcements would be able to arrive. In 2016, the regime conducted several successful No Dong medium-range missile tests. North Korean state-controlled media announced that the missile launches were practice drills for preemptive airburst nuclear attacks on South Korean ports and airfields, where U.S. reinforcement personnel would arrive during a military crisis. A North Korean media-released photo showed that the missile’s range would encompass all of South Korea, including the port of Busan—a critical site for transiting U.S. reinforcements. Pyongyang has repeatedly vowed, including in my meetings with North Korean officials in June 2017, that it will never abandon its nuclear arsenal and has rejected denuclearization negotiations. The Trump administration, for its part, has promised to increase pressure on the regime, strengthen the U.S. military, and increase deterrence and defense through augmented ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. With regards to BMD capabilities, the most immediate upgrade should be to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system to South Korea. In conjunction with the already-deployed Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential, multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD is better than any system South Korea has or will have for decades. The Patriot system only has a 30 km...
altitude and 35 km range capacity, compared to the 150 km altitude and 200 km range of THAAD. Seoul’s planned indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile system would only have a 60 km altitude and 150 km range—both less capable than THAAD—and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. China continues to argue that THAAD deployment runs counter to Chinese security interests. This, of course, overlooks the fact that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles—and the repeated threats to use them—is contrary to South Korean and U.S. security interests as well. Beijing asserts that the associated X-band radar would be able to peer deep into China to observe military activity and ICBMs targeting the United States during a conflict. However, Beijing’s claims are false and disingenuous. Accordingly, China has refused repeated U.S. and South Korean offers of technical briefings because it already knows that THAAD does not pose a threat to its strategic or tactical missile systems. While deploying THAAD would improve South Korean defenses against a North Korean attack, it would not be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs launched against the United States. Chinese ICBM trajectories would exceed THAAD interceptor range, altitude, and speed capabilities, and THAAD interceptors based in South Korea would offer the wrong interception profile: They are designed to attack missiles heading toward the interceptors in the terminal inbound phase, not an outbound ICBM flying away in its boost and mid-range phases. Moreover, THAAD’s X-Band radar, which can only see in a 90 to 120 degree arc, would be directed at North Korea, not China. Chinese ICBM trajectories would therefore be outside the X-band radar range, and would not be seen or tracked. THAAD is also poorly positioned against Chinese medium-range missiles if Beijing decided to attack South Korea or Japan. THAAD missiles would not be able to intercept Chinese DF-21 medium-range missiles launched from eastern China eastward toward South Korea or Japan. Interceptors have to be deployed in front of the radar, making the interception of a “flank-shot” missile not traveling directly toward the radar and interceptors extremely difficult, if not impossible. The THAAD X-Band radar would have minimal, if any, capabilities to monitor Chinese missiles attacking South Korea or Japan. Deploying THAAD to South Korea is clearly not a threat to China. Beijing’s true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation. Once again, China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the pre-
cipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations of UN resolutions. On the issue of THAAD, China has taken Pyongyang’s side over Seoul’s, disregarding South Korea’s legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger. In response to Seoul’s decision to deploy the THAAD system, China engaged in economic warfare, including imposing boycotts on South Korean products and closing South Korean stores in China. At the same time, Beijing has refused to fully implement required UN financial sanctions against North Korea for its repeated violations of UN resolutions. China wants to exercise a veto over Seoul’s defense procurement and national security decisions. While it may be Seoul’s largest trading partner, Beijing clearly does not have South Korea’s best security interests at heart. Deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would enhance South Korea’s defense against potentially catastrophic nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks. The deployment would impede Pyongyang’s ability to engage in coercive diplomacy and would augment deterrence by reducing the chance of success of a potential North Korean missile strike. The THAAD missile defense system in South Korea would work both to improve protection against the North Korean missile threat and to lengthen the fuse of war by reducing the need for a preemptive attack against the North. The decision to deploy THAAD is a sovereign right that Seoul should base on the national security objectives and defensive needs of the nation. South Korea had demurred from redressing this national security shortfall out of concern of agitating Beijing. However, Seoul should not subordinate the defense of its citizens to Beijing’s economic blackmail. Seoul and Washington should make clear to Beijing that they will not succumb to pressure tactics when it comes to defending national security. Instead, China should focus its ire on North Korea, which has continually defied UN resolutions by developing nuclear weapons and missiles, causing South Korea and the United States to take necessary defensive actions.
THAAD is needed for credible deterrence


The casting aside of these four illusions leaves the United States with a policy built mainly around deterrence, which is premised on Pyongyang’s essential rationality – or at least its survival instinct. The available evidence suggests that Kim Jong Un and his lieutenants seek regime survival, and that their nuclear pursuits and extreme repression are aimed squarely at maintaining it. In this sense, they are likely more like the Soviets and Maoists than the Islamic State. Yet mutually assured destruction-type deterrence always represents a bet on the other side’s rational calculation of costs and benefits. It’s also undesirable. Americans do not like Russian nuclear missiles pointed at the United States, but they tolerate it because it remains preferable to the alternatives. Moscow and Beijing understand that any nuclear attack on the United States or an ally would result in massive American retaliation. Adding a third country to that number is unpalatable. Yet deterrence will remain key to ensuring that North Korea’s actions represent provocations rather than direct aggression. Beyond robust deterrence, other elements should comprise a more realistic approach to the North Korean threat. The United States and its allies should take better steps to protect themselves, including deploying the four remaining THAAD elements in South Korea, perfecting ballistic missile defense in the United States, and deploying THAAD or Aegis Ashore batteries in Japan. While Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is likely defensive, the possibility that it is prelude to a war of aggression cannot be excluded. The United States must enhance its ability not to just deter North Korea from attacking in the first place, but protecting against any attacks that do occur and defeating its forces decisively.
THAAD is far superior to status-quo missile defense - it's the latest and greatest tech

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During testimony last month before the ROK National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, former Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin stated that he would not oppose U.S. deployment of the THAAD system. Kim noted the advantages of the THAAD system if “used together with the Patriot ... ground-to-air interceptor”, enhancing “our ability to intercept North Korea’s ballistic missiles”. The new Defence Minister Han Min-koo, who replaced Kim on 30 June, recently reiterated the advantages of THAAD, stating that it would help “strengthening the security posture on the peninsula”. The ROK’s current low-tier Korean Air and Missile Defence (KAMD) system and the THAAD system differ in how they track and intercept incoming missiles, which has implications for ROK defence against a North Korean missile attack. The ROK’s current Patriot system is the PAC-2, which is only capable of hitting targets at a maximum altitude of 15km using a blast-fragmentation warhead that could send dangerous debris to the ground. The THAAD system is capable of intercepting short-range, medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles at a higher altitude in their terminal phase, between 40km and 150km, and utilises a direct hit-to-kill method. The Lockheed Martin-made THAAD system, equipped with a Raytheon-built AN/TPY-2 X-band radar*, would enhance MD in South Korea by providing more extensive detection, higher altitude intercept capacity and greater accuracy. Moreover, THAAD provides an additional layer of defence that, according to Lockheed, is “interoperable with other ballistic missile defence system elements and can accept cues from Aegis, satellites and other external sensors, as well as work in concert with the Patriot/PAC-3”. This interoperability is salient since the ROK’s KAMD system is equipped with Aegis destroyers and utilises U.S. satellite
early-warning launch data. Moreover, the ROK’s Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) recently announced plans to upgrade its PAC-2 fire control system to enable it to fire both PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles.
Korean War goes nuclear, spills over globally


Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as – according to official propaganda – it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. ¶ In response to North Korea’s Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea’s long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. ¶ No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. ¶ Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn’t like, it’s hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United
States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. ¶ The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South – something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons, but even if they didn’t, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. ¶ The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It’s hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn’t occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea’s conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. ¶ The second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military’s existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military’s training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. ¶ Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be
impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America’s strategic objective. ¶ China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing’s intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one – with North Korean aggression – hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. ¶ Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. ¶ If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the result could easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war – in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.
The tensions between the Koreas – and the potential involvement of the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) – create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These range from posturing and threats – “wars of intimidation” – to a major conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula to intervention by outside powers like the US and China to the extreme of nuclear conflict. The Korean balance is also sharply affected by the uncertain mix of cooperation and competition between the United States and China. The US rebalancing of its forces to Asia and the steady modernization of Chinese forces, in particular the growth of Chinese sea-air-missile capabilities to carry out precision conventional and nuclear strikes deep into the Pacific, affect the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. They also raise the possibility of far more intense conflicts and ones that could extend far beyond the boundaries of the Koreas. There are powerful deterrents to such conflicts. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has emerged as a major economic power, one that is important to the economies of the US, Japan, and China – as well as to the world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is one of the world’s most heavily militarized states, but it is still a relatively small military power by US and Chinese standards. It remains vulnerable to US aid, missile power, and precision strike capability, and runs a serious risk of being isolated if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support. Both the US and China have every reason to prevent and contain a conflict in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. Both are dependent on the ROK and Japan for critical aspects of their trade and economies, and both are dependent on the overall stability of a global economy that is heavily driven by the stability of Northeast Asia. Neither can “win” any conflict between
them at a cost approaching the benefits of avoiding a conflict, neither has an incentive to becoming locked into an arms race that extends beyond basic national security concerns, and neither can “win” a limited clash or conflict without triggering a far deeper, lasting process of competition that may lead to far more serious wars. Japan is another player in this process and one that has virtually the same reasons to avoid intensifying its present military efforts or becoming involved in a conflict if it can. Japan cannot, however, stand aside from the Koreas and the overall balance of forces in Northeast Asia. Japan, too, must assess its security position in terms of the DPRK’s expanding missile and nuclear capabilities and the outcome of both the rebalancing of US forces and China’s pace of military modernization. It, too, faces a “worst case” that could push it into creating far larger military forces and even offensive missile and nuclear forces. The fact remains that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war between the Koreas that escalates to involve the powers outside it. This is particularly true if one considers the number of times that war has resulted from unpredictable incidents and patterns of escalation. The historical reality is that the likelihood of less-probable forms of war actually occurring has been consistently higher than what seemed in peacetime to be the most probable contingencies and the patterns of escalation that seemed most likely from the viewpoint of a “rational bargainer.” This report focuses on the strategies, resources, and patterns of modernization that shape the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia as well as the broader balance in the Pacific region. It is the first volume in a three volume series that assesses the balance of forces that shape the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula in the full range of conflicts that could occur in the region. It focuses on the forces of the ROK and DPRK, but looks at outside powers as well. It also addresses the complex and constantly shifting mix of conventional, asymmetric, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) capabilities that shape the balance. The report also examines these interrelated “balances” using a range of different sources – emphasizing the official language used in DPRK, ROK, US, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian sources where possible. These sources seem to present the best view of what countries think about their own forces and the threats they face, although many clearly are designed as at least partial exercises in strategic communications and propaganda. They do, however, include US Department of Defense reports which provide a unique unclassi-
fied picture of US intelligence estimates and analysis. The detailed contents of each chapter consistently reveal just how different the perceptions and values of each side are and how great the risk is of miscalculation based on different values. North Korea is, to put it mildly, a strategic outlier in virtually all of its statements and actions – differing sharply from China as well as South Korea, the US, and Japan. Even when given sides appear to share the same values, it may be more a matter of rhetoric and propaganda, and the political, ideological, and strategic differences between major actors are compounded by major differences in the estimates of given sources, both in terms of data on given military forces and as to how the balance should be assessed. It is clear that any model of deterrence, scenarios, and escalation ladders – as well as arms control options – would present the need for research and negotiations over basic data, similar to past experiences.
3.1.9 Other AMS

Help South Korea develop its own anti-missile systems.

Casey, Michael. [Graduate student in security policy studies at The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.] “Ignore China and Deploy THAAD to South Korea,” The National Interest. April 17, 2016.

The second option is refraining from deploying THAAD batteries to South Korea, but assisting South Korea in developing its own long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM) system. The United States could provide funding and technology transfers to South Korea in order to expedite the development of South Korea’s L-SAM system, which is expected to be completed by 2023. Assisting the South Korean program undercuts China’s security rationale for opposing increased missile defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, because China primarily opposes deployment of the AN/TPY-2 radar system. Completion of the L-SAM would also free the United States’ limited number of THAAD batteries for deployment in other strategic locations, such as Europe.
Cyberwarfare as a way to combat missile systems.

Berlinger, Joshua. [Digital Producer at CNN’s Hong Kong bureau]. “Could the US take out North Korea’s missiles before launch?” CNN. July 6, 2017.

Though United States authorities have yet to publicly confirm that any specific tests have been interfered with, the tactic is actively being pursued by the US military, according to public statements and Congressional testimony by current and former members of the armed forces – as well as senior figures from a top US ally. “There is a very strong belief that the US – through cyber methods – has been successful on several occasions in interrupting these sorts of tests and making them fail,” former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind told the BBC earlier this year. Rifkind’s comments came on the heels of a report in the New York Times saying US President Donald Trump inherited a cyberwar on North Korea meant to sabotage its missile tests. “It’s clear United States policy to develop the cyber capability to disable enemy ballistic missiles,” said Greg Austin, a professor at the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales. It’s been touted as a cost-saving measure that could be used in conjunction with the traditional ballistic missile defense systems, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Sea-based ballistic missile defense in cooperation with a regional coalition is essential to defense.


Another crucial element of deterrence is ballistic-missile defense. The ability to use sea-based platforms – the Aegis-equipped destroyers and the comparable Ticonderoga-class cruisers – in the waters off the southern portion of the peninsula is central to neutralizing North Korea’s long-range missiles. Coupled with the land-based system known as Thaad in an integrated air-defense network, these maritime systems can significantly reduce the power and lethality of the North Korean threat. And while the U.S. can do much alone, it also needs to cooperate with allies, particularly our principal Asian partners, Japan and Australia. Japan, of course, faces a very specific series of threats – from Kim’s bellicose rhetoric to his propensity to launch test missiles in that direction. The Japanese, who operate the Aegis combat system on their Kongo-class destroyers, have the most capable navy in Asia after the U.S. and China. New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and other partners are also part of the coalition approach to stopping North Korea.
3.2 US-South Korea Alliance

3.2.1 US-South Korea Relations

The US-South Korean relationship is currently fragile.


Observers in South Korea and the United States have grown anxious over the potential for friction between Presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump. The two countries enjoyed a relatively peaceful and cooperative relationship during the Obama-Lee and Obama-Park eras. Both Obama and his two successive counterparts in Seoul touted that the ROK-U.S. alliance couldn’t get any better. However, this did not imply that the relationship was without its problems. On several occasions, South Korea and the United States [have] noticeable differences in their policy agendas. For example, the Obama administration was dissatisfied with South Korea regarding the full implementation of the South Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and South Korea’s active involvement in territorial issues in the South China Sea. When former President Park Geun-hye visited Beijing in 2015 to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, the United States frowned upon her attendance even though its official comments remained neutral. Washington was also frustrated with Park’s reluctance to deploy the American missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) on South Korean soil to defend against North Korea’s growing missile threat. Even though the two governments went through occasional rough patches, however, they never questioned the each other’s fundamental commitment to the alliance. This changed in the second half of 2016 when South Koreans began to have serious concerns about the relationship. On the campaign trail, Trump publicly criticized the United States’ one-sided relationship with South Korea. In his speeches and Twitter feed, Trump labeled the KORUS FTA as an unfair deal because of the large American trade deficit with South Korea. He went on to say that the United States would provide security and defense only if South Korea paid for American services. This led many South Koreans to believe that Trump was undervaluing the long-standing alliance. In the meantime, Park’s involvement in an
influence-peddling scandal incapacitated South Korea’s leadership. Her impeachment forced South Korea to remain on the sidelines when Trump was elected president. With the beginning of the Moon presidency, many foresee potential for friction on a number of critical issues including THAAD, military burden-sharing, KORUS FTA, and North Korea policy.
Deploying THAAD is a sign of continued collaboration and trust between the US and South Korea.


Kang added that by securing democratic and procedural legitimacy, the South Korean government will be able to strengthen public support for the deployment, which will also strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance. She added that the deployment of THAAD was a decision made by the allies, who will continue to collaborate on the basis of mutual trust. The decision to deploy THAAD to the peninsula was made soon after North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test and an intercontinental ballistic missile test last year.
THAAD is a symbol of the United States partnership with South Korea.


THAAD deployment is not just Seoul’s security preparation in the event of a North Korea attack – it also bears the symbolic significance of the United States and South Korea jointly working together against the common DPRK threat. If Moon follows through on his decision to delay THAAD deployment, this could not only create a vacuum in the ROK’s defensive capabilities against its northern neighbor; it could also strain U.S.-South Korea relations. Moon in his public statements has maintained that his intention for an environmental assessment on THAAD is neither to overturn the already-made decision nor to convey a “different” message to Washington – that Seoul is pivoting toward Beijing. But this is precisely the impression that he’s giving, especially in light of Beijing’s condemnation of THAAD and increasing chokehold on South Korean businesses and economic activities in China in an attempt to force Seoul’s acquiescence.
South Korea cannot afford to risk its security alliance with the United States.


For Moon, the challenges stem from the perennial tension in South Korea’s foreign policy between the desire for autonomy and the need for alliance with the United States to ensure its security (something I detail in my forthcoming book “South Korea at the Crossroads”). The rising peninsular threat from North Korea and growing regional tensions among great power neighbors China, the U.S. and Japan are simply too serious for South Korea to risk its security by pursuing autonomy and abandoning the alliance with the United States. South Korean progressives are advocating for autonomy within the alliance and have urged Moon to convince Trump to let South Korea “take the lead” on North Korea while also encouraging Seoul to gain greater leverage with China by appeasing Beijing’s objections to the installation of a U.S. mid-tier missile defense system in South Korea. But Moon must also worry that an overly-assertive approach might bring Trump to de-value consultation with South Korean allies just at a time when South Korea is struggling to overcome signs of “Korea passing” in regional relations following South Korea’s political leadership vacuum and impeachment of the former president. Thus, South Korea faces contradictory and simultaneous fears that Trump will abandon South Korea and that the U.S. will entrap South Korea amidst rising tensions between Washington and Beijing. Because of the devastating consequences that would arise from a conflict with North Korea, it is in South Korea’s interest to maximize its influence and solidarity within the alliance with its security guarantor, the U.S.
Reassuring allies of a strong security alliance requires a credible deterrent.

Santoro, David and Warden, John K. [Senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS; WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS]. “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The Washington Quarterly. 20 May 2015.

Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7 In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”8 Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively.
The US-South Korean trade relationship is very important.


US exports of goods to South Korea are valued at roughly $43 billion, an increase of 92% from 2002. South Korea’s exports of goods to the US are worth over $58 billion, up 79% since 2002. The total value of US-South Korea two-way trade of goods and services exceeds $125 billion annually. South Korea’s trade surplus on goods with the US totaled $16 billion in 2012, while the US trade surplus on services with South Korea totaled $8 billion. This will only increase with better relations.
The strength of the US-South Korean security alliance is the deterrent that has kept the peace.


The powerful deterrent provided by the U.S.-Republic of Korea security alliance has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula for over 63 years. Today, with the rising threat of a nuclear-armed, aggressive North Korea, growing friction in U.S.-China relations, and rapidly changing security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S.-ROK security alliance is more important than ever and a pillar of America’s ability to project military power, deal with uncertainty, and [to] maintain stability in [the] region of vital importance to American interests. The 28,500 U.S. forces in Korea demonstrate America’s determination to defend a key ally and reflect U.S. commitment to the region at large.
Blocking THAAD could erode public support for US troops in South Korea.

Snyder, Scott. [Senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations].” South Korea’s Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks,” Forbes. June 11, 2017.

The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.
THAAD is important for the credibility of the US-South Korean defense alliance.

Miller, J Berkshire. [Director of the Council on International Policy and is a fellow on East Asia for the EastWest Institute]. “What’s next for South Korea-US relations?” Al Jazeera. 25 June 2017.

Washington’s position, before the Moon-Trump meeting, is that Seoul’s change of heart on THAAD is not only upsetting the operational effectiveness of the missile defence system (which is aimed to both defend South Korea and the more than 30,000 US troops in the country) but also is simultaneously weakening the credibility of the deterrence value of the US-Korea alliance. Moreover, some reports have indicated that Trump himself is “furious” over Moon’s decision to suspend the full deployment of the launchers.
THAAD is a litmus test for the strength of the alliance (1/2)


The potential deployment of a THAAD missile defense unit to South Korea has become a “litmus test” for how Seoul is aligned between Washington and Beijing, according to a U.S. congressional report. The Congressional Research Service made the point in a report published earlier this month and titled, “Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition,” noting China’s outspoken opposition to a THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery in the South. “In one sense, the proposed THAAD deployment has become a litmus test for Seoul’s alignment between Beijing and Washington. Some observers in South Korea are concerned that angering China in this dispute would have negative ramifications for ROK-China relations,” the report said. The CRS report said China is concerned about radar capabilities of the THAAD system. “Beijing appears to be concerned that the U.S. military may – even for short periods – configure the THAAD radar in ‘look mode’ and rotate it to greatly increase its coverage over Chinese territory, which some Chinese consider a form of ‘spying,’” it said. However, American officials have dismissed the Chinese worries, saying such a configuration would nullify the ability of the THAAD system to intercept missiles from North Korea, the purpose of deployment, according to the CRS report. “U.S. defense officials assert that the THAAD system will be configured in ‘terminal mode’ (or engagement mode) to optimize its ability to identify ballistic missile launches in North Korea and intercept them before they reach targets in South Korea,” the report said. “This mode has a shorter radar range and would therefore not have much coverage over Chinese territory, except perhaps for areas near the border with North Korea,” it said. Since Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, first raised the need last year for a THAAD deployment to the South, the proposed deployment has been one of the most sensitive defense and political issues in South Korea as China and Russia have expressed strong opposition to such a deployment. Supporters say the advanced missile defense unit is necessary to meet ever-growing missile and nuclear threats from North Korea, while opponents claim mid- and low-altitude missile interceptors are enough as the North is unlikely to at-
tack the South with such high-altitude missiles. The CRS report also noted that South Korea has other concerns surrounding the issue, such as affordability of buying its own THAAD system from the United States and the effectiveness of THAAD against North Korean missiles. “Although the U.S. government has not proposed that South Korea purchase THAAD, some political opposition figures in Korea nevertheless claim that a potential U.S. deployment is part of a campaign to convince the ROK government to bear some of the costs,” the report said. “Seoul may also be wary of THAAD as a backdoor into the U.S.-led regional (ballistic missile defense) system, in which some Korean leaders are reluctant to participate fully.” (Yonhap)
THAAD is a litmus test for the strength of the alliance (2/2)


First, in recent years, although South Korea is a U.S. ally and cooperates with the United States in regional affairs, it has been moving closer to China. Obama administration secretary of defense Ashton Carter and other administration officials wanted to stop South Korea’s gradual political re-alignment. THAAD is a political instrument to compel South Korea to recommit to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. THAAD is, in nature, a litmus test. The Obama administration put much pressure on South Korea and suggested that if Seoul had rejected the system, the alliance would be in question. South Korea had opposed the system for 10 years, but it finally succumbed to overwhelming U.S. pressure. When the most powerful country in the world demands something, it is extremely difficult for a small country to say no. Second, the South Korean people understandably view North Korea as a military threat, but they do not know that THAAD does not work. The strong demand from the public for deployment of THAAD placed significant pressure on the Blue House. Third, Park Geun-hye was a weak and unpopular president. Even though the South Korean military was not interested in THAAD, the South Korean government yielded to the deployment plan because of the combination of U.S. pressure, public demand and a weakened president.
Weak US-ROK alliance kills regional stability and destroys the global US alliance system


The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes—mainly in Western quarters—that nuclear weapons would be relegated to the dustbin of history.4 This belief led the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to downsize their arsenals and assist a financially-strapped Russia to do the same. Meanwhile, several states across Asia—in Western Asia (the Middle East), South Asia, and East Asia—developed nuclear and long-range missile programs.5 China’s efforts to modernize its nuclear and missile forces continued steadily. India and Pakistan pushed forward with their own programs and, after exploding nuclear devices in 1998, became nuclear-armed states. North Korea conducted several rocket tests during the late 1990s and tested its first nuclear device in 2006. Iran, Syria, and others also developed nuclear and missile programs. By the early 21st century, the Cold War order tightly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union was replaced by a multiplayer arena with several less experienced nuclear decision-making parties and an epicenter in Asia. As a result, today, while there is less risk of global annihilation—both because major-power relations have improved and because important firebreaks against conflict are in place, including robust crisis management mechanisms and enhanced economic interdependence—the potential for war, and even nuclear use, is growing.6 Not surprisingly, these developments have led U.S. allies to seek strengthened assurances that the United States, their main security guarantor, will continue to protect them from coercion and attack. The assurance challenge is particularly difficult because it turns on more than effective deterrence. Deterrence primarily requires the United States to influence an adversary’s calculus at critical moments during a crisis. For allies to be fully assured, however, the United States must, during peacetime, convince them 1) that U.S. extended deterrence will succeed in preventing adversaries from challenging their core interests, and 2) that should deterrence fail, the United States can and will provide for their defense. Hence former
British defense minister Denis Healey’s formulation that during the Cold War it took “only five percent credibility of U.S. retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”\(^7\) In the second nuclear age, it is more difficult for the United States to assure its Northeast Asian allies than it was during the Cold War. James Schoff notes that during the Cold War “the U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little.”\(^8\) Today, the United States must convince allies that it can deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, some of whom have less adversarial relations with the United States than the Soviet Union did. Just as important, the United States also faces an equally difficult task of convincing its allies that it could and would respond should extended deterrence fail. North Korea continues to develop long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and China is modernizing its military and acting increasingly assertively. The United States’ relationship with China is also more complex than its Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union, featuring varying degrees of competition and cooperation. At the same time, the United States has shifted from a 1960s deterrent posture of deploying thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific (1,200 in Okinawa), to one with far fewer deployed nuclear weapons and none forward-deployed in Asia.\(^9\) U.S. assurance of allies exists along a spectrum, and Washington must carefully balance its desire to reduce allied anxiety against other interests. There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea
and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor. In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asan Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.
3 Pro Evidence

3.2.2 South Korean nuclearization

There is support in South Korea for developing their own nuclear weapons.

Santoro, David and Warden, John K. [Senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS; WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS]. “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The Washington Quarterly. 20 May 2015.

There are some allied interests that the United States—rightly—does not deem worthy of risking war. But if the gap between the United States and its allies becomes too large, allies will lose faith in U.S. assurance, which could have disruptive consequences. In the worst case scenario for the United States, Japan or South Korea might choose to bandwagon with U.S. competitors in the region. Another slightly better, but still deeply troublesome, possibility is for Tokyo and Seoul to develop nuclear arsenals of their own, which would likely eviscerate the remaining credibility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In either case, a loss of confidence in the United States as a reliable security guarantor in Northeast Asia would send reverberations across the entire U.S. alliance system. Development of nuclear weapons by Japan or South Korea is not a farfetched scenario. Both possess the latent capability to develop weapons programs relatively quickly, and some in South Korea and to a lesser extent Japan have advocated that their countries should go nuclear if the Northeast Asian security environment deteriorates or they lose confidence in the United States as a reliable guarantor.10 In South Korea, there are also signs of public support for nuclearization. After North Korea’s third nuclear test, for example, an Asian Institute poll revealed that 66 percent of people in South Korea wanted nuclear weapons.11
Calls for an independent South Korean nuclear deterrent are growing in the wake of escalating North Korean threats.


With North Korea carrying out its fifth underground nuclear test recently - and reports that the regime of Kim Jong Un is looking to conduct another similar detonation at its Punggye-ri test site - there are growing calls in Seoul for South Korea to develop a comparable nuclear deterrent. Following an emergency meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on Monday, September 12, a faction of the ruling Saenuri Party called on the government to consider developing and deploying nuclear weapons to deter Pyongyang from new and increasingly belligerent provocations. “In order to protect peace, we also need to consider all measures to deter North Korea’s provocations, including nuclear armament for the purpose of self-defense,” Won Yoo-chul, a senior lawmaker for the party, was quoted by the Korea JoongAng Daily as saying. ‘A nuclear crisis is developing’ “With North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, its nuclear weapons have taken a stride toward posing an actual threat to the South Korean people,” he stated, adding that a “nuclear crisis is developing” as Pyongyang has ignored international condemnation and United Nations sanctions to go ahead with both the development of an arsenal of nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. A group of 31 members of the Saenuri Party signed a statement calling for South Korea to take all possible measures - “including nuclear armament” - to protect the safety of the South Korean people. And there are growing numbers of citizens who agree that historic attempts to communicate and negotiate with the North have come to naught and that Pyongyang has no real interest in reducing tensions on the peninsula.
South Korea could build a nuclear weapon within a few months.

Kane, Chen. [staff member of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies]. “Time for Leadership: South Korea and Nuclear Nonproliferation” Arms control Association. March 2011.

Given Seoul’s mixed nonproliferation record and the 1992 denuclearization agreement that disallows enrichment or reprocessing technology on the Korean peninsula, the United States and key regional states such as Japan and China are concerned about South Korea launching programs that involve such technologies. They fret that because of South Korea’s other capabilities, such as in missile technology, the possession of such technologies could bring the country within a few months of being able to build a nuclear weapon. They also worry that South Korea’s action might make it even more difficult to convince North Korea to return to the terms of the 1992 denuclearization agreement. South Korean officials counter that the United States and China long have had this concern about Japan’s extensive reprocessing program as well, but that the United States has granted Japan permission to reprocess U.S.-origin fuel. In contrast to South Korea, however, Japan developed its reprocessing program before U.S. views on reprocessing changed in the mid-1970s following India’s test of a “peaceful nuclear explosive,” which used plutonium from reprocessed spent fuel. Also, Tokyo did not agree to restrictions such as those included in the Korean denuclearization agreement and has no known violations of its IAEA safeguards agreement.
Strengthening the US-South Korea alliance prevents nuclear proliferation.


This dynamic suggests certain factors that increase the effectiveness of the U.S. security assurance in preventing allied nuclear proliferation. Most broadly, actions increasing the credibility of the patron’s security assurances in the eyes of the ally help prevent allied proliferation. The logic here is simple: when an ally finds its patron’s security assurances credible, it will be less likely to engage in proliferation activity. In the South Korean case, the ROK perceived certain actions taken by the United States as evidence of the credibility of its assurance. For example, when Nixon and Carter announced troop reductions, the ROK viewed this policy change as an indication that the United States might not be committed to its security and that its assurance was therefore not credible. As a result, the ROK pushed ahead in its nuclear development. Conversely, when Reagan offered the South Koreans a re-invigorated strategic relationship – coupled with the threat of a significant cooling between the countries – they perceived the change as an indication of renewed U.S. commitment to South Korean security interests and consequently ended proliferation activity.
A nuclear South Korea would destabilize the entire region.

Maj. Frank Kuzminski. [A graduate of West Point and Harvard University, currently an active duty Army officer serving as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon]. “No Nukes in South Korea,” Real Clear Defense. March 1, 2016.

Moreover, a nuclear-armed Republic of Korea (ROK) will, in fact, make the region less secure, and threaten to turn the South into a pariah state like its errant, northern neighbor. Additionally, Seoul going nuclear would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and lead to a collapse of the delicate nonproliferation regime. By encouraging a nuclear-armed South Korea, the United States risks seriously eroding the credibility of its extended deterrent, and the strength of its alliances. South Korea acquiring its own nuclear arsenal will achieve little beyond destabilizing the region. While North Korea defiantly continues its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it keeps the bulk of its military positioned forward and able to attack the South with little or no warning; North Korea’s long range artillery and known stocks of chemical and biological weapons are just as threatening as, if not more destructive than, North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal. Kim Jong-Un does not need a nuclear-tipped Unha-3 ballistic missile, or even a submarine launched ballistic missile to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The real purpose behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is to ensure the regime’s long-term survival, and to convince the world that North Korea be taken seriously. According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, North Korea’s ballistic missile threat is aimed at the United States, and a nuclear South Korea will not neutralize this threat. Instead, it will dramatically alter the regional balance of power and incense China, which already strongly opposes the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea. China will likely consider its interests directly threatened, leading to further polarization over the North Korean issue, and a costly breakdown in Sino-South Korean relations. China is South Korea’s top trading partner by far – South Korea can only lose in a strategic contest with China. One can also speculate that Japan, which forswears nuclear weapons largely due to being the only country ever attacked by them, will not tolerate being left out of a North East Asian nuclear arms race, especially given the recent security reforms championed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
3 Pro Evidence

South Korean nuclearization would destroy the nonproliferation regime and undermine the US nuclear umbrella.

Maj. Frank Kuzminski. [A graduate of West Point and Harvard University, currently an active duty Army officer serving as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon]. “No Nukes in South Korea,” Real Clear Defense. March 1, 2016.

These effects may spill over into other regions, such as the Middle East, where the potential for nuclear proliferation exists. If countries perceive the United States is ceding its leadership in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in favor of the parochial interests of a regional power like South Korea, one can easily envision that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will withdraw from the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons. The potential for a nuclear arms race among second-tier powers will not make the world a safer place. At stake is not only the viability of the global nonproliferation regime, which has kept the total number of nuclear-armed states to nine, but also other agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limits Iran’s capacity to produce fissile material in exchange for sanctions relief, and is predicated on the enduring strength of the NPT. Controlling the world’s most dangerous weapons is founded on global consensus and confidence in the international community’s commitments to keeping the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons prohibitively high. If the U.S. suddenly reverses its long-standing policies, and encourages South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, the whole system is at risk of collapsing. The subsequent finger-pointing and accusations by those opposed to a nuclear-armed South Korea will also seal the growing perception that America’s global leadership on important matters is waning towards irrelevance. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of the United States allowing South Korea to obtain nuclear weapons is the erosion of confidence in America’s nuclear umbrella, or extended deterrent, which underwrites its seven military alliances, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such a move would represent a striking policy reversal by the United States, as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech in 2009, and violate security commitments made by the U.S. to its allies. At the 47th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held in Seoul on November 2nd, 2015, ROK Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter affirmed the “continued U.S. commitment to pro-
vide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.” The United States has led the global security order since the end of World War II, largely on the premise of a credible, extended deterrent afforded by its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted in November of 2010, clearly defines nuclear deterrence as a “core element of the Alliance’s overall strategy.” Any indication that Washington’s nuclear umbrella is somehow “imprecise,” as Major Lee suggests, would raise serious doubts about Washington’s commitment to its allies. Given Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine and on NATO’s flank in Eastern Europe, as well as China’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea, such doubts will surely invite further aggressive behavior by these countries, lead to a more dangerous world, and reinforce the narrative of a declining and retrenched United States.
South Korean nuclearization undermines its own strategic interests by playing into North Korea’s hands.

Maj. Frank Kuzminski. [A graduate of West Point and Harvard University, currently an active duty Army officer serving as a strategic planner on the Army Staff at the Pentagon]. “No Nukes in South Korea,” Real Clear Defense. March 1, 2016.

There’s no question that North Korea’s nuclear program is a danger to the entire world, and a more direct approach, which includes China, is needed to counter this threat. Despite the pro-nuke agenda of a vocal minority, led by Mr. Chong Mong-joon, a South Korean businessman and erstwhile political operative, South Korean nukes are neither in South Korea’s, nor in the United States’ strategic interests. South Korea risks undoing years of economic progress, destabilizing the region, and sparking a nuclear arms race in North East Asia, if not around the world. The United States cannot endorse a South Korea withdrawal from the NPT, and must oppose any such unilateral effort by Seoul. South Korea’s greatest advantage over North Korea is its extensive integration in the global economy as one of the world’s top trading power. For its sake, Seoul must resist letting the nuclear genie out of the bottle and deal with North Korea in innovative ways. Anything else would play right into Kim Jong-Un’s hands.
THAAD is key to reassuring South Korea of the alliance and prevents nuclearization

Pinkston, Daniel [North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis Group, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, PhD in International Affairs from UCSD]. “Why it makes sense to deploy THAAD in South Korea,” NK News. 8-14-2017, https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/why-it-makes-sense-to-deploy-thaad-in-south-korea/

This type of rhetoric is extremely irresponsible and counterproductive. First, it reveals Beijing’s likely intentions in the case of an inter-Korean crisis, and second, it strongly encourages South Koreans who insist that Seoul must acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Many critics fail to appreciate the role THAAD plays in reassuring Seoul in the shadow of Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities. There is strong support in South Korea for nuclear breakout, it almost certainly would occur if not for the U.S.-ROK alliance. If South Korea were to seek a nuclear deterrent, it seems implausible that Japan would not follow. This scenario is not in the interest of China, Russia, the U.S., or any nation with the exception of North Korea.
East Asian missile defense checks conflicts, reassures allies, and prevents nuclear breakout

Klingner, Bruce. [Former deputy division chief for Korea for the CIA; testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center]. “The Case for Comprehensive Missile Defense in Asia,” The Heritage Foundation. January 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/the-case-for-comprehensive-missile-defense-in-asia

The United States and its allies are at risk of missile attack from a growing number of states and nonstate terrorist organizations. This growing threat is particularly clear in East Asia, where diplomacy has failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them on target, and where China continues the most active nuclear force modernization program in the world. To counter these growing threats, the U.S. should work with its allies, including South Korea and Japan, to develop and deploy missile defenses, including ground-based, sea-based, and air-based components. The United States and its allies are at risk of missile attack from a growing number of states and nonstate terrorist organizations. Today, this once exclusive nuclear club has nine members, and Iran, with its hostile regime and long record of supporting terrorists, is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. At least 32 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. The U.S. ballistic missile defense review of February 2010 warned: [T]he ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range.1 Diplomacy, engagement, international condemnation, and United Nations resolutions have not deterred North Korea from developing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. While Washington continues to seek diplomatic resolutions to the ballistic missile threat, it is critical that the U.S. simultaneously pursue missile defense programs to protect itself and its allies.[1] Missile Defense Needs To deter and defend against ballistic missile attacks, the United States and its allies need a comprehensive, integrated, multilayered ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Regrettably, the United
States military cannot currently protect all American citizens or all of the homeland—much less its troops, allies, and friends abroad—from ballistic missile attacks. Despite recent deployments and technological advances, the United States still does not have sufficient defenses. U.S. missile defense capabilities “exist in numbers that are only modest in view of the expanding regional missile threat.”[2] The United States has 30 ground-based interceptors stationed in Alaska and California to defend against long-range missile attacks. The U.S. Navy has equipped 18 Aegis warships with sea-based interceptors and 21 Aegis warships with long-range surveillance and tracking systems. These sea-based interceptors can defeat short-range and medium-range missiles in mid-flight. Many of these ships are stationed in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Equipping additional Aegis cruisers would provide an ability to patrol America’s coasts as well. Additional destroyers are needed to perform the new phased-adaptive approach mission in Europe to replace the planned “third site” in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States currently has the capability to shoot down approximately 10 ballistic missiles launched from North Korea or Iran, but not if Iran and North Korea continued to develop their nuclear capabilities and coordinated an attack. U.S. missile defense systems cannot protect against Russian or Chinese ballistic missiles or against short-range or medium-range missiles launched from ships off the U.S. coast. A comprehensive missile defense system would not only protect the American homeland, but also reassure U.S. friends and allies of Washington’s commitment to their security against steadily rising military risks and threats of coercion or aggression. Missile defense contributes to regional peace and stability and supports international nonproliferation efforts by reducing other nations’ perceived need to acquire nuclear weapons. Conversely, the absence of sufficient missile defenses leaves the U.S. and its allies “limited in their actions and pursuit of their interests if they are vulnerable to North Korean or Iranian missiles.”[3]
South Korean insecurity in US alliance leads to rash decisions and nuclearization


Throughout the history of the U.S.-ROK alliance, South Korea has faced abandonment fears stemming from the possibility that its great power sponsor would remove its troops from the Korean peninsula and end or weaken the alliance. South Korea’s fear is a reasonable reflection of historical events. In 1950, Kim Il Sung’s decision to invade South Korea depended on his belief that the United States would not come to Seoul’s rescue. Even today, South Korean fears of abandonment persist despite the current strength of the alliance. The U.S. is a global actor with an array of interests that make it difficult to maintain focus on any one relationship, no matter the importance. Since the United States has interests across the globe, it often has to react to unplanned circumstances that distract attention from declared policies and long-term strategies. The Nixon administration’s handling of the ROK during these years led Park to later write, “this series of developments contained an almost unprecedented peril to our people’s survival.” During the early 1970s, this fear of abandonment had real consequences, such as Park’s decision to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program, including negotiating with France to buy the technology necessary to create plutonium for a nuclear weapon. The ROK only quit the nuclear program after the U.S. discovered it in 1976. Another outcome was Park’s Yusin reforms, which he started in 1972 and which included the imposition of martial law, dissolution of the National Assembly, and the banning of all antigovernment activity. This policy led to abuses such as the jailing and torture of political dissidents and opposition figures. One of the reasons given for the Yusin reforms was the fear of U.S. unreliability and external threats that necessitated tighter domestic control.
Strong US alliance system is vital to cooperative approaches to resolve conflicts


Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren’t necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It’s worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington—notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might act in ways that would intensify the region’s security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it’s hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it’s not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn’t actually hurt
the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East—but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries’ regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States’ global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as a percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States’ top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States’ military lead over its potential rivals is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence of regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony—China—and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United
States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country’s military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred—convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul’s desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, “We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all.” Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be “a setback to the political and security relationship.” More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administra-
tion’s most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan’s security ties with the United States. The United States’ geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world’s reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU’s dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States’ military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For exam-
ple, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States’ image in the region. The United States’ global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, “The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds.
Asian allies proliferate with weak American security guarantee - historical precedent


Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, “Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons” despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. (36) Such fears compelled President Park Chung Hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter’s abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park’s pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction.” (37) This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communique, which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves” including nuclear weapons. (38) Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade. (39) In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that
states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States. While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.
US military presence is the main reason we haven’t seen East Asian proliferation


U.S. military power and its security commitments in East Asia can be seen as a critical factor in explaining why Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have not become nuclear actors and why there is little likelihood of Tokyo, Seoul or Taipei pursuing a latent or actual nuclear capability in the near future. In the case of Japan and South Korea, the fact that both states are protected by U.S. defense treaties and the U.S. nuclear umbrella has meant that neither Tokyo nor Seoul currently consider it necessary or in their interests to seek to acquire an independent nuclear capability, despite their challenging security environments. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the United States used its significant diplomatic and military ties and leverage with Taipei to shut down Taiwan’s nuclear program on two separate occasions. The fact that Taipei has seemingly abandoned any ambitions to pursue an actual or latent nuclear capability can principally be seen as resulting from the U.S. security commitment and Washington’s clear and forcefully demonstrated opposition. The fact that U.S. power has helped to prevent each of these actors from seeking to become nuclear powers is strategically beneficial for China. If any of its East Asian neighbors possessed a nuclear capability or were seriously pursuing one, China’s already challenging and complex security environment would be that much more complicated. It would also heighten the risk of China being affected by a nuclear crisis or accident and would also increase the possibility of Beijing being drawn into nuclear diplomacy or destabilizing acts of nuclear brinkmanship. Further, if Taiwan had succeeded in achieving a nuclear deterrent it would have essentially ended Beijing’s ability to reassert control over the island and instead made it highly probable that Taipei would have used the security provided by its nuclear capability to declare independence. So the fact that U.S. power has served to dampen down the possibility of nuclear proliferation in East Asia has produced real and significant strategic dividends for Beijing, including with regard to its core interests relating to Taiwan. This demonstrates a further area of overlap between U.S. and Chinese interests in the region, and again shows how the U.S. military presence
3 Pro Evidence

in East Asia does not automatically equate to a challenge or threat to Chinese interests, and indeed provides further reason to think that China may not necessarily look to drive Washington militarily out of East Asia.
Failing to deploy THAAD enables Trump to pull out US troops


The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.
Troop reductions erodes the foundation of the alliance and causes proliferation

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While the offer of the reinvigorated security guarantee provided the South Koreans with a strong incentive to adopt the deal, the threat of further reductions in US armed forces if they continued with their program provided the country additional incentives. Given that the South Koreans had sought nuclear weapons because of a perceived dwindling in American commitments, not accepting this deal would further exacerbate that decline. Thus, the decision to shutter the nuclear program provided the South Koreans with precisely what they desired (a reinvigorated security guarantee) while preventing a circumstance they wanted to avoid (a further reduction in security commitments from the United States).

The South Korean case illustrates that security guarantees—if credible—can prevent allied nuclear proliferation. Prior to the late 1960s, the South Koreans did not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and only when they perceived the US security guarantee as wavering did their pursuit begin in earnest. While it is difficult to assess whether the South Koreans wanted nuclear weapons prior to the late 1960s and therefore that the US security guarantee was preventing their proliferation, it is clear that a reinvigorated US security guarantee in the 1980s did prevent proliferation activity. Further, the South Korean decisions to develop nuclear weapons clearly reflected the country’s consideration of the likelihood of abandonment versus the costs of embarking on its own nuclear weapons program. During the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s—when South Korea pushed to develop nuclear weapons—the United States repeatedly catalyzed South Korean fears by announcing reductions in its commitment to the country. Under Nixon, the United States adopted the Guam policy, which removed a number of US troops from the country and emphasized burden sharing. Likewise in the cases of Ford and Carter, both presidents adopted a similar policy and did not restrengthen US force deployments on the peninsula. As a result, the South Koreans continued to feel that the United States might abandon them
and pushed for the development of nuclear weapons. Only when President Reagan came to power and offered the South Koreans a strongly reinvigorated commitment did the country cease its efforts. Yet, this offer worked because it lowered the likelihood of abandonment and significantly raised the cost of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, that is, the fracturing of the broader United States–ROK relationship. The South Korean case therefore illustrates how security guarantees can prevent proliferation and how states consider the risks of abandonment and the costs of nuclear programs in making proliferation decisions.
Perception is critical and immediate – the devil is in the details.


Our research suggests that certain factors do increase the likelihood that security assurances will prevent allied nuclear proliferation.9 The ally’s perception of the credibility of the patron’s assurance is extremely important; in both cases, South Korean and British perceptions of the credibility of the assurance – and the robustness of the overall relationship – played a major role in their proliferation decisions. The logic is straightforward: if the ally believes that the assurance is credible and that the patron is committed to the ally’s security, it will be less likely to engage in proliferation activity. As both South Korea and the United Kingdom feared that the United States was becoming less invested in their security, they increased their proliferation activity. Only when the ally began to perceive that the United States was firmly invested in its security did it curb its proliferation activity. This analysis also suggests that the devil is in the details when it comes to the proliferating curbing effects of security assurances. The cases indicate that certain factors, such as troop deployments and reductions, can help determine whether the security assurance is credible – and therefore whether it is more or less likely to deter allied proliferation. In addition, as our analysis of the United Kingdom makes clear, even in circumstances where proliferation is highly likely, an assurance can – if coupled with these arrangements – still affect the speed and way in which a country proliferates.
Nuclearization is feasible - it has political and popular support and the tech is there


In response, talk of reviving the South’s nuclear option is growing. Won Yoo-cheol, parliamentary floor leader of the ruling Saenuri Party, told the National Assembly: “We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor every time it rains. We need to have a raincoat and wear it ourselves.” Won is not alone in this view. Chung Moon-jong — member of the National Assembly, presidential candidate, and Asan Institute founder — made a similar plea two years ago. He told an American audience “If North Korea still refuses to surrender its nuclear weapons then we have to make the ultimate choice.” That is, “if North Korea keeps insisting on staying nuclear then it must know that we will have no choice but to go nuclear.” He suggested that the South withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and “match North Korea’s nuclear progress step-by step while committing to stop if North Korea stops.” The public seems inclined to follow such advice. Koreans’ confidence in America’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of the ROK has declined, while support for a South Korean nuclear program is on the upswing, hitting 66 percent in 2013. Nearly a third of people “strongly support” such an option. While President Park Geun-hye’s government remains formally committed to the NPT, Seoul has conducted nuclear experiments and resisted oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Like Japan, the ROK could develop a weapon quickly if it chose to do so, perhaps in a matter of months.
South Korea is more and more likely to get nukes each day - driven by alliance insecurity

Cheong Seong-chang will be calling for South Korean nuclearization either way. Speaking in Seoul last week, before America voted, the soft-spoken scholar and government advisor argued that his country needs nukes to defend itself, that a majority of his compatriots agree, and that skeptics in government will embrace the view sooner or later. Sooner if a Drumpf administration backs it, he says, but within a decade regardless. Mr. Cheong argues that at this point North Korea won’t let its nuclear program be rolled back diplomatically, “no matter how many sanctions we impose.” China’s policy of protecting its ally from collapse “will remain unchanged.” And when Pyongyang inevitably acquires a credible capability to hit the U.S. with nuclear-tipped missiles, “the U.S. will have no choice but to come to the negotiating table” and sue for peace. This will yield, “if not a total abandonment of South Korea,” then a bargain aimed at mere containment: “If North Korea has 50 nuclear weapons, and promises not to build any more, and to suspend missile tests, the U.S. will strike a deal.” Tensions between Pyongyang and Washington may cool, he says, “but South Korea will continue to be held hostage. Hence the need to go nuclear. South Korea’s civilian nuclear infrastructure—24 plants providing 30% of the country’s energy—could be used to produce 5,000 bombs worth of fissile material, Mr. Cheong says, dwarfing Pyongyang’s capability. Embracing the necessary technologies, including plutonium reprocessing, could be “the game-changer that will enable South Korea to manage North Korean problems.” Japan may indeed seek to go nuclear, Mr. Cheong acknowledges, but it too could placate its rivals by keeping its arsenal small and co-managed. “The U.S. should assure China that Japan will not build more than a certain number of nuclear weapons large enough to counter the North Korean threat,” allowing China to “maintain its nuclear advantage over other Asian countries.” Taiwan, for its part, has to sit on its hands. Such prescriptions seem rather tidy given all the uncertainties and dangers involved, and for years Seoul and Washington could dismiss them as non-starters. Even as majorities of South
Koreans have told pollsters since the 1990s that they support nuclearization, policy makers in both capitals have been overwhelmingly opposed. That may no longer be so. Several potential candidates in South Korea’s looming presidential election back nuclearization, including former National Assembly floor leader Won Yoo-cheol and Nam Kyung-pil, governor of the country’s most populous province. Mr. Cheong, who acknowledges that “experts and technocrats have tended to be against going nuclear,” says that officials have privately expressed greater interest since Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test in September. Once Pyongyang completes a hydrogen bomb, he says, “many experts will switch their views.” Then there’s Donald Trump’s. If he sticks to supporting South Korean and Japanese nuclearization, he might as well hold a bonfire of traditional U.S. nonproliferation dogmas on the White House lawn. Even if he reverses course, though, his record of denigrating U.S. allies has already made South Koreans and others more fearful of abandonment and therefore more likely to hedge their bets and consider going nuclear, despite the costs. Mr. Trump reportedly had a good phone call with South Korea’s president Wednesday night, but it’s no surprise that headlines this week in Seoul are blaring about “shock” and “panic.”
South Korean proliferation would cause a nuclear cascade


Are we headed for a new Korean War? Not just skirmishes, sabre-rattling or a torpedo in the night, but a full-blown armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula? You would be forgiven for thinking so if you’ve followed the drumbeat of headlines since the 13 February nuclear test or even last December’s missile launch. Some serious analysts are stressing the possibility of war. Some are even underlining, too much in my view, the risk of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. I would put the analytical focus on a somewhat different place. Deterrence is alive and well and at home, for better or worse, in the Asian century. Yes, those warning of war have a point. An iconic act of limited aggression by the North is a real possibility. Kim Jong-un obviously feels he has lots to prove, and a fresh act of violence like the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan or the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island might just do the trick. Yes, the South has promised to respond forcefully to any future such provocations, and the US and possibly others would feel compelled to back it up. Yes, the young Kim has thrown fairly much every toy out the cot this time, and needs a face-saving way to quieten down. But I still assess, on balance, that the North Korean leadership is aware of the risks of a spiral into the war, which would seal its fate. Why else, after first promising nuclear attack, has Pyongyang lurched back to rather less apocalyptic threats, such as restarting its Yongbyon reactor or obstructing South Korea workers at a joint project? As for ordinary North Koreans, it’s not clear that they think Armageddon is just around the corner. The fate of North Korea is less likely to be about a high-definition replay of the 1950-1953 war than about change from within and eventual regime failure leading to some seriously dangerous moments for US-China diplomacy (as explored in Chapter 5 of this Lowy Institute report). So for the moment I would play down the war talk. I put a small-scale North Korean attack in the ‘possible’ basket, an escalation to large-scale conventional conflict in the ‘highly unlikely’ basket, and the chance of nuclear escalation pretty much as remote as it has been for decades (which is not to say it is impossible). If the Korea crisis of recent weeks underscores one reality it is the central and continu-
ing role of deterrence in Asia’s security. It exposes in plain sight – as plain as last week’s much-publicised B-2 ‘stealth’ bombing run – the unpleasant fact that the security and prosperity of the Asian century still rests on the existence of American military power and a professed willingness to use it. The talk and action coming from Washington at present is about reinforcing the credibility of so-called extended deterrence – America’s capability and willingness to use force, including nuclear force, to protect its allies. This is not the Asian century Australia’s economic optimists had in mind when they wrote Canberra’s eponymous white paper. As I have explored with colleagues in a major international study on the subject (including a research workshop in Seoul on the day the North bombed Yeonpyeong Island) the toughest audience to convince when it comes to extended deterrence is not the adversary, it is the ally. A parallel debate on this blog reached much the same conclusion. Much as some may comfortably decry America’s supposed obstinacy, the fact is that the US extended deterrent is doing us all a favour by keeping a lid on the other North Asian nuclear proliferation genies: South Korea and Japan. Bear in mind that two-thirds of South Koreans claim to be in favour of their country building its own nuclear weapons, presumably out of concern that the US cannot really protect them. And the possibility of Japan eventually following that path is not to be discounted, even though the politics of it would tortuous. Japan already has the scientific infrastructure and the plutonium stockpile it needs. The good news is that there is no nuclear arms race in North Asia now. If Tokyo and Seoul definitively lost faith in Washington, there would be. Indeed, the effect would cascade right across the Indo-Pacific, for China could well build up its presently modest nuclear arsenal if it faced a nuclear Japan, and India would end its relative nuclear restraint if China did (Pakistan seems to be going hell for leather with its nuclear program anyway). None of this means that the US should lightly brandish its overwhelming nuclear capabilities or issue matter-of-fact pronouncements about a readiness to use them. Thankfully it is not doing those things. President Obama’s Administration is arguably the most morally troubled by America’s possession of nuclear arms of any administration since the Bomb was invented. Obama has done sane, practical, realistic things to reduce the size of the US nuclear arsenal and the role those catastrophic weapons play in global security. In recent months, there have been rekindled discussions within the Administration about possible
new reductions to America’s strategic arsenal. But it is likely that the current Korea crisis will put that push on hold, to avoid unnerving the Asian allies. However cautious the language (‘everything necessary’) or ambiguous the signals (a B-2 can carry conventional or nuclear bombs), the posturing of extended deterrence is back. It’s now a part of America’s Asia pivot. No wonder China is getting worried and perhaps even rethinking its creaking North Korea policy.
US security commitment is key to preventing allied proliferation—that causes instability and nuclear war


But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It’s worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington – notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – might act in ways that would intensify the region’s security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it’s hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it’s not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn’t actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East – but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries’ regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States post-
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sessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.
South Korean nuclear acquisition breaks down the NPT and causes global proliferation


U.S. allies and security partners in Asia and the Middle East would use America’s diminished military power and geopolitical influence as justification to pursue their own nuclear options. If Washington were perceived as acquiescing in any way to nuclear breakout by Tokyo or Seoul, then we should expect signatories of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT),25 including some U.S. friends, to cite discriminatory double standards and even quit the NPT. Likely candidates in the Middle East would include Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf security partners who are already threatened by Iran’s drive to rapid nuclear weaponsmaking capability in violation of the NPT and numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In Asia, candidates would include the region’s many technologically-advanced and technologically-rising nations. Taiwan might be tempted to restart its reversed nuclear bomb-making efforts from the 1970s and 1980s. Australia, birthplace of the SILEX method of laser enrichment that General Electric hopes someday to commercialize,26 may see prudence in developing, at the very least, a latent nuclear weapons-making capability. So might partners like Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. China, Russia, North Korea and perhaps others would likely use Japanese and South Korean nuclear breakout—and any accompanying breakdown in the international nuclear order—as an excuse to proliferate, rather overtly, nuclear weapons-making technologies or nuclear weapons themselves to problematic states. Moreover, the United States could expect Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, if not also India and Pakistan, potentially to ramp up the size and capabilities of their respective nuclear arsenals. In terms of strategic nuclear forces, the regional and global distribution of military power would shift further against America’s advantage. Nuclear war would likely go from being in the background of interstate conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions, to the immediate foreground. In turn, the worsening nuclear dimensions of the international security environment would gravely strain the formal security guarantees of Amer-
ica’s treaty-based bilateral alliances and informal guarantees of its bilateral security partnerships.
Proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism - intentional transfers, low security, and state collapse

Kroenig, Matthew. [Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security]. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” The Journal of Strategic Studies. 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism. While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al-Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West. Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them. Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security. Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal. Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government
were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
Proliferation increases the chance of nuclear war - laundry list of reasons

Kroenig, Matthew. [Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security]. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” The Journal of Strategic Studies. 2015, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s. This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal,
in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war. This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority. As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to
de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’. They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war. When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.
Global proliferation causes war - accidental launch means deterrence can’t check


The real threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation is to regional stability. Introducing long range missiles and nuclear warheads into inflamed regions such as the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asia, opens the possibility for accidental launch and rapid escalation. While the United States and the Soviet Union stared each other down at the nuclear threshold for decades, other adversaries may not have as advanced a military decision process, or the experience of living with the threat of total annihilation. The future of missile proliferation looks bleak, with the impending disintegration of the NPT and the circumvention of the MTCR. On the other hand, the foreign market for budding missile designers appears to be booming. Perhaps there are job offers waiting for this graduating senior in Pyongyang, Tehran or Islamabad.
3.3 Preemptive Strike

3.3.1 Strategic Patience

Strategic patience is over - the US is looking towards a more hardline approach


President Barack Obama’s administration eschewed direct talks with Pyongyang amid rocket, missile, and nuclear tests, and adopted an approach described as “strategic patience [PDF].” A 2016 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service described the policy as designed to pressure the regime in Pyongyang by insisting on a commitment toward denuclearization, attempting to sway Beijing to toughen its stance on Pyongyang, and ratcheting up sanctions. Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue either bilaterally or under the auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts were fruitless. The administration of President Donald J. Trump has shaken up U.S. policy toward North Korea. Trump aides have declared the end of “strategic patience” and stated that “all options are on the table,” alluding to the possibility of preemptive military strikes to thwart Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and development. President Trump has also warned that Washington will be prepared to take unilateral action against Pyongyang if Beijing remains unwilling to exert more pressure on its neighbor. “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will,” Trump said in an April 2017 interview with the Financial Times. The U.S. military has stepped up joint exercises with its allies in Japan and South Korea and has periodically dispatched U.S. carrier strike groups near North Korea as a show of force.
Under strategic patience North Korea would just call our bluff


After two decades of sticking largely to the same ineffective playbook, the course is unlikely to change without a drastic shift in policy from an outside nation. “The likely outcome will be similar to prior efforts,” predicted Robert Ross, a Boston College professor and China policy expert. “North Korea will call our bluff, the US will draw back from using military force, and North Korea will continue to develop their nuclear program.”
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3.3.2 THAAD Enables First Strike

First strike plans are foiled by South Korean and Japanese fears of retaliation


This allows the country to retaliate against any limited strikes by imposing costs that are disproportionately difficult for its adversaries to bear. North Korea can retaliate, for instance, by launching cyberattacks, as it is suspected to have done in 2013 against South Korea’s banking system and in 2014 against Sony Pictures. It can stir up the risk of conflict, as it did with provocations in 2013. This benefits North Korea’s leadership, rallying citizens around the state narrative of a glorious struggle. American, South Korean and Japanese civilians are less willing to accept the looming threat of war. Mark Fitzpatrick, a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, wrote on the think tank’s website that strike plans could face heavy opposition from South Korean and Japanese leaders, whose citizens “would bear the brunt of the retaliation.” That opposition could limit American military options.
THAAD protects US troops which makes a first strike more realistic


But although missile defense systems are usually viewed as solely defensive, the protection they provide also creates a perverse incentive for U.S. military planners to use force offensively. If U.S. planners believe essential military facilities are relatively safe from missile attack, they could be emboldened to launch first strikes against North Korea’s nuclear forces. Currently, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea all face strong incentives to go first in a conflict. The best way for the United States and South Korea to limit the damage of a North Korean attack is to destroy the North’s nuclear weapons on the ground or kill Kim Jong Un before he can give the order. Unfortunately, this also places Kim Jong Un in a “use it or lose it” position to attack first with his nuclear weapons in the hope of short-circuiting a disarming attack. Before THAAD, a disarming blow was incredibly risky because of the damage that just a few surviving nuclear-armed missiles could do to U.S. forces in South Korea. The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but THAAD does reduce them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike. Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive. The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.
A credible threat forces Kim to listen to US demands


Washington’s recent posturing aims to force North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to decide once and for all whether his nuclear and missile programs are worth the mounting cost. It attempts to present Kim with a binary — almost apocalyptic — choice: back down immediately and engage with the United States on Washington’s terms, or risk an all-out war that brings down his regime.
Current diplomacy fails


Instruments: The record of diplomacy with North Korea shows that neither incentives nor efforts at coercion have been successful in inducing North Korean cooperation. Neither has U.S. signaling (in the form of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 overflights of the Korean peninsula) worked to draw a line designed to contain North Korean provocations. But China fears that additional pressure will lead to peninsular instability and has moved too slowly to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang.
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Trump is pursuing the strategy of threatening force which is the only way to get Kim to back down — but the threat has to be credible


Kim Jong-un probably won’t stop for small sweeteners. Even if he said he would, his regime’s dismal record of keeping promises would require intrusive inspections. They will resist that mightily, and, unless they cave, that will kill the deal. The days of John Kerry and Barack Obama accepting Iranian self-reporting are dead. If carrots won’t work and delay is too dangerous, the alternative is to reach for a big stick. That’s what the Trump administration has chosen, hoping they will not have to use force if the threat is credible enough. But if your adversary sees you flinch, you’ll either have to swing the stick or back down. That’s where we are now. The threat is directed at Pyongyang via Beijing, which dreads a war on the peninsula. The hard part is to resolve the issue with threats and not the actual use of force, which could lead to vast casualties. In using threats, Trump has a huge advantage over Obama. Trump’s threats to use force are credible. For the first time in years, the Chinese and North Koreans — and America’s friends in the region — have to take that seriously.
US credible threat of force is also key to bringing China in


Still, “China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime,” write Joshua Stanton, Sung-Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs. Whether Chinese pressure can sway Pyongyang to alter its behavior remains to be seen, especially amid a climate of mounting distrust in Northeast Asia, but North Korea’s nuclear program is becoming increasingly problematic for China’s desire to maintain regional stability.
US preemptive strike could take out North Korean nukes


With a force of 10 Massive Ordnance Penetrators and 80 900-kilogram GBU-31 JDAMs, the U.S. B-2 bombers alone are more than enough to dismantle or at least severely damage North Korea’s known nuclear production infrastructure, as well as associated nuclear weapons storage sites. The effectiveness of the B-2 first wave would enable the 24 F-22 fighters — and the wave of 600 or so cruise missiles sharing the skies — to focus on destroying North Korea’s delivery vehicles. A single good hit from a JDAM or cruise missile is enough to knock out the nascent sea-based leg of North Korea’s defensive triad. Hammering the Uiju and Changjin-up air bases, where North Korean H-5 bombers are based, would further reduce Pyongyang’s most likely air delivery force for a nuclear weapon. The most difficult target to eliminate when it comes to delivery vehicles is the missile forces. North Korea has a fleet of approximately 200 transporter erector launchers (TEL) of varying size and type spread out across the country, so the intelligence picture would have to be very accurate. With enough information, however, the United States still has more than enough firepower in a single strike to severely reduce North Korea’s TEL inventory.
3.4 China

3.4.1 China Precedent

THAAD increases China’s interest in the Korean peninsula, which in turn increases the chance of a resolution of the decades’ long conflict.


This author sees the South Korea-China relationship as one on the brink of an era of mature strategic cooperation. It is true that the THAAD decision has caused deep doubts on the Chinese side. Rather than worrying about how the THAAD installation will sever or terminate relations, we need to be more concerned about how the strategic relationship between the two countries will evolve as a result of the THAAD development. China’s ambiguous approach to the peninsula is being put to the test by the THAAD emplacement. Compared to South Korea, China has been relatively loose on the matter of denuclearizing the peninsula. The question is: will their increased seriousness on the matter actually bring them closer to the South Korean position. The ferocity of China’s opposition to THAAD reveals to us that peninsula issues such as denuclearization have become a hot issue of elevated importance to China. It is up to South Korea to devise and propose cooperative measures to China on these matters. To put it another way, China has been intensely focused on issues such as Taiwan Strait affairs and competing claims with Japan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, but now that Beijing’s attention has shifted over to the peninsula, there is a chance that the path to solving to the North Korean nuclear problem might be hastened.
Giving in to China sets a terrible precedent for Seoul.


“The next administration, however, will continue to face an excruciating dilemma,” writes South Korea expert Benjamin Lee in the Diplomat. “If South Korea decides to revoke the THAAD decision, this will set a terrible precedent, which will cause China to believe that it can use its economic influence over South Korea to control Seoul’s strategic agenda.”
Giving in to China now invites more pressure in the future.

Snyder, Scott. [Senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations].” South Korea’s Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks,” Forbes. June 11, 2017.

Moon’s decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.
China has no reason to be upset about the THAAD Radar for a number of reasons.


Neither of these arguments is convincing. In the first place, there are already two THAAD radars in Japan, which can see into China, albeit not quite as far as the radar going into South Korea. Michael Elleman, a missile-defence expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the THAAD radar in South Korea might pick up Chinese missiles bound for the West Coast of America in their boost phase, but the advantage it would give would be “quite marginal”. THAAD interceptors in South Korea cannot be used to hit Chinese missiles in their launch or boost phase and are in the wrong place to hit missiles attacking America in their terminal phase. Moreover, the radar in South Korea will be configured in “terminal” rather than “look” mode. It takes a software change and about five hours to switch modes, but doing so would render THAAD useless against North Korean missiles, which pose a grave and immediate threat to the 28,500 American troops in South Korea. America says it has repeatedly offered Chinese officials technical briefings on the radar’s capabilities and limitations. They have shown little interest, possibly because they do not really disagree about the threat THAAD represents. Chinese military analysts have boasted of China’s ability to “blind” THAAD (meaning to incapacitate it through electronic interference)—a further indication that the outrage is politically motivated.
THAAD cannot intercept Chinese missiles


THAAD in South Korea does not pose a direct threat to China. THAAD is an anti-ballistic missile system designed to destroy short to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, meaning that the system cannot intercept missiles during their boost or mid-course phase. THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, therefore, cannot intercept Chinese missiles heading toward the United States. The X-band radar that is part of the system would be positioned and configured in “terminal mode” to intercept missiles originating from North Korea, instead of being used to scan deep into China. Deploying THAAD would not directly affect China’s nuclear second-strike capability vis-à-vis the US. Instead, the system would complement the Patriot system already in South Korea by adding an additional layer of protection and bolster deterrence against North Korea by increasing uncertainty of its capabilities and complicating its security calculations.
Not deploying THAAD invites future Chinese economic pressure


Moon’s decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.
China’s resistance of THAAD is just power politics - we need to say no to set a precedent


Yet the Chinese will not budge on THAAD, nor will they seriously enforce the sanctions. They warned South Korea for years not to accept THAAD and, in the last year, have threatened various punishments. Stephen Haggard conveniently brings together the many, often quite petty, ways in which the Chinese have struck back. Beijing is essentially demanding that South Korea remain defenseless—“roofless”—in the face of a spiraling nuclear missile threat on its doorstep. That is an astonishing ultimatum: to effectively surrender South Korean national security over an existential threat to demands of a foreign power. That China would make such a demand regarding an issue where the developments all broadly support the South Korean position—the North Korean missile threat is blatantly obvious, as is the South Korea’s thin defense—shows all the more chutzpah on Beijing’s part. The Chinese “argument” against THAAD is so preposterous that it is hard to read its demands against Seoul as anything but bullying power politics. The question, then, is why. What is China’s objectively bizarre resistance to something so obvious telling us? For years, China vigorously promoted the idea that its rise was different from that of previous great powers. Its “peaceful rise” would open the possibility of a “new type of major power relationship” to promote a “harmonious world.” All would benefit from China’s growth, as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative tied Asia together. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would help developing states. Even Chinese cultural production got in on the act. But in its maritime periphery, specifically, the South and East China Seas, China is acting, however quietly and obliquely, like a fairly typical aggrieved rising power. Its actions on Senkaku, the Paracels, Scarborough Shoal, North Korea and now THAAD all suggest that it expects regional states to bend to its demands conveniently packaged as uncontestable and expanding “core interests.” This looks an awful lot like a sphere of influence by stealth. China has learned the cost of unnecessary belligerence. It is avoiding the forthright aggressiveness of Imperial Germany.
or the Soviet Union, which both provoked large counter-coalitions to their rise. Instead, it pursues a salami-slicing strategy of pushing here and there to see what happens. This escalating coercive diplomacy worked reasonably well with the Philippines, where President Rodrigo Duterte last year gave up and bandwagoned with China to appease it. And in South Korea, this year’s leftist presidential candidates are hinting that they will roll back the THAAD deployment. Seoul conservatives will read this as “kowtowing” to Beijing, but economic anxiety is rising, given South Korea’s asymmetric economic interdependence with China. The next questions, then, are these: Will China try this bullying, using asymmetric economics and oblique threats as a lever, again elsewhere (Vietnam would be my guess)? And will Japan and the United States, the only regional powers with a serious ability to push back, eventually hit some kind of threshold and respond?
China doesn’t actually care about THAAD - it’s an empty threat and sanctions won’t be seriously enforced


In 2016, the South Korean government agreed to the 2017 installation of a U.S. missile defense system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. The objective arguments for South Korean missile defense are pretty irrefutable at this point. North Korea’s missile program is well known. Pyongyang conducted dozens of tests just last year, and even talks up intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Its nuclear-weapons capabilities, after five tests in ten years, are well established also. And the regime’s harsh, extreme rhetoric about South Korea—turning Seoul into a “sea of fire”—is notorious. If any state in the world needs missile defense, it is South Korea. The Chinese know all this. The Chinese also know that THAAD is not particularly effective against Chinese strategic forces. The South Korean THAAD radar will be configured around North Korea, not China, and cannot simply be “turned left”; the technology and software package is more complicated than that. The United States already has remote sensing for Chinese strategic launches in any case, so THAAD’s X-band radar adds nothing new. THAAD is also intended for use against a few incoming missiles (in their “terminal” phase, per the name of the system), not hundreds of missiles in the lift-off or boost stage, as would be the case were the Chinese to launch against the United States. American and South Korean officials have explained this to the Chinese repeatedly, and the media discussion of this has been quite extensive. It is hard to imagine that the Chinese are still unclear about the technical issues around THAAD. Politically, South Korea has tried for years to work with China on the underlying issue—North Korea’s missilization—to no avail. South Korean president Park Geun-hye launched a three-year charm offensive to flatter the Chinese into a tougher line on North Korea. South Korea has consistently reached out to China to work on North Korea sanctions at the United Nations. Seoul has said THAAD is only a stop-gap measure until its own Korean Air and Missile Defense is completed. It is very obvious that South
Korea wants some kind of deal with China on North Korea. The THAAD decision came only after years of prevarication, during which Seoul would likely have made major concessions for serious Chinese action on the North. Yet the Chinese will not budge on THAAD, nor will they seriously enforce the sanctions. They warned South Korea for years not to accept THAAD and, in the last year, have threatened various punishments. Stephen Haggard conveniently brings together the many, often quite petty, ways in which the Chinese have struck back. Beijing is essentially demanding that South Korea remain defenseless—“roofless”—in the face of a spiraling nuclear missile threat on its doorstep. That is an astonishing ultimatum: to effectively surrender South Korean national security over an existential threat to demands of a foreign power. That China would make such a demand regarding an issue where the developments all broadly support the South Korean position—the North Korean missile threat is blatantly obvious, as is the South Korea’s thin defense—shows all the more chutzpah on Beijing’s part. The Chinese “argument” against THAAD is so preposterous that it is hard to read its demands against Seoul as anything but bullying power politics.
China fears South Korean BMD because of US Army control – Korean independent missile defense wouldn’t anger them - nothing about the resolution intrinsically requires that the US be the one deploying missile defense

Yoon, Sukjoon. [retired navy captain and a senior research fellow of the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. He is also a visiting professor at the Department of Defense System Engineering, Sejong University, Seoul, Korea]. “Are China’s THAAD Fears Justified?,” The Diplomat. 2-20-2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/are-chinas-thaad-fears-justified/

The U.S. has been giving out ambiguous signals on whether it intends to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries to South Korea. For its part, China has repeatedly expressed serious concerns and deep unhappiness about the prospect. From a South Korean perspective, this is regarded as a political rather than a military matter. Would China’s strategic security really be compromised by such a deployment? On February 4, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan delivered China’s first official response to ongoing speculation about the prospective deployment of the U.S.-developed THAAD to South Korea, during the bilateral “cooperative” defense ministers meeting. General Han Min-koo, his South Korean counterpart, attempted to allay Chinese concerns by reiterating that there has been no agreement between South Korea and the U.S. on this issue. Nevertheless, Beijing is exerting heavy pressure on Seoul to speak out against any such deployment, claiming that it would endanger their bilateral relationship and threaten regional peace and stability. Why is China so sensitive? China’s Concerns Whenever a state places defensive weapons and systems at forward bases to protect forward forces from a specific adversary, this can easily give rise to political misunderstandings by neighboring states, resulting in unintended military escalation. For China, the deployment of THAAD to South Korea is just such an apparent provocation. The deployment would imply that South Korea is part of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) led by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. South Korea is also developing an indigenous missile defense system against North Korean threats, the Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which is less likely to antagonize China than THAAD, since it will not be integrated into the wider BMD system designed to counter Iran in Europe and China in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, operating THAAD
3 Pro Evidence

in South Korea represents an explicit threat to China’s asymmetric Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, which aims to exclude forwarded U.S. forces from the so-called first island chain. So China could interpret THAAD deployment by South Korea as a major military posture by the U.S. intended to neutralize China’s A2/AD strategy. In September 2013, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported a successful test of an integrated linkage between the Aegis and THAAD systems, the fourth consecutive successful intercept test. THAAD can therefore serve as a hard kill tool for the broader GBMD system. China is also understandably concerned about South Korean involvement in the trinational intelligence sharing accord signed last year with Japan and the U.S. and the extent to which this facilitates GBMD coordination. Moreover, THAAD’s range will extend beyond the Korean Peninsula. The coverage provided by the existing sea-based Aegis system will be greatly extended by the planned deployment of AN/TRY-2 radars. These track inbound short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with a high-resolution X-band (8-12.4 GHz) phased-array sensor system providing a 120-degree azimuth field out to 1,000–3,000 km, effectively covering the whole of mainland China.

China’s Fears Justified?

China is clearly rattled by the possible consequences of the U.S. plans to deploy additional defensive THAAD to the Asia-Pacific region. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported in April 2013 that the first THAAD was installed in Guam that month; it is intended to provide early intercept capability for North Korean missiles during their boost or ascent phase. Military leaders in Beijing will have noted General Curtis Scaparrotti’s infamous remarks during his keynote speech at a defense-related forum held in Seoul on June 3, 2014. Scaparrotti recommended the deployment of THAAD to South Korea as a superior option to KAMD, citing THAAD’s capability to engage all classes of ballistic missiles and in all phases of their trajectories. This rings alarm bells for China, which sees the U.S. stance as intended to deter not only North Korean WMD threats, but also as a military rebalancing to Asia in which the U.S. acquires the capacity to detect air and missile trajectories over China. What has particularly disturbed the Chinese military is the prospect of the U.S. linking individual sensors, interceptors, and communications assets dispersed all around the Asia-Pacific region into a comprehensive and integrated BMD system to interdict Chinese ballistic missiles in the boost and ascent phases of their trajectories. This
would allow THAAD to penetrate and severely compromise China’s air
defense zone. The Chinese senior political and military leadership, right
up to President Xi Jinping, are worried that the deployment of THAAD
and Aegis surface combatants in and around Japan and South Korea will
prove a game changer. This is because China has numerous SRBMs and
MRBMs which, in the event of conflict, could potentially annihilate U.S.
forward bases; but which could be neutralized with a full deployment of
THAAD and related systems. No Game Changer The South Korean press
has exaggerated the significance of this issue, at least insofar as it concerns
South Korea directly. If THAAD is indeed deployed in South Korea, then
it will be the U.S. using this system to protect its forward military forces in
South Korea, which are under constant threat from North Korea. Therefore,
if the Chinese are concerned, Beijing should take the matter up directly
with Washington, instead of leaning on Seoul and thereby fuelling the
ongoing speculation about the possible deployment of THAAD. And China
should remember that South Korea is a core strategic partner, and that their
bilateral relations have been growing ever closer and more consolidated,
while China’s ties with North Korea have deteriorated. It must be evident
that South Korea has no interest in deliberately provoking China. The
controversy about whether to deploy THAAD is not being taken lightly in
South Korea: we understand the Chinese standpoint. All things considered,
China should accept at face value the U.S. insistence that the purpose of
deploying THAAD in South Korea is to protect the U.S. military force in
South Korea from incoming North Korean SRBMs and MRBMs. China
should also recognize that South Korea has no intention to be integrated,
in the way that Japan is, into the U.S.-led theater BMD architecture which
counters Chinese SRBMs and MRBMs targeting U.S. forward-deployed
military forces in the region. Given China’s vast stockpile of ballistic
missiles, which underpin its A2/AD capabilities, it is not surprising that the
U.S. is incrementally building a collective BMD system in East Asia. With
continuing technological advances, Chinese ballistic missiles are becoming
ever more capable and sophisticated, so that with the possible deployment
of THAAD to South Korea, and even with the ultimate regional integration
of THAAD and related systems, the Chinese will still be able to retain a very
adequate defensive posture. South Korea represents a significant strategic
wedge, balanced between China’s declared vision of a New Asian Security
3 Pro Evidence

and the U.S. implementation of its rebalancing to Asia. It is true that South Korea hosts U.S. forward military forces on the Korean Peninsula, but these number fewer than 30,000. Again, China should take up the issue of THAAD deployment in South Korea directly with the U.S., through the recently established bilateral military-to-military channels. It should refrain from pressing South Korea to directly oppose the U.S.: Chinese interests are better served by allowing South Korea strategic autonomy, while China continues to hedge its bets between the two Koreas.
THAAD radar doesn’t actually increase US ability to look into China or shoot down Chinese nukes


Chinese officials claim that the radar system associated with THAAD, known as the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), would give the United States a greater ability to see (and therefore defend against) potential Chinese ballistic missile launches against the American homeland. According to Beijing, this radar would serve to undermine China’s strategic deterrent and plunge the U.S-China strategic relationship into instability. In reality, however, these fears are baseless. THAAD in the Korean Peninsula will be able to conduct only one mission: defend South Korea against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea. The only way that THAAD in the Korean Peninsula could defend against Chinese missiles would be if China decided to strike South Korea — a highly unlikely scenario. Moreover, deploying an AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea would not substantially enhance the ability of the United States to “see” Chinese ballistic missiles. The United States has already installed the same radar three times in East Asia — once in Guam and twice in Japan.
3.4.2 Chinese Nuclearization

China is not interested in building up its nuclear arsenal more because it already has enough nukes for deterrence.

Hanham, Melissa. [Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the META Lab at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey]. “China’s Happy to Sit Out the Nuclear Arms Race,” Foreign Policy. 30 January 2017.

So why hasn’t Chinese leader Xi Jinping stripped off his shirt and flexed his strategic forces? Why not take to Twitter — or Weibo, at least — to brag about how long he can last in an arms race? Well, he doesn’t need to and he knows it. Decades of Chinese leaders have known it. The Chinese think about nuclear weapons in a fundamentally different way than their Western counterparts — one that could give China an edge in the contest to become the defining power of the 21st century. As Jeffrey Lewis noted in his book *Paper Tigers*, China has always maintained a small nuclear force. From their first announcement of a successful nuclear test on Oct. 19, 1964, China officially advocated the complete prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, and even went so far as to declare that Beijing would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, no matter the circumstances — a policy maintained to this day. Former Chinese leader Mao Zedong thought of nuclear weapons as appearing powerful, but nothing to be afraid of in reality — the eponymous paper tigers of Lewis’s title. While the number of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union swelled to over 50,000 in the mid-1980s, and they produced warheads and delivery devices far deadlier than those used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, China was content to stick with dozens, not thousands, of warheads. Even today, the United States and Russia believe nuclear deterrence requires thousands of warheads each, and at least three ways to deliver them. But the truth of the matter is that you can annihilate your adversary (or the planet) only so many times. In fact, some in the U.S. Air Force have argued that 311 warheads would provide nine-and-a-half times the destructive power needed to incapacitate the Soviet Union by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s count. For China, it’s not the size of the arsenal that counts, it’s how you use it. About 200 nuclear warheads are “enough.” China’s primary goal has always been
to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them. Beijing figured out that you don’t need 30,000 nuclear warheads to achieve that end — you only need enough that the risk of losing a major city in retaliation holds your opponents back. They have enough for escalation control, they have enough for deterrence, and they only need to mate their warheads to delivery vehicles to signal. So they keep their strategic forces small and agile. With about 200 weapons, you already have increased the cost of nuclear war enough that nobody wants to start one with you.
China doesn’t want to spend unnecessary money on its nuclear arsenal.

Hanham, Melissa. [Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the META Lab at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey]. “China’s Happy to Sit Out the Nuclear Arms Race,” Foreign Policy. 30 January 2017.

You don’t even have to spend a fortune to keep those weapons ready to go at a moment’s notice, as Russia and the United States do with their arsenals. Instead, China can invest in its conventional and not-so-conventional weapons, including a growing naval force, hyper-glide vehicles, and systems for both cyberspace and outerspace. Last, China is happy to sit back and wait until escalation is called for, so it keeps its warheads separated from the missiles it predominantly relies on as delivery systems. Does this make them weak? No. In fact, while Trump is threatening to shower his enemies with a stream of destruction, China has already realized the limitations of nuclear weapons. First, they are not very useful. It’s not just the moral, economic, and environmental reasons that prevent states from using nuclear weapons — they are bad on the battlefield. Real military leaders don’t want more nukes. They want shiny new conventional weapons they can actually use. Officers’ careers stall when they are assigned to staffing the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons are also expensive. Militaries can’t afford the next-generation conventional technology they want while footing the bill for nuclear weapons. It will cost the United States an estimated $1 trillion over the next 30 years to maintain the existing nuclear arsenal. Why is it so expensive? These weapons are special, and they come with special risks. You have to keep them safe and secure in addition to operational. These weapons are also old. Parts of these systems will simply age-out unless they are replaced. You need a very skilled workforce to keep them going, and there is a huge age gap as millennials are drawn to the snack bars and salaries of Silicon Valley instead of the dusty corridors of the nuclear arsenal. Other costs haven’t even been calculated yet. What is the cost of accidental use? We’ve had several close calls in the few decades that we’ve had these complex weapons. How much longer will we stay lucky? By keeping their numbers small, China reduces maintenance costs and the odds of an accident.
Nuclear weapons are becoming outdated.

Hanham, Melissa. [Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the META Lab at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey]. “China’s Happy to Sit Out the Nuclear Arms Race,” Foreign Policy. 30 January 2017.

Finally, nuclear weapons, once the definitive weapon, are now out of date. Advances in remote sensing, unmanned vehicles, and cyber-capabilities hold nuclear weapons at risk. What use is the weapon if everyone knows where it is and can even disrupt its readiness? Biological weapons are becoming cheaper, and they are more feasible members of the weapons of mass destruction family for states and nonstate actors to obtain. New technology like artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, and hypersonic boost-glide vehicles are making conventional weapons more attractive to militaries. Nuclear weapons are not going to disappear yet, but their role in strategic stability is declining. China is thinking smart, not big. Though they are not impressed by the bravado of a large nuclear arsenal, Chinese scholars do call for equally modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems so as not to lose their ability to retaliate in the face of U.S. conventional weapons and ballistic missile defenses. In 2015, the United States assessed that China may have already added multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles to its intercontinental ballistic missiles. With its smaller, more cost-effective arsenal, China has had the time and money to project greater sea power than ever before. Proudly launching its own aircraft carrier and multiple nuclear submarines, it is not above showing off. Beijing is also developing cutting-edge conventional technologies, such as anti-ballistic missile defenses, quantum satellites, drones, hyper-glide vehicles, and cyberweapons. After all, there is more than one way to make a conquest — which China may pull off while Trump and Putin are distracted by the size of each other’s nuclear arsenals.
3.5 Japan

3.5.1 Japanese Militarization

This is completely nonunique to anti-missile systems (which are defensive). Japan has already been spending more and more on its military.


Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has signed off a record defence budget in the face of territorial disputes with China and North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Spending on fighter jets and submarines are partly behind the increase of 1.4% to 5.13tn yen (£35.2bn; $43.6bn). A separate coastguard budget will also be raised sharply. The plans are part of a 97.5tn yen budget for the financial year starting 1 April 2017. Japan’s parliament must still approve the budget, but if approved it would be the fifth consecutive rise in the defence budget. A rising social security bill to fund the cost of services for an ageing population is already putting increasing pressure on the country’s economy, and the extra defence and coastguard spending will add to Japan’s debt. Rising tension with China over disputed islands in the East China Sea has led to Japan’s coastguard budget being raised to 210bn yen ($1.8bn) next year - up from 187.7bn yen. Coastguard vessels from both countries routinely shadow each other near the uninhabited islands which are controlled by Japan but also claimed by China. Five new large patrol ships, and 200 more maritime law enforcement staff are among the spending plans. Meanwhile, the country’s ballistic missile defence system will also be upgraded in response to advances in North Korea’s programme.
Japanese remilitarization increases safety in the region.


If Japan is to remilitarized, not only would the U.S. release a potential burden both economically and militarily, but it would gain a formidable ally in the growing hostile east Asian theatre. Japan would be an ally capable of utilizing one of the most advancement missile defense system in the world if an attack was launched at the U.S. from the East Asian peninsula. Coupled with a reduction of housing of troops and base expenditures within Japan, the U.S. could meet its reduced military spending goals but also bolster its defense by utilizing Japan’s increased willingness to shoulder the responsibility.
3.5.2 Japan Nuclearization

Japan would never nuclearize in fear of international condemnation, especially from China.


Tetsuya Endo, a former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, argues that while Japan possesses the technical capabilities to stage a nuclear breakout, the material costs combined with the prospects of international isolation would deter Tokyo from pursuing such an option. Brad Glosserman cautions that Japan likely would not survive intact as a nation-state following a nuclear exchange—even a limited one—owing to its lack of strategic depth and the extremely high population density throughout the Japanese Archipelago. Llewelyn Hughes identifies a series of domestic institutional constraints, ranging from constitutional to informal, that have anchored Tokyo securely to the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Others believe that Japan is actively pursuing other strategic options, including strengthening its own conventional military capabilities and deepening its alliance ties to the United States, as substitutes for an independent nuclear deterrent. In summary, normative, material, geographic, institutional, and strategic considerations militate against going nuclear.
Withdrawal from the NPT would harm Japan both economically and strategically.


Former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, who is known for his knowledge of nuclear and military affairs, recently said about Japan exercising the option to develop nuclear weapons, “That would naturally mean Japan withdrawing from the NPT. We would not be able to obtain nuclear fuel.... With dependency on nuclear power for about 40% of [our] electricity, we would experience a major decline in economic activities. Japan going nuclear would automatically mean the collapse of the NPT regime and there would be nuclear countries all around us.”[29]
There is no public support for nuclearization.


In a book published three years ago, Ishiba said, “In any case, the voters would not allow such a thing as possession of nuclear weapons.”[30] Japan would have to consider these realities before going nuclear, which so-called realists in the United States tend to ignore. Ishiba, a conservative, knows about these realities. If the United States adopts a sole purpose policy, can one really argue that Japan would believe that whatever benefits it might gain from going nuclear would outweigh the negative consequences?
3.6 Other Impacts

3.6.1 Military Industrial Complex

There’s no impact to South Korea. THAAD is a US system, and the US is paying for it.


Mr. Trump caused alarm here on Thursday when he told Reuters that he wanted South Korea to pay for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as Thaad, which is being installed as a defense against North Korean missiles. According to South Korea, the two allies had agreed that the Americans would pay for the system and its operation and maintenance, with Seoul providing land and supporting infrastructure. On Sunday, the White House national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, called his South Korean counterpart, Kim Kwan-jin, and “the two reconfirmed what has already been agreed” about the system’s costs, Mr. Kim’s office said in a statement. General McMaster “explained that the recent statements by President Trump were made in a general context in line with the U.S. public expectations on burden sharing with allies,” Mr. Kim’s office said.
The MIC is only a tiny section of the US economy.


Granted, this may represent close to a tenth of all U.S. manufacturing, given the way so many industries have fled the U.S. for Mexico and Asia. But how much of a problem can the “military-industrial complex” be when it only represents 1% of the economy? Healthcare is 17%, but nobody refers the “healthcare-industrial complex.”
3.6.2 Environmental Harm

Both studies and real world experience prove that THAAD batteries do not pose safety or environmental concerns.


Vice Admiral James Syring, director the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), visited Korea, and in his interview with MND press corps held at the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 11 emphasized the interception competence and safety of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which will be deployed by the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. Addressing claims that THAAD had only a 47% success rate, he stated that the actual interception function is ‘100%’ successful. “Our data confirms that it has a success rate of 100%. This data has been verified by the Operational Test and Evaluation department, in the U.S. Department of Defense. Every time a test is completed, we report the results to the US leadership and the assembly.” said Director Syring. He confirmed that 6 out of 13 interception tests were short and medium range missile interception tests under 3,000km, while the rest are long-range ones. He also added that the range of the medium-range missile is 3,000-5,500km and medium-range ballistic missile interception tests will be carried out next year. On the controversy over the harmfulness of the electromagnetic waves used by THAAD radar, he explained, “Safety evaluations for the THAAD battery to be deployed on the Korean Peninsula have been conducted with the same standards as for TPY-2 radar, specifically. For radars which are now in operation in other locations around the world, there have been no safety issues or accidents reported for local residents in the last 10 years. As it will be deployed quite far from civilian residential areas, its safety can be guaranteed. It has been also confirmed to have no negative effects on the surrounding environment, including air, soil, animals and plants.”
3.6.3 Arms Races (General)

Arms races do not lead to war.


Conclusions This study retested Wallace’s (1979) findings that a mutual military buildup between major powers increased the probability of a serious dispute escalating to war. Using a modified set of assumptions and indicators, it was discovered that only one-fourth of the disputes preceded by mutual military buildups resulted in war, while ten of thirteen wars occurred in the absence of joint arms increases by the dispute participants. Therefore, it was concluded that mutual military buildups did not exercise any general impact on the initiation of war under the limited conditions studied. This lack of a relationship between military spending and dispute escalation remained unchanged when controls were instituted for inter-century differences and when retested to ascertain the influence of a unilateral military buildup.
4 Con Evidence

4.1 Missile Defense Doesn’t Defend South Korea

4.1.1 No realistic missile system can defend South Korea

Missiles hit too quickly

Kim Taewoo [President of the Korea Institute for National Unification], “ROK Mil-
itary Transformation and ROK-US Security and Maritime Cooperation: MD, PSI
http://www.icks.org/data/ijks/1483111470_add_file_3.pdf/

Currently, the U.S. is developing a three-phased missile interception system
for Theater Missile Defense (TMD). The U.S. is developing airborne laser
(ABL) systems for boost phase interception and testing Theater High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) systems and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missiles like SM-3s for in-flight phase interception. For terminal phase interception, it deploys SM-2 Block IV for ships and PAC-3s on ground. For TMD the U.S. is collaborating with Japan and Taiwan, while SM-3 missiles are now co-developed by the U.S. and Japan. South Korea, however, is not participating in the U.S.-initiated missile defense. South Korea’s passive attitude stems from both technical and political reasons. Technically speaking, the proximity to North Korea nullifies the South’s missile defense efforts, as North Korea’s missiles can strike targets in South Korea within 3-7 minutes. Missiles launched near the truce line can penetrate Seoul in less than a minute. It is technically not feasible for a South Korean defense system, if any, to detect and interdict the incoming missiles like Rodongs or Scud-Cs, more than half of whose flight is exo-atmospheric, and occurs in the blink of an eye. South Korea’s SAM-X program, when completed, will exercise limited defense capability for only terminal phase interception.
4 Con Evidence

Boost Phase interceptors equipped with ABLs are too provocative, and they're the only somewhat effective option


Given the sensitivity of inter-Korean military relations, it is not possible to attempt boost phase interception by an air-born laser which is the only feasible way to proceed. While ABL is not yet a completely perfected technology, it is unthinkable to deploy such a mechanism over the North’s airspace. In addition, the fact that North Korea has other ways of launching a nuclear attack via commando infiltration or dirty bomb sprays renders South Korea’s missile defense investments even more unattractive.
Artillery can take out Seoul


The U.S. military released grainy neon-green night vision video which showed a military transport plane delivering two THAAD trucks to Osan Air Force Base in South Korea. So far, only the “first elements” have arrived, with the rest due to arrive by April, Yonhap news reported. The planned location for South Korea’s two THAAD launchers in the rural county of Seongju means Seoul is outside of their protective range. But with so much conventional North Korean artillery pointed at the South Korean capital, just 40 km (25 miles) from the North Korea border, Pyongyang could carry out its threat to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” by using only its Soviet-era guns.
4.1.2 THAAD Doesn’t Work to Protect South Korea

THAAD is vulnerable to barrage attack


Images released by North Korean state media showed leader Kim Jong Un presiding over Monday’s simultaneous launch of four ballistic missiles, which landed in seas off Japan’s northwest. In response, the United States started the early deployment of its advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea on Tuesday, despite angry opposition from China. THAAD’s job is to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in its final phase of flight, either inside or just outside the earth’s atmosphere. But with its specifications secret and having never been used in wartime, THAAD’s ability to deal with a barrage of missiles at the same time is uncertain. “The use of multiple shots, timed ever-more-closely together, appears destined to rehearse saturating a defensive system by presenting it with an overwhelmingly complex radar picture,” Joshua Pollack, editor of the U.S.-based Nonproliferation Review, said of Monday’s launch.
THAAD hasn’t been tested against realistic decoys


The MDA, which combs through its test data for months before drawing in-depth conclusions, has released just enough information about the May 30 test to show how it was deemed a success. Physicist Laura Grego, who studies missile defense at the Union of Concerned Scientists, has examined the publicly available data and disagrees with the Pentagon’s assessment that the system worked against a realistic threat. She says the test did not address the possibility of North Korea using complex countermeasures and decoys to confuse the anti-ballistic missile’s “kill vehicle,” which pops off the top of the defending missile above the earth’s atmosphere and seeks out and destroys the attacking missile’s warhead. Decoys and countermeasures are meant to dupe the kill vehicle into attacking the wrong object, allowing the real warhead to pass unscathed toward its objective. “When you look at the objects in the onboard sensor’s field of view they have very different brightness,” Grego said, adding that an adversary would make the decoys look very similar to the warhead to confuse the kill vehicle. Phil Coyle, a former head of testing and evaluation at the Pentagon who has also reviewed the publicly available test data, said that instead of using decoys meant to look and act identical to the dummy nuclear warhead, the decoys looked like “specks of sand” compared to the “bright” dummy warhead. He concluded the infrared signature of the countermeasures was so low they would have been easily distinguished and avoided by the Raytheon-built (RTN.N) kill vehicle.
THAAD doesn’t and won’t protect Seoul


The problem is that given the range of the interceptors with THAAD, you really need at least two and probably three or four THAAD batteries in South Korea in order to defend the whole country,” says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. Not only that, but the US and South Korea agreed to place that single THAAD in Seongju, about 135 miles southeast of Seoul. That puts it out of range to defend South Korea’s capital city, the most likely target if a North Korean attack did occur because of its population and proximity to the reclusive nation. The THAAD’s placement, though, still makes strategic sense, especially from the US point of view. Its location would help it defend some key US strongholds in the region, and would protect US troop deployments coming in through the southern tip of the Korean peninsula if South Korea ever needs reinforcements. “That’s the area through which US forces would flow to Korea if they were coming to help the South Koreans defend the country. They would come through Busan, not Seoul,” Bennett says. “The US also figured that if South Korea really wants to defend Seoul, they can buy a THAAD battery of their own.” The US only had one THAAD to offer so it went to a place that prioritized US interests. President Trump indicated that he thought it would be “appropriate” for South Korea to pay for the installed system, but national security adviser H.R. McMaster confirmed this week that the US would bear financial responsibility. In its current placement, the THAAD can defend a number of US military bases, like Camp Walker in Daegu and Kunsan Air Base in Gunsan, along with ports in Busan and the southern tip of South Korea. All of this serves South Korean defensive interests as well, but experts doubt that South Korea could afford to purchase additional THAADs on its own any time soon.
4.1.3 Missile Defense Has Weak Theoretical Backing

Tests are not rigorous enough


On May 30 the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) held its 10th successful test, in 18 attempts, of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, a network of radars, anti-ballistic missiles and other equipment designed to protect the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from North Korea or Iran. Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves, the MDA’s director, told Reuters the defense met expectations and shot down the incoming warhead. “This was a realistic and stressing test, and it simulated an actual attack on the U.S.,” he said in an emailed statement. Within a few days of the test, the Pentagon’s testing office for the first time in five years upgraded its assessment of the U.S. ability to defend against incoming ICBMs like the ones North Korea is developing. Its assessment went from “limited capability to defend the U.S.” to “demonstrated capability”. The test, however, took place during daytime and intercepted a single incoming missile. Few experts expect either of those assumptions to be likely if North Korea launched an attack. “We have to get into the realism” of what North Korea would be most likely to launch at the United States, said Riki Ellison, chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, which aims to educate the American public and rally support for missile defense. While calling the simulation on May 30 the “most difficult and challenging test MDA has done,” Ellison said the system needs to be tested more strenuously against threats such as multiple warheads that employ devices to confuse missile defenses.
Even missile defense systems that had 100% success rates failed 100% of the time in battle


“Making [military] plans does not actually bring about the desired results,” Postol said, citing the example of the missile defense provided by the American Patriot interceptors during the Gulf War. Shortly before the Gulf War in 1991, the Patriot missile defense system posted a 100% success rate, reaching goals in 17 out of 17 tests. But when the system was used in actual battles, the success rate fell to 0% in 44 attempts. Patriots failed to shoot down a single Iraqi Scud missile. “South Korea could prepare an alternative system that would be appropriate for the threats that it faces. Some advantages of implementing an alternative defense system would be that Seoul could operate and develop the system itself instead of defending upon contractors,” Postol said. He believes that it would be better for South Korea to acquire its own defense system through methods including receiving technological assistance from the US government.
4.1.4 Missile Defense Encourages The Development of Countermeasures

Missile defense theory says countermeasures are likely


It is a truism that the development or deployment of a weapons system often leads to the development and deployment of another system to counter the first. Indeed, the planned US national missile defense is itself such a response to ballistic missiles. Thus, one must expect that countries that want to acquire or maintain the ability to attack the United States with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles will respond to the deployment of a US NMD system by incorporating countermeasure strategies and technologies to defeat it.
Attacker has the advantage - multiwarrant


The attacker has a strong advantage because the defense must commit to a specific technology and architecture before the attacker does. As is happening now with the US NMD program, the defense will choose and then deploy hardware whose general characteristics will be known to the attacker. Moreover, because it will take at least several years to build an NMD system, the attacker will have adequate time to respond. The attacker need not commit to a countermeasure technology until after the defense system is being deployed, and it can then tailor its countermeasures to the specific system that the defense builds. The defense might be able to learn something about a potential attacker’s countermeasure program if its countermeasures are flight-tested and the defense can observe the tests. However, even if the defense could obtain some information about a particular countermeasure in this way, it could not know the details of how such countermeasures would actually be implemented or what other countermeasures the attacker intended to use. Moreover, since the other country would know that its flight tests would be monitored, it might choose to conduct tests that were deliberately misleading, and the defense could not rule out this possibility.
Defense has to hit much smaller target


In addition, the defense has more demanding requirements on accuracy than does the offense. The hit-to-kill interceptors must arrive at a precise point in space at precisely the right time whereas the offensive warhead only need target a relatively large area on the surface of the earth. (In contrast, the US defense system deployed in 1975 used nuclear-tipped interceptors, which only needed to explode within a few kilometers of the incoming warhead to destroy it.) The target will be only a few meters long and will be moving at a very high speed relative to the kill vehicle (roughly 10 kilometers per second). This demanding feat has been described as “hitting a bullet with a bullet.” Even more relevant than the inherent difficulty of hit-to-kill technology is that the low margin of error makes it easier for an attacker to foil the defense. Thus, countermeasures that an attacker takes can make this very difficult job essentially impossible. Moreover, the attacker gets to choose the timing of the attack and can target the attack in a way that is most stressing to the defense. The time constraints add to the technical difficulty: the defense has only a very short time—well under 30 minutes—to respond. And the confusion that would almost certainly accompany an actual attack would complicate the job of the defense.
Standards for defense are much higher


National missile defenses are intended to defend against missiles armed with weapons of great destructive power: nuclear and biological weapons. This mission places a very high requirement on defense effectiveness—much higher than the requirement on offense effectiveness.\(^2\) Any failure of the defense would lead to large numbers of deaths, whereas an offense that partially failed could still succeed in its mission. For example, a defense that intercepted 25 percent of the incoming warheads would be much less successful than an attack in which 25 percent of the warheads hit their targets. Not only must the defense be effective to be useful, but in most cases the defense must also know with a high level of confidence how effective the system is.\(^3\) Effectiveness and confidence level are two very different things, but both are needed to describe a system. Effectiveness is a property of the system, and testing is used to determine what the effectiveness is. Confidence level describes how well the system effectiveness is known as a result of testing. (See box on Confidence and Effectiveness in Chapter 10 for more details.) Even if a defense system were in fact highly effective, without adequate testing the country deploying it would have no way of knowing what the system effectiveness was. Indeed, consistent with its mission of intercepting nuclear warheads, the NMD system reportedly has a 3\(^4\) design requirement of 95 percent effectiveness with 95 percent confidence against a small-scale missile attack. Yet an effectiveness of 95 percent is rarely—if ever—achieved by a complex military weapons system that faces countermeasures, even after years of use.
North Korea is developing KN-11 in response to THAAD


“While it is impossible to know how much progress North Korea has made on the KN-11 and other submarine-launched ballistic missiles, developing the KN-11 would inevitably neutralize THAAD.” The remarks were made on Oct. 2 by Theodore Postol, an emeritus professor at MIT, during a visit to South Korea. Postol met the leadership of the opposition Minjoo Party, including Choo Mi-ae, at the National Assembly on Oct. 2 to discuss the issue of deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. Postol has studied missile defense systems for decades and served as a consultant for the chiefs of staff of the US Navy. Postol was in South Korea to deliver the keynote address for an event marking the 9th anniversary of the Oct. 4 Inter-Korean Summit Agreement called “2016: A Critical Year for THAAD and Northeast Asia,” which was held at the 63 Convention Center in Seoul on Oct. 3. “I believe that THAAD’s actual performance in battle would be poor. There are a number of countermeasures that opponents could implement, and these could be used to neutralize THAAD,” Postol said during the meeting on Oct. 2.
4.1.5 Diplomacy

Moon may push for diplomatic talks with North Korea


Liberal Moon, 64, ran for president against conservative Park Geun-hye in 2012. He lost narrowly — only to win five years later after Park was ousted for corruption. But though South Korea’s domestic politics likely played the largest role in Moon’s victory, his win will have international consequences — including for President Donald Trump’s policy toward North Korea. Moon is an outspoken advocate of dialogue with North Korea, and open to returning the Blue House to what used to be known as the “sunshine policies,” of greater engagement with the North. As chief of staff to President Roh Moo-hyun during Roh’s term from 2003 to 2008, Moon was part of an administration that pursued exactly that, increasing political and economic contact with North Korea in an effort to keep the peace.
Moon is intent on economic engagement with South Korea


Moon worked for President Roh Moo-hyun’s administration from 2003-2007 during the peak of the Sunshine era, including serving as chairperson of the promotion of the second inter-Korean summit in 2007. As such, he has long held an affinity for Sunshine-esque engagement policies. In his 2015 Korean Independence Day speech, he argued to expand inter-Korean economic cooperation in order to spur South Korea’s own economic growth. This idea is not fundamentally different from former President Park Geun-hye’s unification as “jackpot” argument, but unlike Park, he has not argued for quid-pro-quos. He wants to undo actions taken by his predecessors who shut down the Mount Kumgang tourism zone in 2009, and Kaesong Industrial Complex indefinitely in 2016. Moon has even called to expand Kaesong eight-fold. Last week he outlined a broad plan for inter-Korean cooperation, which was translated by NK News here (link is external). Moon argued for a restart of meetings for separated families, which have happened rarely under the conservative governments. These meetings are sadly used as political chips by the DPRK government, which places less importance on them than the South. Next, Moon argued for the enactment of inter-Korean cooperation agreements into law by both South Korea’s National Assembly and the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly, which he argues will result in the “increase of predictability and permanence of inter-Korean policies.” Moon then reiterated his argument that economic integration will lead to greater growth for South Korea. He suggested that GDP will increase by an additional one percent as the Korean market grows toward 80 million people.
Talks and Engagement are key to calming and changing North Korea


I’m not speaking for Moon Jae-in, but Moon Jae-in is most likely to engage in very intense consultation with the United States, and also China, too, on the North Korean issue. But Moon Jae-in will try to take initiative in getting things moving, not like Park Geun-hye. And Moon Jae-in’s view, the way I understand it—no matter how devilish North Korea is, he believes he’s got to talk with Kim Jong-un. At least when he talks with Kim Jong-un, he understands very clearly. When South Korea and the United States engaged with North Korea, North Korea didn’t provoke. Even Victor Cha has an article showing that when North Korea engaged in Six Party Talks and whatever negotiations, North Korea didn’t show provocative behavior. When negotiations were suspended, when there was stalemate, North Korea showed provocative behavior. If the past the scientific data can be a kind of guide for us, then I think Moon Jae-in will talk with the North Koreans. Then, at least, as Siegfried Hecker argued, that will prevent the worsening of situations. Meanwhile, as Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun think, if there is a full engagement with North Korea, if there is a full opening and reform in North Korea, if North Korea has a market system— they informally used to tell me, there could be a major change in North Korea in five years.
THAAD upsets North Korea. It sours relations between the South and the North. The implication of this card is that it undermines the sunshine policy.


North Korea threatened “physical response measures” including “ruthless retaliatory strikes” on Monday, protesting an announcement from South Korean and US officials who said the countries would deploy an anti-missile system on the peninsula. The warning came hours after Pyongyang said it would end a diplomatic communication channel with the US and hinted at harsher punishments for Americans detained in North Korea, responses to the US Treasury Department’s personal blacklist of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un for human rights abuses. Though South Korea and the US have maintained the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system is merely to shield them from any attacks from the north, the system has enraged Pyongyang, which has repeatedly threatened to retaliate. “There will be physical response measures from us as soon as the location and time that the invasionary tool for US world supremacy, THAAD, will be brought into South Korea are confirmed,” North Korea’s military said in a statement. “It is the unwavering will of our army to deal a ruthless retaliatory strike and turn (the South) into a sea of fire and a pile of ashes the moment we have an order to carry it out,” the statement, broadcast by the North’s official KCNA news agency, said.
4.2 United States

4.2.1 Preemptive Strikes

US has specific plans ready for a preemptive strike


The Pentagon has prepared a specific plan for a preemptive strike on North Korea’s missile sites should President Trump order such an attack.

Two senior military officials — and two senior retired officers — told NBC News that key to the plan would be a B-1B heavy bomber attack originating from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.

Pairs of B-1s have conducted 11 practice runs of a similar mission since the end of May, the last taking place on Monday. The training has accelerated since May, according to officials. In an actual mission, the non-nuclear bombers would be supported by satellites and drones and surrounded by fighter jets as well as aerial refueling and electronic warfare planes.
THAAD emboldens the US to launch a preemptive strike


With these technical limitations in mind, THAAD’s main purpose is to provide a protective umbrella for U.S. air force bases in South Korea, and the port of Busan, the primary port of entry for follow-on U.S. ground forces in the event of a long-term fight with North Korea.

But although missile defense systems are usually viewed as solely defensive, the protection they provide also creates a perverse incentive for U.S. military planners to use force offensively. If U.S. planners believe essential military facilities are relatively safe from missile attack, they could be emboldened to launch first strikes against North Korea’s nuclear forces.

Currently, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea all face strong incentives to go first in a conflict. The best way for the United States and South Korea to limit the damage of a North Korean attack is to destroy the North’s nuclear weapons on the ground or kill Kim Jong Un before he can give the order. Unfortunately, this also places Kim Jong Un in a “use it or lose it” position to attack first with his nuclear weapons in the hope of short-circuiting a disarming attack.

Before THAAD, a disarming blow was incredibly risky because of the damage that just a few surviving nuclear-armed missiles could do to U.S. forces in South Korea. The risk and danger of a disarming strike are both still high, but THAAD does reduce them by providing a better shield against any weapons that may survive the first strike.

Ultimately, THAAD will do little to defuse the current tensions on the Korean peninsula. The greater protection it provides to U.S. troops could make U.S. escalation less costly and therefore more attractive. The Trump administration will have to find another way out of this crisis.
North Korea would respond to a strike with artillery, killing a million civilians


It probably wouldn’t work well enough. North Korea’s missiles and nuclear facilities are dispersed and hidden throughout the country’s mountainous terrain. Failing to hit them all would leave some 10 million people in Seoul, 38 million people in the Tokyo vicinity and tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel in northeast Asia vulnerable to missile attacks – with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Even if the U.S. managed to wipe out everything, Seoul would still be vulnerable to attacks from North Korea’s artillery.
North Korea could kill up to a million people in Seoul with artillery


North Korea has also managed to turn its heavy artillery, particularly corps level 170-millimeter Koksan guns, 240-millimeter heavy rockets and new 300-millimeter MRLs into weapons of mass destruction. Since the 1990s, right about the time the Clinton administration decided not to undertake military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, the general consensus has been that Pyongyang had enough artillery to turn nearby Seoul, home to approximately 25 million South Koreans, into a “sea of fire” that could see up to one million civilians killed.
North Korea could respond to a strike with chemical weapons


North Korea would surely retaliate, and this retaliation could include use of chemical weapons.

The casualties would be unimaginable. Some 23 million people live in the region of Seoul, with parts of the city sitting a mere 35 miles from the North Korean border. Also at risk would be some 150,000 U.S. citizens who live in South Korea, including 29,000 troops stationed there.

“Nuclear weapons are not the only threat,” said Kelsey Davenport, director of non-proliferation policy for the Arms Control Association. “North Korea could respond to a U.S. attack using chemical weapons. That would be devastating.”
North Korea has huge stockpiles of chemical weapons


North Korea might also use chemical weapons to negate key U.S. and South Korean advantages. It is thought to have chemical weapons from the principal five categories: riot, choking, blood, blister and nerve agents. In 2012, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense estimated the North had a stockpile of between 2,500 and five thousand metric tons of chemical weapons. It further estimates the country has the ability to generate another 4,500 tons annually in peacetime, and twelve thousand tons in wartime.
North Korea would likely retaliate to any strike with chemical weapons

Woolf, Christopher. [Correspondent, former BBC reporter]. “The only effective arms against North Korea’s missile bunkers are nuclear weapons, says a top war planner,” PRI. August 2017. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-10/only-effective-arms-against-north-koreas-missile-bunkers-are-nuclear-weapons-says

Most of the games were before North Korea had nuclear weapons. And what we always saw was that the team playing North Korea responded the way we thought, with artillery and with chemicals causing a million-plus casualties.
A preemptive strike causes war on the peninsula


If the U.S. resorts to a preemptive strike on North Korea without consultation and agreement from Seoul, the costs to South Korea would have a critically damaging effect over the U.S.-South Korea alliance, even possibly lead to its dissolution. Considering President Moon Jae-in’s interest in engagement with North Korea, it would be highly unlikely for South Korea to support a U.S. decision to launch a targeted nuclear attack on the North. A U.S. preemptive strike on North Korea would also likely invite Chinese intervention. The Sino-North Korea Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty commits China to North Korea’s defense in the event of foreign aggression. Although the validity of the 56-year old treaty is constantly debated, few doubt that China would intervene to defend its perceived national interests in the Korean Peninsula, including the preservation of a North Korean state and the prevention of a South Korea-led unification. It would put U.S. and China directly on a collision course and could lead to another Korean War.
A first strike would lead to nuclear and chemical war, which would kill millions


Trump orders a massive assault on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. The goal is simple: Destroy not only Pyongyang’s ability to create nuclear weapons and advanced missiles, but the current stockpiles they have. Washington launches what can only be described as a “shock and awe” campaign on steroids: over 1,000 cruise missiles in the first few hours alone, B-2 bombers flying around the clock from bases in Missouri with stealth F-22 Raptors leading the way.

The assault itself, according to every metric conceivable, is a success. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are set back a decade or more with most of Kim’s nuclear weapons and missile launchers destroyed. Republicans and Democrats alike applaud President Trump’s bold actions — acting when leaders of the past decided to do nothing.

There is however a catch to what seems like a resounding military success: The Kim regime’s nuclear deterrent was not completely destroyed. One weapon, buried deep underground, survived the attack. And since North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons were largely hidden underground as well, Kim has a terrible choice to make: Use the weapons he has now, or lose them in a potential second wave of strikes. He decides to use his full arsenal before it’s too late.

What happens next is one of the worst military and human tragedies in history: Kim orders a nuclear strike on Seoul. While the missile lands four miles outside of the city thanks to a targeting error, millions of people are instantly killed with millions more poisoned by radioactive fallout. In a sheer panic, the millions of people who survive the attack rush south, creating a massive humanitarian crisis of the worst magnitude.

From here, things get even worse. Kim launches dozens of chemical and biological weapons at South Korea and Japan. Sarin, VX, and other toxins are lobbed at Tokyo, Pusan, and other large cities. Millions of people try
to flee the impacted areas just as in Seoul — creating a panic not seen since World War II.

In just a few hours, hell is unleashed on the Korean peninsula. And while the United States and its allies would eventually win any war against North Korea, it is clear from the above — far from what could be the most extreme of examples of a Second Korean War — what damage the Kim regime could do in a military confrontation. Indeed, the price of such a victory could be millions of people dead and large sections of Korea rendered uninhabitable for decades, if not longer.
4.2.2 On Site

People near THAAD site have trouble sleeping


The women, who brandish canes and umbrellas at the military helicopters and shout for them to go away every time one flies through the village, say they have no interest in the politics of the deployment. But they protest, longing for the peace they had before. “I can’t sleep. I’m taking sedatives at night but I still get only two hours of sleep,” said 87-year-old Na Wi-bun, who lives within a kilometer (0.62 mile) of the site and says she can hear the generator that powers THAAD humming around the clock. Na goes to the town hall every day, a refuge to a group of women as well as a number of civic groups protesting the deployment. “During the daytime, we used to farm and later go to the town hall and us grandmothers would spend time together. Now there’s no day and night for us. I live at the town hall now,” said 81-year-old Do Geum-ryeon. Most of the villagers are farmers of chamoe, or Korean melon. Do, who moved to the village 61 years ago, said she sustained bruises fighting against police in late April, trying to keep U.S. military trailers full of THAAD components from passing through the village at early dawn. “On my dying breath, I’m going to tell them to take THAAD away,” she said.
4.2.3 Militarism Links

Link: Anti-missile systems fund the military industrial complex

Phillip Cunningham [Regular Contributor to the Japan Times], “Anti-missile missile system missing the point in South Korea”, Japan Times, April 2 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/04/02/commentary/world-commentary/anti-missile-missile-system-missing-point-south-korea/#.WZdC1ZN97WU

Extending the costly anti-missile program to South Korea is a hard sell strategically, but all strategic considerations aside, such sales are a boondoggle for a U.S. military industrial complex that has long raked in cash from spurious Star Wars style anti-missile schemes despite their questionable worth. It’s not that China doesn’t have an argument about THAAD, it’s that the argument is not with the South Korean people. If it’s with anyone, it’s with Trump, under whose militant posture the provocative installation is taking place. If China’s leadership wants to address the root of the problem, it makes more sense to boycott Mar-A-Lago than Lotte.
Con Evidence

Anti-Missile Systems have contributed billions to defense contractor coffers


The Cold War’s legacy has been characterized by a systematic pattern of threat inflation, a relentless stream of surplus weapons development, and a predilection for a brand of secret science that lines the pockets of defense contractors and swells the war chests of hawkish politicians-things that fray the fabric of democracy. There is perhaps no military project more representative of this legacy than ballistic missile defense (BMD). Since Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars address” in 1983, taxpayers have spent more than $100 billion on BMD projects. Close examination reveals that many of these programs were of dubious value. Politically seductive but scientifically elusive, the notion of missile defense has given rise to waves of runaway rhetoric featuring technical claims that have outstripped supporting scientific data.
One of the primary reasons that the situation has been developing in this manner is the irresponsible behavior of the Korean government. Korean Defense Minister Han Min-gu and Blue House National Security Chief Kim Kwan-jin have taken actions suggesting that they are not opposed to THAAD being deployed with US Forces Korea. Rumor has it that the South Korean government wants to make a “backroom deal,” allowing the US to deploy THAAD in the country in exchange for delaying the transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea. If that is true, it is the worst possible choice, as it would mean deferring South Korea’s sovereignty over its own national defense while compromising the country’s security. The entire world knows that THAAD is a key component of the American missile defense system, and that the system is primarily designed with China and Russia in mind. THAAD operates in tandem with an X-band radar that is capable of monitoring the entire territory of China, and the general view is that the US had made a great effort to deploy this in South Korea in the past as well.
Con Evidence

Link: THAAD deployment involves deploying troops


Last week, the South Korean military had announced a round of environmental assessments and estimated the inspection would take about 30 days. “The move [on Wednesday] was made to secure some operational capability of what is available of the THAAD system,” Seoul’s defense ministry said. The relocation of the equipment by U.S. Forces Korea also took place early Wednesday to attract the least possible attention from local activists. The move that occurred between 4:42 and 7 a.m., however, drew a crowd of about 200 protesters who gathered as 20 military trucks hauling interceptor missiles, a radar, generators and coolers began to arrive at the golf course in Seongju, according to Yonhap. A South Korean military official who spoke anonymously said two mobile launchers had arrived at the site, but could not confirm whether the “remaining four” had been delivered. One THAAD unit typically includes six launchers, and the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, subordinate to the U.S. Eighth Army, would operate the system.
US presence and expansion boosts militaristic mindset


The expansion of U.S. military bases and operations has had a huge adverse impact on local communities at social, economic, political, and environmental levels. Host governments and local business elites are complicit in this. They equate progress and economic development with U.S. corporate and military interests instead of addressing the effects of U.S. militarism on local communities. The United States uses political and economic control to exert military force in the Pacific region. Allied nations trade sovereignty for militarized “security.” Japan and South Korea both pay for upkeep of U.S. troops and the restructuring or expansion of U.S. bases in their countries.
Link: North Korean testing empowers militarists


The state military budget is set for 37.4 trillion won (U.S. $33.6 billion), which makes up roughly 10 percent of the country’s entire budget and is up 4.9 percent from the previous year. The figure is catching up to the defense spending of the United States and China, which have devoted 19.3 percent and 18.2 percent, respectively, of their total government budget toward the military.

“The reason that we are building up our military is to counter North Korea’s attacks and provocations,” a military source close to the South Korean Defense Ministry said. “The purchases are to protect, not to pre-emptively attack North Korea or start a war. But we are only able to maintain peace when we are more advanced militarily, which will also fend off North Korea from attacking.” The military source cited the attacks in 2010 by North Korea, including the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island bombing, to emphasize that military spending is justified to ensure a defense against surprise attacks. Analysts in South Korea agree that the government needs to bulk up its military, noting Pyongyang’s firepower. “Even though it’s not often acknowledged, North Korea has nuclear weapons with successful long-range missile technology. So this military buildup is needed in defense of North Korea,” said political science professor Yang Seung-ham of Yonsei University. But Yang also argued that the move could deteriorate the opportunity for better relations with North Korea, which many experts say are the best they’ve seen in five years.
South Korea uses North Korea as an excuse to beef up its military. If THAAD makes North Korea angrier, this is a link to militarism


“We can’t say the Park government is doing a good job opening up dialogue and preparing for unification because the two countries are reverting back to a state of competing for military preparedness. This is a problem,” Yang said. South Korea is emerging as one of Asia’s top weapons exporters. In 2014, defense exports hit a record high of $3.6 billion, which is the largest the country had distributed since the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) was established in 2006. Major deals including a $1.2 billion contract to build six corvettes, or small warships, for the Royal Malaysian Navy and a $420 million bid by the Philippines for 12 FA-50 fighter jets. According to a recent IHS Balance of Trade report, South Korea is forecast to generate more revenue from defense exports than China by 2016. The report comes at a time when the country’s largest companies, such as Samsung Electronics, are experiencing steady declines in market value. Some analysts suggest South Korea is beefing up its military power to establish a new industry rather than simply to deter North Korea. Among them is Kim Jong-dae, chief editor of Defense 21 magazine. “It’s obvious that South Korea’s military buildup will cause North Korea to react negatively,” Kim said. “But this works because the government is using the justification that it has to protect from North Korea’s threat. That isn’t right, and in the truth, the [country’s] military-industrial complex is a major aspect.”
4.2.4 Militarism impacts

US militarism justifies the continued domination of South Korea


U.S. military expansion and restructuring in the Asia-Pacific region serve patriarchal U.S. goals of “full spectrum dominance.” Allied governments are bribed, flattered, threatened, or coerced into participating in this project. Even the apparently willing governments are junior partners who must, in an unequal relationship, shoulder the costs of U.S. military policies. For the U.S. military, land and bodies are so much raw material to use and discard without responsibility or serious consequences to those in power. Regardless of gender, soldiers are trained to dehumanize others so that, if ordered, they can kill them. Sexual abuse and torture committed by U.S. military personnel and contractors against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison illustrate a grim new twist on militarized violence, where race and nation “trumped” gender. White U.S. women were among the perpetrators, thereby appropriating the masculinized role. The violated Iraqi men, meanwhile, were forced into the feminized role. Gendered inequalities, which are fundamental to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, affect men as well as women. Young men who live near U.S. bases see masculinity defined in military terms. They may work as cooks or bartenders who provide rest and relaxation to visiting servicemen. They may be forced to migrate for work to larger cities or overseas, seeking to fulfill their dreams of giving their families a better future. U.S. peace movements should not only address U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, but also in other parts of the world. Communities in the Asia-Pacific region have a long history of contesting U.S. militarism and offer eloquent testimonies to the negative impact of U.S. military operations there. These stories provide insights into the gendered dynamics of U.S. foreign and military policy, and the complicity of allied nations in this effort.
Militarism is associated with more racism, sexism, and other hierarchical oppressors.

Madelaine Adelman [Associate Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry in the School of Social Transformation], “The Military, Militarism, and the Militarization of Domestic Violence,” VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, Vol. 9 No. 9, September 2003 1118-1152

Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas. The more militarization transforms an individual or a society, the more that individual or society comes to imagine military needs and militaristic presumptions to be not only valuable but also normal. (p. 3) Building on Enloe’s framework, Lutz (2002) argued that militarization is simultaneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of militant nationalism and militant fundamentalisms but also the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality. (p. 723)
4 Con Evidence

Military industrial complex harms democracy - US proves


In January 1961 when he left office President Eisenhower gave a well-remembered farewell address in which, though he hit the usual buttons of American exceptionalism and greatness, he warned about the “military-industrial complex” in terms that remain valid today: In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. The former general was aware of the insidious power of what is now often called the defense sector. The “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex has not only become a reality rather than a potential danger but it is indeed endangering the liberty and economic well-being of the United States, if by United States we mean its citizens rather than its elites or ruling class. Militarism has become the norm in US political debates and the military-industrial complex pervades every single sphere of American life which takes its toll on the health of the nation. Health here means satisfactory or healthy functioning of the economy and society. The US economy is in disarray with huge budget and trade deficits, a high level of unemployment and a dismal state of repair of many infrastructures (public housing, roads, public schools). Militarism is one cause among several of this disease of the American economy; it also contributes to what Susan Sontag calls the “brutality of American life”2 which has public health consequences. Militarism can thus be apprehended from a sociological and psychological as well as from a historical perspective.
Military industrial complex harms the economy


The concept of “overkill” enables us to somewhat reconcile the two positions about the effects of military Keynesianism. Indeed, after an initial phase of Keynesian stimulus lasting about 6 years, military spending destroys jobs and prosperity. So even from a purely economic point of view totally divorced from ethics, excessive military spending is bad for any society. This is the main conclusion of a 2007 report by economist Dean Baker: “After an initial demand stimulus, the effect of increased military spending turns negative around the sixth year. After 10 years of higher defense spending, there would be 464,000 fewer jobs than in the baseline scenario with lower defense spending.”
4.2.5 China

4.2.6 Chinese Arms Race

Uniqueness - China was willing to sit out a nuclear arms race before


While U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin preen and compare the size of their nuclear arsenals, China has been quite modest on the subject. This macho dance doesn’t interest Beijing. Why? Isn’t bigger always better? For decades, when it comes to nuclear weapons, the answer from China has been a resounding no. The rest of the world would do well to consider their reasons why.
Uniqueness - Chinese officials said in ’09 that they are not in an arms race


China on Thursday voiced its strong dissatisfaction over the new report by the U.S. Defense Department on China’s military strength. Hu Changming, spokesman of China’s Defense Ministry, said the report severely distorted facts, censured China’s legitimate and normal national defence development, and disseminated the mainland’s “so-called military threat” to Taiwan. “China is strongly dissatisfied with it and resolutely opposes it,” said Hu. “China unswervingly sticks to a path of peaceful development and pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in nature.” Hu noted that China is not in an arms race of any form and constitutes no threat to other countries. Hu said the report, which continued the dissemination of the “Chinese military threat” theory and severely distorted facts, was absolutely groundless.
China Hates THAAD


The proposed deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system by the US in South Korea this year is one of the many points of conflict between America and China. The Asian giant considers THAAD deployment as a direct threat to its own security and believes it will increase tensions in the Korean peninsula. Notwithstanding Chinese concerns, US and South Korea claim that THAAD is intended to defend against any North Korean aggression.
China is opposed to X-Band Radar


The X-Band radar of the U.S. missile defense system THAAD has arrived in South Korea and is expected to be placed in position in April.

The powerful radar has been at the center of regional controversy.

China has repeatedly voiced opposition to the THAAD radar, claiming the system could monitor military movements within Chinese borders, even as the United States tried to reassure Beijing THAAD was being used to deter North Korea missiles.
X-Ban Radar harms Chinese second strike capabilities


THAAD’s radar could then relay launch data back to the U.S. homeland, improving the targeting of anti-ballistic missile systems. That such a capability might be used to penetrate Chinese territory has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was highly critical of the deployment, arguing it “far exceeds the Korean peninsula’s defense needs” and may “harm other countries’ legitimate security interests.” In particular, an improved U.S. ability to intercept or otherwise counter Chinese nuclear missiles directly undercuts the utility of China’s existing nuclear deterrent.
China may worry about US nefarious use of missile defense

Ken Booth [E.H. Carr Professor in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK] and Nicholas J. Wheeler [Professor in International Politics in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK], “Rethinking the Security Dilemma,” University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 2010. http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1924/security%20studies%20chapter%2010,%20Wheeler.pdf?sequence=1

What worries strategic planners in Beijing is that Washington might view Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) as part of an offensive strategy of nuclear pre-emption designed to give the USA dominance over the process of escalation in any future crisis (Lieber and Press 2006: 52). Even if Chinese leaders are persuaded that a particular US administration does not harbour aggressive intent (a predicament recognized all too well by US offensive realists) what guarantees can they have that future US leaders will not seek to employ missile defences as part of an offensive strategy?
China cares a lot about retaining a deterrent, and missile defense may cause China to proliferate vertically


The U.S.-China strategic relationship also is characterized by mutual uncertainties about each other’s longer-term strategic intentions in both Washington and Beijing. In Washington, the scope and goals of China’s planned nuclear modernization as well as its readiness to play a constructive role in dealing with pressing non-proliferation problems remain open questions. Beijing’s decision to test an anti-satellite weapon in January, 2007 clearly reinforced those uncertainties. In Beijing, the scope and goals of U.S. deployment of missile defenses and advanced conventional weapons is being closely watched given concerns about a possible U.S. pursuit of a disarming first strike against China’s nuclear arsenal. For their part, China’s experts and officials have signaled that the scope and pace of China’s nuclear modernization is linked to those American deployments. So viewed, China is prepared to do whatever it takes to preserve a limited nuclear deterrent.
Radar undermines Chinese nuclear deterrent


The THAAD system uses sophisticated radar to detect incoming missiles. In order to detect incoming missiles from North Korea, THAAD’s radar system needs to be pointed at — you guessed it — North Korea. But it just so happens that when you point this sophisticated radar system at North Korea, you don’t just see North Korea — you also see parts of China. China and North Korea do share a border, after all, and the site from which these latest North Korean missiles were fired is really close to that border. That means China is worried that THAAD’s radar system could potentially help the US better detect Chinese missiles being launched at the United States in the event of a future war. To the US military, of course, the ability to detect a Chinese nuke heading our way even earlier than we currently can sounds pretty great. But for the Chinese military, this means the US now has a slight edge. The Chinese military can’t put radar anywhere near that close to the US to detect incoming US nukes, which means that in a nuclear conflict, the US would have a slight strategic advantage — it would be able to detect an incoming Chinese nuke and respond faster than China could in the reverse.
China has responded in inflammatory ways - arms race declaration


A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, denounced the United States’ decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, and vowed that Beijing would “take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests.” “The consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea,” Mr. Geng added, warning that the two countries should not “go further and further down the wrong road.” For days, the official Chinese news media has warned that deployment of Thaad could lead to a “de facto” break in relations with South Korea and urged consumers to boycott South Korean products. The Chinese authorities recently forced the closing of 23 stores owned by Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate that agreed to turn over land that it owned for use in the Thaad deployment, and hundreds of Chinese protested at Lotte stores over the weekend, some holding banners that read, “Get out of China.” Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, warned that Thaad “will bring an arms race in the region,” likening the defensive system to a shield that would prompt the development of new spears. “More missile shields of one side inevitably bring more nuclear missiles of the opposing side that can break through the missile shield,” it said.
China has responded in inflammatory ways - training against mock THAAD targets


At least three surface-to-air missile systems were involved in the exercise as well, including the HQ-6, HQ-16, and HQ-22. The HQ-22 was seen publicly for the first time at the PLA’s 90th anniversary parade. The ballistic and cruise missiles simulated a long-range strike on a mock up of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) site and also struck ground-based models of U.S. F-22 Raptor stealth fighters, one source added. The exercise is one of the largest recent PLARF exercises of its kind and one of the first publicly reported uses of the DF-26C IRBM in an exercise. Little public information exists on the DF-26C, which is a secretive PLARF IRBM capable of precision strikes with both conventional and nuclear payloads and is thought to have been first deployed in 2014 or earlier. The DF-16 MRBM is also a secretive program, with the missiles having first been displayed publicly at China’s September 2015 parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Earlier this year, new images of the DF-16, including never-before-seen configurations, appeared on several Chinese websites. The MRBM serves a conventional payload precision-strike role with a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers and at least three known variants exist. The CJ-10, meanwhile, is a standoff cruise missile, capable of striking targets at a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers, according to U.S. Department of Defense’s 2017 report on China’s military capabilities. Combined, the exercise likely tested the PLARF’s ability to stage a coordinated precision-strike salvo attack against defensive installations like a THAAD battery across multiple missile crews.
Chinese fears of THAAD cause an arms race


Beijing’s concern over missile defense might prompt it to pursue a much more aggressive security policy. This week, former South Korean Ambassador to China Kwon Young-se explained. “What China is really worried about is … Seoul’s potential joining in the U.S.-led regional missile defense network, not just THAAD deployment on the peninsula itself.” A concerted U.S. missile defense network in the Asia-Pacific would almost certainly threaten the viability of China’s currently minimal nuclear deterrence model. China is already working toward nuclear modernization and improving the survivability and reliability of its missiles. This year’s decision to promote the Second Artillery Corps provides further evidence of China’s increased commitment to strategic deterrence. Confronted with the very real possibility of a robust and effective missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific, China may take further steps to enlarge their force to compensate – and step on the slippery slope to an arms race with the United States.
Effective missile defense causes an arms race with China


From China’s perspective, things look even worse. China’s modest nuclear arsenal could be neutralized even by a small-scale US ballistic missile defense system—as long as the system were sufficiently effective. If China’s leaders come to believe that the US missile defense system can neutralize Beijing’s deterrent, they may well decide to construct more nuclear weapons to restore strategic stability. The result would be a defense-offense arms race.
China says that they will respond to THAAD


A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, denounced the United States’ decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, and vowed that Beijing would “take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests.”

“The consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea,” Mr. Geng added, warning that the two countries should not “go further and further down the wrong road.”
Arms race leads to war


We explore these concerns with an empirical examination of rivalry and non-rivalry populations in the 1816-2000 period. In brief, we find that: arms races occur most frequently in the context of enduring rivalries, arms races are more likely in the middle and latter stages of rivalry, the frequency of arms races is higher in rivalries with war than rivalries that do not experience war, and only when arms races occur in the latter phases of rivalries is there an increased chance of war. Our study narrows the scope of the arms race-war relationship relative to past studies, demonstrating that the arms race-war relationship is conditional on rivalry processes.
Arms races predict the onset of war in 91 out of 99 cases


Conversely, when an arms race did precede a significant threat or act of violence, war was avoided only 5 out of 28 times. It is difficult to argue, therefore, that arms races play no role in the process of leading to the onset of war.” In Table 2, we see that a high arms race score for a pair of nations correctly predicts the outbreak of war 23 out of 28 times, and conversely, a low score correctly predicts the nonescalation of a dispute 68 out of 71 times, for an overall ‘batting average” of 91 cases out of 99.
A new Korean War will kill hundreds of thousands


One explanation for this may be that estimates of casualties and physical destruction on the Korean Peninsula (and possibly Japan) under any war scenario are so exceedingly high. Should Pyongyang live up to its threat of turning Seoul into a “sea of fire,” casualties in the larger Seoul metropolitan area alone may surpass 100,000 within 48 hours, according to some estimates, even without the use of North Korean weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. Department of Defense assessed that a Second Korean War could produce 200,000-300,000 South Korean and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.
## Chinese fears of THAAD cause an arms race


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Arms races/security dilemma kill cooperation (esp. bottom of the card)

Ken Booth [E.H. Carr Professor in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK] and Nicholas J. Wheeler [Professor in International Politics in the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK], “Rethinking the Security Dilemma,” University of Wales, Aberystwyth. 2010. http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1924/security%20studies%20chapter%2010,%20Wheeler.pdf?sequence=1

The coming decades will see a potentially disastrous convergence of dangers unless sensible collective action is quickly taken to head them off. In a new era of uncertainty human society will be challenged by a novel combination of old and new security predicaments in relation to such issue areas as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, “climate chaos,” competition for non-renewable (especially traditional energy) resources, mass migration, great power rivalry, cultural/religious/civilizational clashes, and the growing gap between haves and have-nots. All these risks threaten to be exacerbated by the huge but uneven growth in the global population – a topic with which security studies and indeed International Relations in general has not yet begun to seriously engage. In most of these key risk areas, 4 as we discuss in the four major illustrations below, security dilemma dynamics threaten to heighten fear, provoke mistrust, and close down possibilities for building cooperation and trust.
US-China Cooperation Key to peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue


The world may need Moon to be as popular with Trump and Xi as he is with the South Korean public. The path to a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue must navigate through the interests of the world’s two foremost superpowers. At a very high level, both America and China agree that there should be some combination of pressure and dialogue to denuclearize North Korea. Yet the Trump administration’s attempts to compel China to take action against Kim Jong Un generated only a minimal response. It may take a middle man like Moon to thread the needle.
Arms race conditions increase danger


It has also been argued that in an international system characterised by anarchy and uncertainty, the existence of “mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats.” This may cause reciprocal counter-responses which lead to increased regional tensions, diminished security and “self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s security environment.”xxi As a consequence, one could expect to see the emergence of spirals of tension. For Christensen, when looking at East Asia, there are many variables which make the development of a security dilemma likely. “Not only could dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities … increase uncertainty and mistrust, … the importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional actors could encourage a destabilising competition to develop power projection capabilities on the seas and in the skies.” Power projection capabilities are usually seen as “offensive threats” and “are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation’s homeland.”xxii If we look at East Asia today, it is not hard to see a China-Japan and a China-US security dilemma functioning. China’s military modernisation has certainly led to the US increasing its support for Japan as well as bolstering its own military presence in the region.
4.2.7 Chinese Economic Sanctions

China sanctions South Korea in response to THAAD


Experts on the region, including former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and Richard Weitz, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis, told CNBC that a warming trend between South Korea and China was put to an end by the THAAD issue. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner.

“China has already engaged in one of its most assertive influence campaigns in recent history to prevent the THAAD deployment, encompassing threatening leadership speeches, alarming media commentary, and most recently coercive economic pressure that has included government-sanctioned trade boycotts,” Weitz said.

Think tank Eurasia Group told CNBC that China’s retaliation against the anti-missile system is becoming a threat to South Korea’s economy.
Con Evidence

Chinese firms boycott South Korean firms to protest THAAD


Several Chinese companies say they will no longer do business with South Korea’s Lotte Group, after it agreed on Monday to provide land to host a US anti-missile system that Beijing sees as a threat to national security.
Chinese travel ban decreases South Korean growth by 20%


China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in China.

China’s travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea’s GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%.

The reasoning is very simple. Chinese tourists, who come as part of tour groups, contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea’s economy, or 0.5% of its total GDP. Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP.

So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea’s GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse.
China aims to crush the South Korean economy in response to THAAD


To prevent deployment of THAAD in South Korea, Beijing has threatening to cut diplomatic relations with Seoul. Furthermore, it is trying to crush the South’s economy, barring its K-pop groups from performing in China, ending charter flights to the South, and banning the import of South Korean cosmetics. Daily Chinese state media tirades target Seoul.

And China’s officials have gone after Lotte, the South’s fifth largest chaebol.

Lotte has been targeted two ways. Of particular concern to the retail company is Beijing’s shutting down tour groups to South Korea. Friday, the Korea Tourism Organization charged that the China National Tourism Administration issued oral instructions to tour operators to stop the sale of packages to South Korea starting March 15.

Moreover, Lotte’s operations in China have been the subject of unrelenting attacks. The official Xinhua News Agency said the group was “acting as the paws of a tiger.” “Showing Lotte the door will be an effective warning to all the other foreign forces that jeopardize China’s national interests,” the Global Times stated in an editorial.
87 of 99 Lotte stores shut down in response to THAAD


Lotte has seen 87 of its 99 stores in China closed and work on a theme park in the country suspended since it agreed to hand over a golf course to the South Korean government to house the THAAD missile defense system.

Chairman Shin Dong-bin told CNN that his company was unable to refuse the government’s request for its land.
4.2.8 Chinese Sanctions

China imposed informal sanctions on South Korea because of THAAD


After South Korea agreed to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system last July, reports surfaced that China had begun sanctioning South Korea to pressure Seoul into reversing its decision. Chinese officials have repeatedly denied that there is any validity to such reports. However, evidence that Beijing has restricted Korean pop culture imports, ordered Chinese travel agencies to halt sales of travel packages to South Korea, blocked importation of Korean cosmetics, and leveled a number of other unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea has led the U.S. and South Korea to call China out for its coercive measures. Beijing, though, has shown no intention of lifting its sanctions, causing many inside and outside South Korea to wonder how much longer the country will be subjected to Beijing’s pressure. A look at Taiwan’s similar experience as a victim of China’s coercive tactics indicates that the sanctions might be lifted soon after the new South Korean president settles into office, but could also linger in one form or another for years, depending on the new South Korean administration’s strategic orientation.
The tourism ban hurts South Korea


China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in China. China’s travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea’s GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. Chinese tourists, who come as part of tour groups, contribute $7.3 billion in tourism revenue to Korea’s economy, or 0.5% of its total GDP. Individual tourists from China, contribute another $11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP. So if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea’s GDP is gone, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse.
China restricts K-Pop and Korean shows


In January, two South Korean classical artists, soprano Sumi Jo and pianist Kwun-woo Paik, were denied performance visas. No reason was given. Sumi Jo said on her Twitter account that her China tour had suddenly been canceled after two years of preparations. It had been China that had initially invited her to perform. “It’s such a shame that conflict between two countries interferes with the fields of pure art and culture,” said Jo in a veiled tweet. In December, China banned imports of 19 Korean cosmetics and in August, Chinese state media reported that restrictions would be placed on Korean TV shows. “It seems there is no end to China’s mean-spirited bullying of South Korea,” an editorial in The Korea Herald said on February 12.
China restricted K-Pop


South Korean pop stars appear to have become unwitting pawns in an escalating diplomatic spat between Seoul and Beijing over the deployment of an American missile defence system. Entertainers from the colourful Korean music scene, K-pop, have been mysteriously barred from entering China to perform, Korean TV shows and films have been blocked, and actors replaced by Chinese stars in advertising campaigns, say local press reports. “No Korean entertainer has obtained Beijing’s permission to perform in the neighbouring country since October,” reported The Korea Times recently, suggesting that the snub signals growing anti-Korean sentiment. The timing of the industry’s troubles coincides with a decision by South Korea’s government to host America’s Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD), an anti-ballistic missile defence system, to protect Korean and US forces from North Korean military aggression.
K-Pop is soft power


In past decades, K-pop, along with South Korean dramas, has successfully seeped into North Korea, mostly through radio broadcasts, CD-filled balloons, and USB drives. The North Korean hunger for South Korean entertainment has only continued to grow, despite the country’s unparalleled cultural, political, and ideological isolationism: it is reported that approximately 70% of North Koreans consume foreign media in their homes. Through this cultural surge, North Korea’s hegemonic barriers have become porous; the country became vulnerable to its southern neighbor’s soft power – a power based on aesthetic appeal, rather than military strength, which fosters co-optation into, in this case, South Korea’s agenda of reconciliatory politics. The effects of soft power, best exemplified through the United States’s global brand dominance with companies such as Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, are unquantifiable, but cannot be understated in establishing political sway. As a result, South Korea has masterfully wielded K-pop as a political conduit of soft power, transcending unbreakable historical-political divisions with its northern neighbor through a clandestine cultural flow.
Chinese sanctions may expand to other important parts of the Korean economy


And things could get worse. China has asked for a boycott of Lotte Group’s products, but China’s displeasure has so far only been directed at cosmetics, duty-free shops and Korean casinos. Will China launch sanctions against Korean smartphones and car makers too? Credit Suisse economist Christiaan Tuntono wrote: In 2016, Chinese tourists to Korea represent a hefty 47% of total tourist arrivals and an estimated 64% of total tourism revenue. Besides tourism, Korea is also highly exposed to China on merchandise trade, with 25% of gross exports (18% on value-added basis) bounded for the country. Korean companies in automobile, electronics and media also have significant operations within the Chinese borders. We are concerned that the Korean economy and the highly exposed sectors may face greater pressures from China if the dispute is not reconciled in the near future.
4.2.9 Diplomacy

China is key to controlling North Korea because of trade


Take-and-Talk is on full display with the latest North Korean missile launch. China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner and strongest diplomatic supporter. North Korea exported about one billion dollars of coal to China in 2014 and 2015 – its biggest foreign exchange earner. Ninety-percent of North Korea’s international trade is with China. With a little economic pressure, China could stop North Korea from proliferating nuclear weapons, probably tomorrow. Threatening to buy coal and other goods elsewhere would get Kim Jong Un’s notice.
Sanctions will only be effective with Chinese support


International pressure on North Korea has ratcheted up in recent days, as the U.S. imposed new unilateral sanctions and China began taking steps to implement a strict, new United Nations Security Council resolution. But while the U.S. has few economic ties with North Korea to cut, China has plenty of screws to tighten. And so whether international sanctions work or fail may depend to a large degree on how strictly China implements them.
THAAD stands in the way of US-China cooperation on the North Korea issue


A new approach is absolutely needed between China and the U.S. when confronting Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile paranoids. An essential option is to conduct tougher sanctions to wither away North Korea’s potential to develop nuclear weapons in internationally coordinated and assured ways. Washington should stop scapegoating China for its failed North Korea policy and respect China’s wide-ranging security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. For the moment, suspending THAAD deployment talks between Washington and Seoul would be helpful. Beijing, equally stuck in North Korean purgatory for two decades, needs to end its indecision and think about completely cutting-off the supply of oil it sends to Pyongyang, following the mandate of a new United Nations Security Council resolution.
Empirics: China can curb North Korean nuclearization


But Gordon Chang, the author of “The Coming Collapse of China,” writes in The Cipher Brief that 90% of North Korea’s trade is done with China, accounting for 90% of its oil and, in some years, 100% of its aviation fuel.

After a provocative North Korean missile launch in 2003, China cut off its supply of oil to North Korea for three days. In no time, the Kim regime caved to international demands and sat down for the six-party talks on nuclear disarmament.

“China can disarm North Korea in the blink of an eye,” Chang wrote.
THAADs eliminate Chinese cooperation


Wang Junsheng, research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in a July 10 piece for Cankao Network (cankaochina.cn) that “THAAD deployment in South Korea destroys the mutual trust among China, the U.S. and South Korea in their efforts to solve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program,” and judged that “The cooperation among China, the U.S. and South Korea has up until now been proven to be the most effective means, but this too will collapse with THAAD deployment.” China has repeatedly brought up its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council in relation to UN-level sanctions against North Korea, with the stance that it would “fulfill its duties and promises to the international community.”
**4 Con Evidence**

Unless THAAD is canceled China will not cooperate over North Korea


Chinese authorities are unlikely to keeping a level head. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently made his official visit to Colombo in Sri Lanka, he made incredibly strong statements to the reporters. According to the July 10th report of leading Beijing newspaper Beijing Times, the minister clearly stated the state’s stance, stating, “We hope friends of South Korea will think calmly that whether the THAAD system is conducive to their national security, to the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and to the solution of the nuclear issue of the peninsula.” His statement sounds like if the THAAD deployment is not cancelled, China won’t cooperate to the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and to the solution of the nuclear issue of the peninsula. What’s important is that the minister called Korea as ‘friends’. The overall nuance is not positive at all.
THAADs can be traded for Chinese cooperation on the issue of North Korean
denuclearization


The third and least likely option is to not increase U.S. or South Korean missile defense capabilities on the peninsula. The United States could refrain from such action in exchange for China moderating North Korean behavior. Such a policy would largely rely on sanctions, but international sanctions will only alter North Korea’s behavior if China fully cooperates in implementing them. China may be persuaded to more fully apply sanctions in exchange for the United States not strengthening South Korean missile defense capabilities. Moreover, refraining from such action would improve U.S. and South Korean relations with China and may moderate China’s behavior in East and Southeast Asia.
4 Con Evidence

Nuclear North Korea risks war on the Korean Peninsula


As Seoul and Washington stopped talking about dialogue with Pyongyang, some security experts are talking about the worst-case scenario: a nuclear war that could breakout on the Korean peninsula. North Korea continues advancing its nuclear and missile programs, while some call for Seoul’s own nuclear armament. Discussions of a nuclear war are taking place at a time when the Obama administration is distracted from its foreign policy in an election year, and the Park government is crippled by a defeat in recent parliamentary elections. Both administrations are resorting to the dubious efficacy of sanctions on North Korea, hoping that pressure would somehow lead to denuclearization. Unlike during the Cold War, when a nuclear war was considered unthinkable and the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) effectively reined in decision makers from going to nuclear war, the possibility of fighting a nuclear war has become a serious topic for discussion. In the past two weeks, three research organizations released their respective updated assessment of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, discussing the conditions for its use, its inherent threats to the security of South Korea and the United States, and the option of a military solution. David Albright, founder of The Institute of Science and International Security, released a well-documented report on June 16, estimating that Pyongyang now has 13 to 21 nuclear weapons. Prior to the publication of this report, a widely accepted estimate was 10 to 16 bombs. In April 2015, Chinese experts said the North had close to 20 bombs, while Washington experts said at the end of 2015 that the North could have 20 to 100 by 2020.
4.3 Missile Defense Causes Arms Races (Various Countries)

4.3.1 North Korea

North Korea will respond to THAAD by increasing number of missiles


“U.S. Forces Korea confirms the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is operational and has the ability to intercept North Korean missiles and defend the Republic of the Korea,” U.S. Forces Korea spokesperson Col. Rob Manning said in a statement to CBS News.

The isolated North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un lashed out again on Monday, meanwhile, accusing the U.S. of drawing the two nations closer to “the brink of nuclear war.” with THAAD. In a statement sent to CBS News on Monday, a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said the country would “speed up at the maximum pace the measure for bolstering its nuclear deterrence,” in response to what it considers U.S. provocations.
North Korean proliferation leads to nuclear conflict

Cirincione, Joseph. [President of the Ploughshares Fund]. “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy. Spring 2000, p. 120-136.

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades-a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang’s; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan’s vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia-whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power-struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation’s actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
North Korean proliferation leads to a nuclear Japan and higher chance of nuclear war


U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, never one for a loss of words, told Chinese President Xi Jinping that Japan has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons “virtually overnight.”

Biden made his disclosure while giving a speech at a Public Broadcasting Service program aired on Monday. Biden said he had urged Xi to exert influence on North Korea so it will abandon its missile and nuclear weapons developments.

Referring to North Korea’s recent nuclear test and missile launches in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, Biden said that if China and the U.S. fail to take effective action against North Korea, “What happens if Japan, who could go nuclear tomorrow? They have the capacity to do it virtually overnight.” Biden did not say when his conversation with Xi took place.
Regional insecurity causes a cascade of proliferation


Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries’ regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.
If North Korean proliferation is not stopped soon, it will be impossible to reverse.


It is too easy to dismiss as bluster the near-constant stream of threats coming out of Pyongyang. But while the world looks the other way, North Korea’s young and isolated leader, Kim Jong Un, is aggressively pursuing four parallel military initiatives: expanding the amount of fissile material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) the country possesses; producing a longer-range missile capable initially of reaching targets in the Pacific and eventually the continental United States; developing a smaller and lighter nuclear warhead to sit atop a long-range missile; and seeking a survivable, strategic “deterrent” via a small missile-launch submarine or mobile, land-based missile launch system. There is much that we do not know about what goes on inside this highly secretive state, but there is both commercially available satellite imagery and credible deductive analysis to support the conclusion that North Korea is making progress on all four fronts. Unclassified satellite imagery taken this year indicates that North Korea has restarted its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon and an adjoining plant housing centrifuges used to enrich uranium. This has led to speculation that it could be in the process of expanding its nuclear stockpile, estimated to be about six to 10 weapons, to 20 or more by the end of 2016 and possibly to 50 or more by 2020. An arsenal of this size would significantly complicate any diplomatic effort to roll back and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. It would also make it much more difficult to pinpoint the precise location of each weapon in the event that they needed to be secured or destroyed.
4.3.2 Japan

THAAD is raising region tensions and contributing to Japanese militarization


Since Seoul and Washington announced “an alliance decision” to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in July 2016, the little-known weapon system has given rise to intense public protests throughout South Korea while triggering a series of countermeasures by the North as well as China and Russia. THAAD, a missile defense system designed to destroy an incoming enemy missile at a high altitude, has the potential not only to undermine the strategic balance between the United States and Russia as well as China but also to drive an arms race in Northeast Asia to an unprecedentedly dangerous level. Japan too is directly contributing to the global and regional strategic instability as it is engaged in operating two THAAD radar units and co-developing a more advanced missile defense system with the U.S. At the same time, Tokyo leverages its participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system to weaken or remove constitutional and legal constraints on its military. THAAD currently serves as a wedge that widens the growing strategic gulf between the continental powers and the pacific alliances led by the U.S. at a time of growing tensions in East Asia and the western Pacific.
Missile defense is driving Japan to remilitarize

Hughes, Christopher. [Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in PAIS, a Research Associate at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, and former Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies]. “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and remilitarisation,” Space Policy. 2013.

Japan’s future trajectory in security policy and the extent of deviation from the post-war course of a constrained military stance have been the source of constant academic and policy debate. Japanese policy-makers have maintained that national security policy has shown no fundamental deviation, and that this can be benchmarked against a range of constant anti-militaristic principles. The advent of BMD, however, poses significant questions over whether Japan is continuing to follow a similar security trajectory. This article examines how BMD has challenged four key anti-militaristic principles—the nonexercise of collective self-defence, the non-military use of space, the ban on the export of weapons technology, and strict civilian control of the military—and uses this assessment to judge how BMD is driving remilitarisation. It concludes that BMD’s impact is highly significant in transgressing these antimilitaristic principles and is thus indicating a more remilitarised security path for Japan developing now and in the future.
BMD deployment enables Japanese remilitarization

Christopher W. Hughes [Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry], “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and remilitarisation,” Space Policy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2013.03.004

Japanese policy-makers have maintained that national security policy has shown no fundamental deviation, and that this can be benchmarked against a range of constant anti-militaristic principles. The advent of BMD, however, poses significant questions over whether Japan is continuing to follow a similar security trajectory. This article examines how BMD has challenged four key anti-militaristic principles: the non-exercise of collective self-defence, the non-military use of space, the ban on the export of weapons technology, and strict civilian control of the military and uses this assessment to judge how BMD is driving remilitarisation. It concludes that BMD’s impact is highly significant in transgressing these antimilitaristic principles and is thus indicating a more militarised security path for Japan developing now and in the future.
BMD’s strategic logic does not work under “collective self defense”

Christopher W. Hughes [Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry], “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and remilitarisation,” *Space Policy* (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2013.03.004

Hence, despite the claims of policy-makers that the introduction of such a large scale project as BMD is totally in line with and marks no deviation from the fundamental principles of Japan’s security policy, the evidence suggests that it is in fact exerting strong pressure on the crucial anti-militaristic prohibition of the nonexercise of collective self-defence. It is certainly not yet the case that Japan has breached this prohibition and its ingenuity in holding the line through various artifices has already been noted. Nevertheless, the military, technological and strategic logic of BMD’s introduction indicates that Japan may eventually find it unavoidable to breach the prohibition, so marking a major development in a trajectory of a more remilitarised security stance.
BMD deployment involves reinterpreting the Constitution

Christopher W. Hughes [Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry], “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and remilitarisation,” Space Policy (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2013.03.004

However, the above investigation reveals that in all cases BMD has actually driven forward significant challenges to, if not yet total revolutions in, these anti-militaristic principles. Japan’s BMD systems have pushed national defence policy towards various scenarios where it will be progressively harder to hold the line on collective self-defence in support of the US, and is creating a series of new constitutional interpretations in waiting which may only require top level political decisions and the military necessity to choose to finally enact in order to further free up Japanese exercises of military power. BMD has contributed to, in effect, overturning the principle of the useful peace of space by converting this into one of the ‘defensive’ use of space. Japan’s ban on the export of weapons technology has moved from a fairly watertight ban since the 1970s to now a potentially looser export licence system, with BMD leading the initial charges for these changes. Finally, BMD has been a key driver in the redesign of Japan’s civilian control structures.
Japanese remilitarization could reignite a regional arms race

Cesar Chelala [contributor, Japan Times], “Abe is wrong to rush toward militarization,” Japan Times, August 15 2015. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/15/commentary/japan-commentary/abe-wrong-rush-toward-militarization/#.WZkllZN97WU

It is possible that a redefined military force would make Japan more assertive in the international arena while at the same time, through increased military sales, it would receive additional income to help balance its economy. In 2014, the Abe government lifted the ban on arms exports and this year hosted a trade show on military defense systems. Not everybody agrees with Abe’s push to militarization. Last June, Seiichiro Murakami, a veteran lawmaker from the Liberal Democratic Party, wept during a press conference while denouncing Abe’s policies. “As a person who was educated under the postwar education system, I believe that the principle of pacifism, the sovereignty of people and respect of basic human rights should be something that absolutely cannot be changed,” he said. Rearming Japan also carries the risk of igniting a regional arms race of unpredictable but certainly not good consequences. Given the volatility in the region, Japan would do well to follow the precepts established in Article 9.
Japanese militarization causes tension with China


For its part, China has consistently reacted sharply to any changes in Japanese security policies and actions. It sees Japanese declarations about China’s actions as an excuse for its own increased militarization, and worries that with its new arms export deals Japan will be creating alliances that are harmful to China’s interests. Hence Japan’s new security strategy received angry reactions, with China’s defense ministry quickly decrying Japan’s attempts to “create regional tension and roil the regional situation.”
4.3.3 Russia

Uniqueness - Russian nuclear development was declining


Russia got rid of an estimated 1,000 nuclear warheads last year, according to a new report from Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of American Scientists, a Ploughshares Fund grantee. That brings the estimated number of nuclear warheads in the world down below 20,000 for the first time since 1959. Russia had already retired these warheads and slated them for dismantlement, so the strategic calculus has not changed. However, it is a strong data point showing the steep downward trend of global nuclear arsenals. The warheads Russia dismantled were pulled from service – through arms control agreement or because of age. They had likely been degrading in storage depots for years. These were the old horses, if you will. The ones trained in the 20th century to lead the cavalry charge but that became less relevant, much older, and finally put in line for the glue factory. Eliminating the warheads is the responsible thing to do. Russia sheds the burden of safely storing them while helping reduce the risk that a terrorist group might acquire them. If eliminating a thousand warheads now feels routine, it’s because we forget how far Russia and the U.S. have come in cutting excess nuclear weapons. The backlog of retired weapons exists because American and Russian leaders retired warheads by the thousands over the last two decades - so many, and so fast that we are still dismantling the bombs decades later. President George H.W. Bush unilaterally cut thousands of warheads from the US arsenal and Mikhail Gorbachev matched his cuts with thousands of his own. George W. Bush unilaterally cut deployed US strategic warheads by almost two-thirds. Along the way, each presidential administration has pursued arms control agreements that made nuclear cuts verifiable. Today, each country has shed roughly 80% of their operational stockpiles from their Cold War highs. But the work is nowhere near finished. The U.S. and Russian arsenals still vastly exceed security needs. There is plenty of room for cuts. The U.S. and Russia together
still possess 18,500 warheads – approximately 95-percent of the world’s nu-
clear weapons. Each bomb is capable of unleashing unimaginable catastro-
phe. Fortunately, the trendline presses ever downward. Old weapons are
going scrapped, while operational weapons are gradually getting in line
for the scrap heap. So long as leaders have an eye to history and the political
will to follow through, the global stockpile will keep going down – taking
the nuclear threat with it.
Russia has warned that further BMD deployment will lead to an arms race


The Russian Defence Ministry has said the US’s deployment of an anti-missile system will spark a new arms race. The ministry also warned the deployment is a threat to world security designed to contain Russia and China. “The presence of the global ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, because it gives the US the illusion of impunity for using strategic offensive weapons from under the protection of the ABM ‘umbrella,’” Viktor Poznikhir told a disarmament conference in Geneva, according to a translation by the state broadcaster RT. “The ABM shield is a symbol of the build-up of rocket forces in the world and a trigger for a new arms race.”
Putin believes US missile defenses are meant to encircle Russia

Denis Pinchuk and Andrew Osborn [Staff writers, Reuters], “Putin says U.S. missile systems in Alaska, South Korea challenge Russia,” Reuters, June 1 2017.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that elements of a U.S. anti-missile system in Alaska and South Korea were a challenge to Russia and that Moscow had no choice but to build up its own forces in response. Putin, speaking at an economic forum in St Petersburg, said Russia could not stand idly by and watch while others increased their military capabilities along its borders in the Far East in the same way as he said had been done in Europe. He said Moscow was particularly alarmed by the deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system to South Korea to counter a North Korean missile threat and to reported U.S. plans to beef up Fort Greely in Alaska, a launch site for anti-ballistic missiles. “This destroys the strategic balance in the world,” Putin told a meeting with international media, the start of which was broadcast on state TV. “What is happening is a very serious and alarming process. In Alaska, and now in South Korea, elements of the anti-missile defence system are emerging. Should we just stand idly by and watch this? Of course not. We are thinking about how to respond to these challenges. This is a challenge for us.” Washington was using North Korea as a pretext to expand its military infrastructure in Asia in the same way it had used Iran as a pretext to develop a missile shield in Europe, charged Putin.
Russia reacts by supporting North Korea


In 2014, Russia announced that it was canceling $10 billion of North Korea’s $11 billion in Soviet-era debt and that the remaining $1 billion would be invested back into the country. Russian investors also agreed to sink $25 billion into the North’s dilapidated railway system, while more would go into basic infrastructure. The two governments also announced that Russia would rebuild the North’s power grid, while the two countries would develop the ice-free port of Rason for exports of Russian coal. In total, Russia planned to increase bilateral trade almost ten-fold to $1 billion by 2020, and that does not appear to have been hampered by more recent UN sanctions. But Putin is also motivated by security concerns in Russia’s Far East, Brown said. “Moscow has always been worried that the defensive missile systems that the US is deploying in the region - the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea and now Japan is discussing having Aegis Ashore - are more directed at its interests than North Korea,” he said. Daniel Pinkston, a professor of international relations at the Seoul campus of Troy University, believes that Putin - who is at odds with the international community over the Ukraine conflict and has been accused of meddling in a number of elections, including those in the US and France - may be forging closer ties with Pyongyang to sow further disarray among his perceived enemies.
4.3.4 Taiwan

Uniqueness - Taiwan is going nuclear free

Gloria Kuang-Jung Hsu [Professor in the Department of Atmospheric Sciences, National Taiwan University], “Taiwan to become nuclear-free by 2025?,” World Information Service on Energy, March 21 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/840/taiwan-become-nuclear-free-2025

Before the presidential election in early 2016, Ms. Tsai Ing-Wen, now the President of Taiwan, promised that all existing nuclear power plants will be closed by 2025. Implicitly, all reactors would operate for a maximum of 40 years, with no lifetime extension, and the fourth nuclear power plant will not become operational. In January 2017, the Amendment of the Electricity Act passed the Legislative Yuan. Article 95 of the Amendment states “all nuclear power generating facilities shall cease operation by 2025.” President Tsai’s campaign promise became law. However, many uncertainties lie ahead, which will determine whether this part of Electricity Act becomes reality. First, if the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins the next two presidential elections and maintains its majority in the parliament, the chance of having another amendment to Article 95 of the Electricity Act will be small. However, since her inauguration in May 2016, President Tsai’s administration has been criticized heavily not only by the oppositions, but also by many long-time DPP supporters. The latter group felt uneasy about the administration being filled with many ex-KMT old-guards, perhaps out of President Tsai’s conservative nature. The KMT or Kuomintang is the Chinese Nationalist Party, retreated to Taiwan after WWII.
China is deploying S-400s, giving them a strategic advantage over Taiwan


A deal between Russia and China for procurement of the new S-400 air defense system will serve as a force multiplier for Beijing in its quest to dominate the skies along its borders, experts said. The 400-kilometer-range system will, for the first time, allow China to strike any aerial target on the island of Taiwan, in addition to reaching, the missile system will let China reach air targets as far as New Delhi, Calcutta, Hanoi and Seoul. Total coverage of The Yellow Sea and China’s new air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea will also be protected. The system will permit China, if need be, to strike any air target within North Korea. The S-400 will also allow China to extend, but not dominate, the air defense space closer to the disputed Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, said Vasiliy Kashin, a China defense specialist at the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow. China refers to the islands as the Diaoyu, and tensions between Beijing and Japan have been increasing for over the past several years as China continues to claim the islands.
S-400s are a game changer


“Given its extremely long range and effective electronic warfare capabilities, the S-400 is a game-changing system that challenges current military capabilities at the operational level of war,” said Paul Giarra, president, Global Strategies and Transformation. The S-400 will have the “effect of turning a defensive system into an offensive system, and extend China’s A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] umbrella over the territory of American allies and the high seas.” The S-400 will give China more confidence in controlling airspace over Taiwan, and will serve as a critical factor in defeating Taiwan’s air defense capabilities during a war, said York Chen, a former senior adviser of Taiwan’s National Security Council. After China’s surface-to-surface missiles destroy Taiwan’s air bases and runways at the beginning of a conflict, the S-400 could target remaining fighter aircraft that managed to reach the air beforehand, not to mention any US or Japanese fighters coming to Taiwan’s aid during the battle. Chen supports procurement of short take-off, vertical-landing aircraft such as the F-35B fighter and V-22 Osprey, for cargo/troop transport. China has 1,300 short-range missiles aimed at Taiwan. Air bases would be wiped out shortly after a war begins with China.
Topicality - S-400s are missile-defense


In confirming the deployment of its S-300 and state-of-the art S-400 missile-defense systems in Syria, the Kremlin boasted six months ago that it had secured the country’s air bases from American cruise missiles.
China’s new S-400 system will allow China to strike nearly any target in the region, including Taiwan


TAIPEI — A deal between Russia and China for procurement of the new S-400 air defense system will serve as a force multiplier for Beijing in its quest to dominate the skies along its borders, experts said.

The 400-kilometer-range system will, for the first time, allow China to strike any aerial target on the island of Taiwan, in addition to reaching, the missile system will let China reach air targets as far as New Delhi, Calcutta, Hanoi and Seoul. Total coverage of The Yellow Sea and China’s new air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea will also be protected. The system will permit China, if need be, to strike any air target within North Korea.
The S-400 gives China air dominance over the Taiwanese strait


The S-400 itself is likely to significantly enhance Chinese military power in a number of different contingencies. No country will be more affected by China’s S-400 missile systems, which—with a range of 400 kilometers—experts suggest will allow Beijing to achieve air dominance over the Taiwanese strait. York Chen, a former member of Taiwan’s National Security Council, told Defense News last year: “When S-400s work together with Chinese land- and sea-based fighters, the Chinese will have more confidence in sustaining airspace dominance over the Taiwan theater, thus depriving any organized resistance by the Taiwan Air Force and deterring the American intervention.”
Taiwan relies on the America’s security commitment to deter Chinese aggression


First, to cope with its unique security situation and challenge, Taiwan has adopted a broad strategy combining elements of “hard power” and “soft power” (Nye 2004). Since 1949 Taiwan’s security strategy has incorporated four elements: (1) self-defense, (2) alliance (explicit or implicit), (3) economic statecraft, and (4) democracy.1 Second, while Taiwan’s economic power and democratic example increase the international community’s stake in Taiwan, ultimately its survival depends on its own conventional deterrence capability and the U.S. security commitment. Third, since Taiwan has forsworn its own nuclear weapon program and China’s objective concerning Taiwan is mainly political (unification), nuclear weapons play only an indirect role in Taiwan’s defense strategy. The important question is whether the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan (including an implicit nuclear umbrella) remains credible.
US security commitments are key to prevent a nuclear Taiwan


China’s nuclear test in 1964 kindled “fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction.” This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communique, which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, “The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves” including nuclear weapons. Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade. In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option.
Taiwanese nuclearization is unlikely. The criteria for nuclearization are below...some might argue that S-400 deployment significantly increases the probability of eventual Taiwanese nuclear development


The only imaginable scenario in which Taiwan could pursue the nuclear option is if three conditions were present concurrently: (1) there is a serious problem in the credibility of America’s tacit extended deterrence commitment; (2) the United States is perceived as ready to abandon Taiwan in the face of Chinese assertiveness; and (3) the cross-Strait military balance has become so lopsided in favor of China that only nuclear weapons could restore some (semblance of) balance. These are extraordinary conditions under which the unthinkable could happen.
Taiwanese nuclearization would be destabilizing.

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=polisci-faculty-publications

The impact of Taiwan becoming a nuclear weapon state on regional security is expected to be largely negative. China has declared that Taiwan’s development of nuclear weapons would be a casus belli. 30 The dual shock caused by the “demonstration effect” of America’s abandonment of Taiwan and a militarily more belligerent China could cause Japan to renounce its decades-old pacifist policy and reconsider the nuclear option.
4.4 South Korean Public Opinion

4.4.1 People of SK don’t want THAAD

South Koreans Opposed to THAAD


56% of South Koreans support the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system on the Korean Peninsula, survey results show.

The findings published on Aug. 12 from a regular survey by Gallup Korea also showed 31% opposing the deployment. No major changes were found on opinions regarding China’s importance in peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Will of the people is the state’s best interest


Locke of course is a social contract theorist, which in his case means that the state is made a legitimate institution (whenever it is such) by virtue of the fact that its subjects have in one way or another entered into an agreement to that effect: the only thing that can render a state legitimate is a certain sort of agreement among its subjects. After a lengthy discussion of historical examples meant to cast doubt on the idea that the governments that actually exist can have such a foundation, he turns his attention briefly to the idea that such an agreement, even if it exists, could justify the state:
4.4.2 Protests

Generic Protests


On July 14, South Korea announced plans to base the platform in the rural town of Seongju, about 300km south of Seoul, triggering a protest and hunger strikes by several local councillors. Local leaders, in a letter penned in blood, wrote: “We oppose with our lives the Thaad deployment.” The location has also angered non-locals, as the Seoul metropolitan area, which contains about half of South Korea’s 50 million population, would be out of the system’s 200km range — although it would help protect most US military bases and soldiers from a North Korean strike.
Thousands of South Koreans Protesting, Hundreds Shaving Heads in Protest


The decision sparked protests from residents across the country citing fears over their health and safety, the inevitable increase of US military presence, and the THAAD system becoming a wartime target should South Korea’s adversaries choose to strike. More than 5000 farmers gathered in Seongju County staged protests defend their lands against the proposed missile defense system.

Earlier in July, two Korean-American activists were denied entry into South Korea because of their plans to join the protests. Last August 15, more than 900 South Koreans publicly shaved their heads as part of a series of anti-missiles protests in opposition to the deployment of the THAAD on their land. Residents voiced concerns on the probable rise of cancer incidence due to prolonged exposures to high-frequency waves produced by the system’s radar. Aside from the health concerns and possible land grabbing, protesters also lamented the democratic deficit in the decision-making on the installation of the THAAD. According to them, no prior consultations were made with the residents and local government.
Protests Turn Violent


There’s also frustration about an increasingly heavy police and military presence in an area where outsiders had been mostly limited to small groups of weekend golfers. Residents are also concerned about the rumored harmful effects the electromagnetic waves from THAAD’s radar might have on them and their crops. Seoul’s Defense Ministry calls such worries groundless.

“We have been living very peacefully as farmers, but our daily lives have been shattered after the arrival of this weapon; we can’t rest comfortably for a day and can’t work without worrying,” said Kim Yoon-seong, a 60-year-old melon farmer. He says many younger residents with children are considering leaving Seongju.

Residents say at least 13 people were treated at hospitals for injuries including broken bones and teeth after a violent clash last week between dozens of villagers and supporters and some 8,000 police officers who were mobilized to remove them from the road.

Three days later, more than a hundred police officers ended an hourslong standoff by swarming a handful of people who had been blocking a mountain path with a tractor to prevent construction equipment from entering the THAAD site. Police detained a man and drove away the tractor as villagers showered them with insults, including “dogs” and “Americans’ slaves.”

“We won’t allow any U.S. military and construction vehicles to pass through the two roads,” said Rev. Kang Hyun-wook, a minister of Won Buddhism, an indigenous form of the religion. The grounds include a site Won Buddhists consider as sacred and are no longer allowed to visit. “If they fly in (the THAAD parts) with helicopters, then fine, it’s their money to spend and we can’t do anything about that.”

Several people were hurt in another clash on Sunday as police tried to remove protesters blocking two U.S. military oil trucks from entering the THAAD site.
Protests lead to clashes with police


Following the national peace march in Soseong-ri, Won Buddhist priests set up for a sit-in protest on Jinbat Bridge, which leads to the deployment site. Every night since early March, Won Buddhist priests have been holding overnight prayer sit-in’s on Jinbat Bridge. Due to inclement weather conditions, the priests began to set up a “peace tent” to avoid the rain but were met with violence from the police.

Without any verbal warning, the police used force to take down and remove the tent. The residents of Seongju and other protesters attempted to help the priests and block the police from destroying the tent. Several were injured in the process. A few of the protesters sustained serious enough injuries to require ambulances to transport them to the hospital.
4.5 Other Impacts

4.5.1 Russia China Alliance

THAAD loosens pressure on North Korea


China and Russia may re-consider implementing U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea in response to a decision to set up a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea, analysts said Tuesday. They refuted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claim that issues on UNSC sanctions and THAAD would be be dealt with separately, and that China and Russia have already pledged to implement the punitive measures against Pyongyang faithfully. The analysts said Beijing and Moscow — veto-wielding UNSC members — can loosen their inspections on Pyongyang and allow the Kim Jong-un regime to exploit loopholes in the sanctions. “The UNSC sanctions may not gain momentum although I would not say China and Russia will refuse to carry them out,” said Park Won-gon, an international relations professor at Handong University. “In particular, China may interpret clauses outlined by the UNSC in favor of North Korea and give the internationally-isolated state room to breathe.” Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, agreed. “The dispute concerning THAAD will continue to draw attention from China and Russia over the UNSC sanctions for the time being,” he said. “Against this backdrop, the UNSC sanctions will inevitably become looser.”
Pressure Key to resolving North Korea crisis


As North Korea rapidly develops the ability to strike the mainland United States with a nuclear missile, the Trump administration has adopted a well-known strategy: demand China do more to pressure Pyongyang. But American presidents have pressed Beijing to rein in North Korea for the past 25 years with little success. There’s no reason to believe Trump’s efforts will end any differently. Without China pulling the plug on North Korea, the crisis will not abate. The U.S., then, could soon face two horrible options: start a catastrophic war that would kill hundreds of thousands of South Koreans or live with a nuclear-armed North Korea capable of striking Washington.
THAAD Brings Russia and China together


In 2011, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, a former administrator of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, proposed that government technical experts from China and the United States conduct a joint analysis of the U.S. national BMD system and its capabilities against Chinese missiles and a joint analysis of the North Korean missile threat.

At the geopolitical level, the U.S.-China disconnect over BMD may have had the consequence of helping bolster China’s relations with Russia. China’s and Russia’s shared antipathy toward U.S. BMD is an important point of commonality in their bilateral relationship, although Russia is also wary of the program of nuclear modernization that China says it is carrying out partly in response to U.S. BMD.
Con Evidence

THAAD is creating a new “authoritarian alliance” between China, Russia, and North Korea


Official news sources in China have claimed that plans to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea are pushing China, Russia, and North Korea into closer relations, what I would call a de facto authoritarian alliance. “Now facing common threat to their national security imposed by Washington and Seoul,” according to a Xinhua editorial, “China and Russia, along with other regional countries, will have little choice but come closely together to address the issue.”

Sino-Russian alliance is mutually beneficial


The US’ ABM deployments in the border regions of Russia and China become a litmus test of the Sino-Russian strategic coordination and partnership. Their shared concerns over the US unilateralism should bring the two countries to closer cooperation in military technology.

Technical assistance from Russia could be a game changer for China’s nuclear modernization. On the other hand, economic factors are important for Russia’s own R&D on future weapons development and here China can play a big role in the funding of such programs.
Russia and China running drills in response to THAAD


At any rate, Russian Defence Ministry announced in May that the two countries would hold their first-ever computer-assisted missile defence drill:

The Russian and Chinese defense ministers decided to hold the first Air and Space Security 2016 joint computer-assisted command and staff exercise in May 2016 on the premises of the Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Aerospace Defense Force to practice missile defense. The exercise will aim to practice combined operations of Russian and Chinese air and missile defense task forces to provide protection from accidental and provocative attacks of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Although the statement clarified that the drill was not directed against any third country, a noted Chinese military commentator and retired PLA colonel Yue Gang frankly admitted,

THAAD is a common threat to both China and Russia. This joint exercise will serve as a warning to the US and also mark the beginning of the two countries’ military cooperation following their diplomatic consensus (over the missile system).
Sino-Russian alliance precludes denuclearization of North Korea


But some regional policy experts fear that a united Sino-Russian front on North Korea could make it more difficult for the U.S. to rein in Pyongyang’s burgeoning nuclear program.

“The fact that Moscow and Beijing are using virtually identical language and are very united at this time I think will provide great comfort to Kim Jong Un,” said David Pressman, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for political affairs who now works at the Boies Schiller Flexner law firm.
4.5.2 Space Militarization

Missile defense systems can be repurposed to destroy assets in space


Today’s space-faring nations use their Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Systems, which include long-range ICBMs, as an auxiliary system capable of destroying space-based assets. The difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a warhead. China has been making impressive headway in its ICBM program and in theory, these ICBMs can target U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. There have been debates among scholars on the utility of BMD system as ASAT (Anti-Satellite) weapons. However, Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation asserts that there is no meaningful difference between a midcourse ballistic missile defense system and a hit-to-kill ASAT weapon.

Weeden argues that “because midcourse ballistic missile systems are intended to destroy warheads traveling at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, all midcourse ballistic missile defense systems have inherent ASAT capabilities.” He asserts that these BMD systems are more effective as anti-satellite weapons than as missile defense systems, since most satellites are easier to detect, track, and target than warheads, which are likely to be accompanied with penetration aids designed to confuse a potential defense. The difference between BMD and ASATs lies mainly in the software and control algorithms used to detect, track, and home in on a satellite as compared to a warhead.
Asian powers view space policy as an extension of regional security policy—the potential for an arms race is high


By contrast, Asia’s space powers are largely isolated from one another, do not share information, and display a tremendous divergence of perspectives regarding their space goes and a tendency to focus on national solutions to space challenges and policies of self-reliance rather than on region wide policies or multilateral approaches. As the Japanese analyst Setsuko Aoki observes, “the foundation for Asian collective security in space is fragile, if not non-existent.” Such hostile dyads as India-China, China-Japan, India-Pakistan, Japan-South Korea, and North Korea-South Korea indicate that Asian countries see space largely as an extension of other competitive realms and are carefully watching regional rivals, attempting to match or at least to check their capabilities, influence, and power.
An arms race in space leads to war


The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.

The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreath the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.
Space war collapses global economy


And space warfare, or even “live” tests of the weapons, could create so much space debris that Earth orbit would become un navigable to civilian satellites and crewed spacecraft.
4 Con Evidence

Space systems are key to the global economy

Pace, Scott. [Director of the Space Policy Institute]. “House Committee on Science and Technology Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Hearing,” NASA. April 2009.

Most importantly, space systems such as satellite communications, environmental monitoring, and global navigation satellite systems are crucial to the productivity of many types of national and international infrastructures such as air, sea, and highway transportation, oil and gas pipelines, financial networks, and global communications. Information services enabled by the unique capabilities and global reach of space systems are crucial to the functioning of the global economy.”
4.5.3 Environmental Impacts

Residents worry that THAAD will harm crops and make their neighborhoods a target.


Activists said they were concerned that the system’s sophisticated radar could harm their crops and that having a missile system nearby would potentially make the area a target in wartime. “We won’t do anything to (the two launchers) already deployed, but when it comes to the additional deployment (of four launchers), we have to wait for the environmental impact assessment,” a spokesperson for the South Korean president’s office told reporters.
Residents worry about the potential health hazards of THAAD


SEOUl, South Korea (AP) — An advanced U.S. missile defense system will be deployed in a rural farming town in southeastern South Korea, Seoul officials announced Wednesday, angering not only North Korea and China but also local residents who fear potential health hazards that they believe the U.S. system might cause.
South Korea requires year-long environmental assessment


An official told CNN on Wednesday that while Seoul will not withdraw two launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system that are already in action, four additional launchers will not be deployed until “a full-blown environmental impact assessment is completed.”

During the recent election campaign, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called for the THAAD rollout to be halted and any decision about its future to be put before the country’s parliament.